Le connessioni contingenti fra positivismo e originalismo

• Alessio Sardo ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Genoa

     University of Genoa

     Genoa, Italia

     
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Vol. 22, Nº. 2 (Publicado: 29-12-2022), 2022, págs. 83-92
• Idioma: italiano
• DOI: 10.4454/analisiediritto.v22i2.505
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The Contingent Connections between Positivism and Originalism
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • English

    The main aim of this paper is to show that originalism and legal positivism have several elements in common: a radical skepticism towards ethical objectivism, the idea that law can be identified neutrally, and the belief that the semantic content of law derives primarily from the text of normative documents and the intentions of their authors. In this way, the proposed analysis fills a small gap in Jorge Rodriguez's masterpiece and, more generally, reconsiders the relationship between legal positivism and the prevailing interpretive paradigms. The expected impact is to redefine the boundaries between normative models of interpretation and conceptual models of jurisprudence. The methodological approach chosen is the synchronic comparison between widely paradigms and stratified construction proposed by legal scholars.

  • italiano

    L’obiettivo principale di questo lavoro è mostrare che l’originalismo e il giuspo-sitivismo hanno diversi elementi che li accomunano: un profondo scetticismo verso l’oggettivismo etico,l’idea che il diritto possa essere identificato in maniera neutrale, la credenza che il contenuto semantico del diritto derivi primariamente dal testo dei documenti normativi e dalle intenzioni dei loro autori. In questo modo, l’ana-lisi proposta va a colmare una piccola lacuna nel lavoro magistrale di Jorge Rodri-guez e, più in generale, ripensa le relazioni fra il positivismo giuridico e i paradigmi dell’interpretazione dominanti. L’impatto atteso è la ridefinizione dei confini tra i modelli normativi per l’interpretazione e i modelli concettuali della scienza giudica. L’approccio metodologico prescelto è la comparazione sincronica tra paradigmi e modelli concettuali stratificati proposti dalla dottrina.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Amar, A. (2012). America’s Unwritten Constitution, New York, Basic Books.
  • Austin, J. (1885). Lectures on Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law (5th ed.), London, Murray.
  • Austin, J. (1954). The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), New York, The Noonday Press.
  • Baude, W. (2015). Is Originalism Our Law?, «Columbia Law Review», 115, 2349–2408.
  • Bentham, J. (1843). Scotch Reform, in J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Vol. 5, 1-54.
  • Bentham, J. (1970). Of Laws in General (1782), London, The Athlone Press.
  • Bentham, J. (1977). A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government (1776), London, The Athlone Press.
  • Bentham, J. (1982). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), London, Meuthen.
  • Bentham, J. (1988). A Fragment on Government (1776), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  • Berger, R. (1977). Government by Judiciary,Indianapolis,Liberty Fund Books.
  • Berger, R. (1988). Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation,«Cornell Law Review», 73, 350-358.
  • Bork, R. (1990). The Tempting of America, New York,
  • MacMillan.Hall, K. (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Kay, R. (1988). Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, «Northwestern University...
  • Lawson, G. (1997). On Reading Recipes...and Constitutions,«Georgetown Law Journal», 85, 1823-1836.
  • Marmor, A. (2005). Interpretation and Legal Theory, Oxford, Hart Publishing.
  • McConnell, M. (1998). Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, «George Washington Law Review», 66, 1127-1140.
  • Olivecrona, K. (1971). Law as Fact, 2nd Ed, London, Stevens & Sons.
  • Raz, J. (2009). Between Authority and Interpretation. Oxford,Oxford University Press.
  • Rehnquist, W. (1976). The Notion of a Living Constitution, «Texas Law Review», 54, 693–706.
  • Rodríguez, J. (2021). Teoría Analítica del Derecho, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
  • Sachs, S. (2015). Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, «Harv Journal of Law & Public Policy», 38, 817–888.
  • Scalia, A. (1989). Originalism: The Lesser Evil, «University of Cincinnati Law Review», 57, 849-865.
  • Shapiro, S. (2011). Legality, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
  • Scalia, A., Garner, B. (2012), Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Eegan, West.
  • Schauer, F. (2015). The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, «Virginia Law Review»,101, 957-981.
  • Soames, S. (2013). Deferentialism: A Postoriginalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, «Fordham Law Review», 82, 597-617.