Contingent A Priori Truths as Original Declarations: Some Comments on Marco Ruffino

• Eleonora Orlando ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Universidad de Buenos Aires

     Argentina

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 57, Nº. 170, 2025, págs. 163-176
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1705
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En su libro Contingent A Priori Truths,Marco Ruffino nos proponeentender los ejemplos kripkeanos de lo contingentea priorien términos de emisionescon fuerza ilocucionaria declarativa. Considero que el enfoque propuesto es muyoriginal y revelador, y el libro contienemuchos argumentos en su favor. Si bienestoy de acuerdo con la visión general, en este comentario me ocupo de analizar dosaspectos que me plantean algunas dudas:la naturaleza de los hacedores de verdadde las declaraciones originales yla transmisión del conocimientoaprioridesdelosparticipantes en el bautismo inicial a los usuarios posteriores.

  • English

    In his book Contingent A Priori Truths, Marco Ruffino proposes to understand Kripke’s examples of the contingent a priori in terms of utterances with a declarative illocutionary force. I think that Marco’s approach is very original and insightful, and he provides us with many detailed and thoughtful considerations in its support. Although I agree with the general picture, there are some aspects that remain a bit obscure to me, which will be the focus of this commentary, namely, the nature of the truth-makers of the allegedly (contingently) a priori true original declarations, and the transmission of a priori knowledge from baptizers to later uses.

• Referencias bibliográficas
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