Three Kinds of Logical Indeterminacy in the Law. Alf Ross’s Insights

• Giovanni Battista Ratti ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Genoa

     University of Genoa

     Genoa, Italia

     
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Vol. 19, Nº. 2 (Publicado: 02-03-2020), 2019, págs. 173-184
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • The paper analyzes Ross’s theses about three kinds of logical indeterminacy which affect the law understood as a set of norms. First, the logical status of logically derived norms in the light of some undesirable consequences which follow from the application of deductive rules of inference to the normative domain (so-called Ross’s paradox). Second, the indeterminacy of negation when applied to normative conditionals. Finally, the paper deals with the puzzle stemming from the application, to the rule on constitutional amendment, of the procedure that the same rule provides.

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