Measures without measurement: a critique of Ruffino’s institutional approach to the Contingent a Priori

• Emiliano Boccardi ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto

     Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto

     Brasil

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 57, Nº. 170, 2025, págs. 131-143
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2025.1702
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Este artículo presenta tres objeciones a la teoría de las verdades con-tingentesa prioride Marco Ruffino. En primer lugar, argumento que la “objeciónde Filonús” que plantea Ruffino ignora lo que se considera ampliamente el rasgodistintivo de la percepción: las constancias perceptivas, las cuales permiten formarrepresentaciones estables pese a las variaciones en la información sensorial. En se-gundo lugar, muestro que la concepción institucional de Ruffino de lo contingentea priorise enfrenta a desafíos según las interpretaciones relacionales (basadas enproporciones) como las monádicas (que atribuyen propiedades) de los enunciados demedición: la primera pone en tela de juicio la necesidad de estipulación, mientrasque la segunda corre el riesgo de confundir los actos estipulativos con los resultadosde la medición empírica. En tercer lugar, sostengo que la explicación de Ruffinocorre el riesgo de comprometerse, sin justificación alguna, con unconstructivismosocial de los hechos físicos brutos

  • English

    This paper presents three objections to Marco Ruffino’s account of contingent a priori truths. First, I argue that Ruffino’s “Philonous’ Objection” neglects what is widely considered the mark of perception—namely, perceptual constancies, which allow stable representations despite variable sensory input. Second, I show that Ruffino’s institutional approach to the contingent a priori faces challenges under both relational (ratio-based) and monadic (property-ascribing) interpretations of measurement statements: the former diminishes the need for stipulation, while the latter risks conflating stipulative acts with empirical measurement outcomes. Third, I contend that Ruffino’s account risks an unwarranted commitment to social constructivism about brute physical facts.

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