A Path that Forks. Legal Science between Is and Ought

• Riccardo Guastini ^[1]
  1. [1] Tarello Institute for the Philosophy of Law, University of Genoa
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Vol. 21, Nº. 1 (Publicado: 17-11-2021), 2021, págs. 106-113
• Idioma: varios idiomas
• DOI: 10.4454/analisiediritto.v21i1.360
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Distinguishing between law and legal science –between legal norms and the juristic description of norm- sis a crucial point for the pure theory. Nonetheless, Kelsen seems unable to give a consistent and satisfactory account of both the wording and the logical form of legal statements (or propositions of law), that is, the sentences by which legal scholars are supposed to describe the law. In particular, he cannot decide whether legal statements are empirical (is-) or normative (ought-) sentences. This is especially clear in his posthumous General Theory of Norms.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Kelsen, H. (1928). “Préface”, in Ch. Eisenmann, La justice constitutionnelle et la Haute Cour constitutionnelle d’Autriche, Paris,...
  • Kelsen, H. (1945). General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard U.P.
  • Kelsen, H. (1979). General Theory of Norms (1991), tr. ingl. Hartney M., Oxford, Clarendon Press.