Acceso usuarios
Domingo A. Lovera Parmo, Guido Morrone Castruccio
La justiciabilidad de los derechos sociales, es decir, su reclamo ante los Tribunales se ha considerado problemática por posibles efectos negativos en la política. Entre las objeciones destacan la falta de capacidad técnica judicial, la indefinición del contenido de estos derechos, la objeción democrática y, especialmente, el argumento fiscal: los recursos públicos son limitados y su asignación corresponde a autoridades legitimadas. La intervención judicial puede generar desorden fiscal al individualizar políticas diseñadas para el bienestar colectivo. Sin embargo, el análisis de los diálogos entre Tribunales y poderes políticos muestra que esta objeción fiscal puede matizarse, como ocurre en litigios por medicamentos de alto costo.
A common theme in the discussion about the justiciability of social rights—meaning the ability to claim these rights in court—is the concern that judicial intervention could harm political development. Several reasons support this idea, including judges’ lack of technical expertise, the ambiguous definition of these rights, and a stronger form of the democratic objection. One signi ficant concern can be termed the fiscal argument. National budgets are limited, and those best equipped, through democratic legitimacy, to decide how these budgets are spent are the political authorities. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of social rights due to the substantial resources involved and the inherently complex na ture of social policies. When courts become involved in adjudicating social rights, they intensify the democratic objection and pose a risk of fiscal disorder. Social policies are typically designed to apply broadly, if not universally. However, when courts intervene, they often address social policies from an individualized perspec tive. This approach contradicts the purpose of social policy, which aims to allocate limited resources fairly among the entire population. If individuals or groups can bypass the established order for resource distribution, it undermines the collective good by prioritizing personal circumstances over the welfare of the community. This phenomenon reflects an unexpected consequence of viewing rights as trump cards. This article argues that if we look beyond judicial decisions and examine the dynamics of institu tional dialogue between courts and political powers (both administrative and legislative), we can qualify the fiscal objection. This seems to be the case in judicial litigation concerning what is known as access to ‘expensive drugs’.
