Contingent a Priori Truths, Illocutionary Acts, and De Re Knowledge

• Thainá Coltro Demartini ^[1]
  1. [1] UC Santa Barbara, USA
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 57, Nº. 170, 2025, págs. 145-156
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1703
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo, analizo la propuesta de Ruffino de que las verdadescontingentesa prioriresultantes de los bautismos iniciales (es decir, las proposi-ciones que se emiten para introducir unanueva palabra en el vocabulario de unacomunidad) deberían evaluarse como actos ilocucionarios. Argumento que, incluso siadmitimos que esta interpretación es la forma correcta de comprender el fenómeno,no es suficiente para sustentar la tesis de que existen casos de verdades contingentesa priorique proporcionan al hablante conocimientode reacerca de objetos que noson convencionales de alguna manera

  • English

    In this paper, I analyze Ruffino’s proposal that we should evaluate contingent a priori truths resulting from initial baptisms (i.e., propositions that are uttered to introduce of a new word to a community’s vocabulary) as illocutionary acts. I argue that, even if we concede such an interpretation as the correct way to understand the phenomenon, it is not sufficient to support the claim that there are cases of contingent a priori truths that provide the speaker with de re knowledge about objects that are not themselves conventional in some way.

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