Acceso usuarios
Francisco Javier Paniagua Rojano 
, Lorena Vegas García, Trinidad Fortes Martínez
Este estudio analiza la desinformación en el sector agroalimentario y su impacto en la confianza social. A partir de la tipología de Wardle (2016), se examinaron 676 informes de verificación publicados por Maldita.es, Newtral y EFE Verifica entre 2018 y 2025. Los resultados revelan que la desinformación no se basa principalmente en falsedades absolutas, sino en estrategias como contenido engañoso y contexto falso, que combinan datos reales con interpretaciones sesgadas. Las temáticas más frecuentes son nutrición, salud y aditivos, con intenciones sensacionalistas, económicas y políticas. Redes sociales y servicios de mensajería (WhatsApp, Telegram) son canales clave para la difusión, lo que refuerza la dimensión interpersonal del fenómeno. La elevada proporción de contenidos sin autoría y la opacidad sobre las motivaciones dificultan la atribución de responsabilidades. El estudio concluye que combatir la desinformación requiere estrategias integrales que incluyan verificación, comunicación institucional transparente y alfabetización mediática crítica, además de cooperación entre instituciones, verificadores y ciudadanía, para construir entornos informativos más fiables y resilientes.
This study investigates the dynamics, forms, and implications of disinformation within the agri‑food sector and its impact on public trust, drawing on Wardle’s (2016) typology of false content and the distinction between disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation. While agri‑food systems constitute a strategic pillar of Spain’s economy—both in gross value added and employment—the sector faces growing reputational risks exacerbated by the digital circulation of misleading claims concerning nutrition, safety, labeling, additives, and sustainability. Against this backdrop, we conduct a mixed‑methods content analysis of 676 fact‑checking reports published by Maldita.es, Newtral, and EFE Verifica between June 29, 2018 and June 4, 2025. Our sampling process starts from an initial universe of 1,618 entries (Maldita.es, n=920; Newtral, n=661; EFE Verifica, n=37), subsequently refined to items pertinent to the agri‑food domain and specifically addressing false, misleading, or manipulated content.
Methodologically, we operationalize Wardle’s narrative construction categories—fabricated content, manipulated content, impostor content, false context, false connections, misleading content, and parody/satire—and complement them with variables capturing topic (e.g., nutrition/health, additives, labeling/legislation, sustainability, crises), channel of diffusion (social media, mass media, organizations, magazines, Telegram, WhatsApp, mixed channels), verification outcomes (false, corrected by official sources, half‑truth, other, unknown), intention (economic/commercial, political/ideological, activist/militant, sensasionalist/viral, parodic, unknown), actors involved and harmed (public, media, institutions, companies, influencers, NGOs, parties), resources used, relevance, continuity, and authorship. This design enables a granular mapping of both form and function of problematic information in food‑related communication, and situates verification outputs within broader socio‑relational dynamics.
Results indicate that disinformation in the agri‑food domain seldom manifests as wholly fabricated claims. Instead, it predominantly reconfigures truths through misleading content (n=153) and false context (n=145), which fuse factual elements with biased selection, omission, or reframing. Fabricated (n=17), manipulated (n=15), impostor (n=12), and false connections (n=10) are less frequent, while parody/satire appears rarely (n=5). A sizable portion (n=320) remains non‑classifiable within Wardle’s taxonomy, largely due to preventive pieces that anticipate rumors rather than debunk specific falsehoods. Topic‑wise, nutrition and health (n=165) and additives/controversial ingredients (n=69) dominate, alongside labeling/legislation (n=35) and prevention (n=297)—the latter underscoring the proactive orientation of Spanish fact‑checkers in food communication. Channel analysis highlights social media (n=170) and mixed environments (n=138) as key vectors; WhatsApp functions as a noteworthy interpersonal conduit (n=17), and Telegram appears occasionally (n=1), while a large subset exhibits unknown origin (n=294), again reflecting the prevalence of preventive advisories.
Verification outcomes show 187 items verified as false, 93 corrected by official sources, 56 half‑truths, 7 with no recorded response, and 334 other classifications (primarily accurate or preventive information). When mapped to information disorder, we identify 271 cases of disinformation, 57 of malinformation, 39 of misinformation, and 310 unclassified. Intention is frequently sensationalist/viral (n=97) or economic/commercial (n=76), with political/ideological (n=37) also present; unknown intention (n=141) remains common, consistent with the opacity of online rumor propagation and the tactical ambiguity of actors. The public at large emerges both as principal disseminator (n=166) and chief victim (n=218), while institutions (n=62) and companies (n=28) are recurrently harmed—signaling potential downstream effects on public health choices, market behavior, and regulatory trust.
The keyword landscape—dominated by “olive oil,” “meat,” “insects,” “pesticides,” “ultra‑processed,” “proteins,”“legumes,” “EU,” “Marruecos,” “labeling,” and “health”—reveals persistent anxieties around product integrity, diet‑related risks, and governance. Notably, nutrition/health claims frequently combine selective scientific references with overstated risk frames, while additives and labeling controversies exploit technical complexity and regulatory nuance to seed uncertainty. These patterns align with the sector’s high emotional salience, making food communication particularly vulnerable to credibility shocks and virality.
Discussion underscores that effective responses cannot rely solely on factual correction. Because agri‑food disinformation operates through discursive reframing and emotional activation—often within trusted interpersonal networks like messaging apps—countermeasures must integrate transparent institutional communication, proactive, audience‑centered narratives, and critical media literacy initiatives that help publics evaluate claims beyond headline appeal. Strengthening traceability and accountability, especially where authorship is absent (401 items without identified authorship), remains crucial. The study’s descriptive scope, coupled with reliance on three Spanish verification platforms, constitutes a limitation; nevertheless, the breadth and systematic classification provide a robust evidence base to guide organizational listening, crisis preparedness, and ethical communication in the agri‑food sector.
Overall, the findings portray a resilient, system‑level challenge: disinformation thrives less on pure falsehood than on strategic distortion of context and meaning. Addressing it requires coordinated action among institutions, fact‑checkers, professionals, and citizens to build reliable and resilient information ecosystems in which food‑related claims are interpreted through evidence‑based, empathetic, and culturally literate communication.
