Purpose – The study aims to identify the governance configurations adopted by buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs) to generate high levels of relational financial and knowledge rents.
Theoretical framework – The research follows the classification of formal and informal governance mechanisms proposed by Cislaghi et al. (2022).
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) to examine data collected from 181 food and beverage suppliers in Brazil. The analysis considered 10 formal and 14 informal governance mechanisms.
Findings – The study identifies three governance configurations that generate high knowledge rents and two configurations that produce high financial rents for suppliers. The results emphasize the importance of contractual coordination and a good reputation as critical governance mechanisms across all configurations. Additionally, the study highlights the role of trust, information sharing, and other informal governance mechanisms in fostering relational rents.
Practical & social implications of the research – We contribute to the literature by showing that multiple configurations of governance mechanisms produce higher levels of relational rents for suppliers. Future research should consider both sides of the relationship to gain a comprehensive understanding of governance configurations and their impacts on relational rents.
Originality/value – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to adopt a configurational approach to identifying which governance mechanisms foster relational rents in BSRs. This paper fulfills the need to consider specific formal and informal governance mechanisms since they can be combined to produce knowledge and financial rents. Furthermore, it demonstrates that BSRs rely heavily on a vast repertoire of informal governance mechanisms to foster relational rents.