A Methodized Discretion. L’analisi del ragionamento giudiziale negli scritti teorici di Benjamin Nathan Cardozo

• Luca Malagoli ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Genoa

     University of Genoa

     Genoa, Italia

     
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Vol. 18, Nº. 1 (Publicado: 05-11-2018), 2018, págs. 61-82
• Idioma: italiano
• Títulos paralelos:
  • A Methodized Discretion. Analysis of judicial reasoning in Benjamin Nathan Cardozo’ writings
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • English

    The article’s aim is the analysis of some of the main themes examined in the most notable writings in legal theory by Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, such as The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), The Growth of the Law (1924), The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) e Jurisprudence (1932). Particularly, the first paragraph examines the latter work, as prominent as curiously neglected by the literature (the only and considerable exception being Karl Llewellyn), with the purpose of pointing out how the broad notion of legal realism there presented can still be an useful analytical tool in order to investigate the complexity of that theoretical scenario. The second paragraph, instead, is dedicated to the scrutiny of the four method of judicial reasoning proposed by Cardozo, examining their relation to the crucial topic of judicial creation of law. Finally, the last paragraph focuses on some interesting observation of Cardozo about the relationship among the legislator and the constitutional justice, pointing out as the consideration developed on the matter by the author of The Nature of the Judicial process is far less naïf than the critical observations of Richard A. Posner are willing to recognize.

  • italiano

    L’articolo si concentra sull’analisi di alcuni dei temi fondamentali oggetto dei maggiori scritti teorici di Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, quali The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), The Growth of the Law (1924), The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) e Jurisprudence (1932). In particolare, il primo paragrafo prende in same proprio quest’ultimo lavoro, tanto rilevante quanto curiosamente trascurato dalla letteratura successiva (con la sola seppur considerevole eccezione di Llewellyn), nel tentativo di mostrare come la concezione ampia di realismo giuridico lì tratteggiata possa tuttora rivelarsi una proficua prospettiva analitica attraverso cui indagare quella composita stagione teorica. Il secondo paragrafo si concentra invece sui quattro metodi di ragionamento giudiziale delineati da Cardozo, nonché sulla loro complessa (e sovente problematica) interazione, in relazione alla cruciale questione della creazione giudiziale di diritto. L’ultimo paragrafo, infine, è dedicato ad alcune interessanti osservazioni di Cardozo circa il rapporto fra legislatore e giudice costituzionale, con lo scopo di mettere in luce come la riflessione sviluppata al riguardo dall’autore di The Nature of the Judicial Process sia assai meno naif di quanto talune critiche formulate da Richard A. Posner non paiano disposte a riconoscere.

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