5½ Myths of Legal Non-Positivism

• Matthias Klatt ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Graz

     University of Graz

     Graz, Austria

     
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Vol. 24, Nº. 1 (Publicado: 18-09-2024), 2024, págs. 53-78
• Idioma: varios idiomas
• DOI: 10.4454/sdph4y11
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Many legal philosophers assume that legal non-positivism misconstructs its counterpart, legal positivism; that it destroys law’s positivity by allowing the judges to grab directly into the blue sky of justice; that it disempowers the legislator; that it accepts a bizarre notion of an ideal dimension of the law which is either empty or ideological particularism; that it could not settle the eternal conflict between real and ideal elements; that it transformed a descriptive-analytical debate about what the law is into a normative-political debate about what the law ought to be. The present article unmasks these assumptions as myths.

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