Weder Idealismus noch Naturalismus: zum Anliegen einer Idealitätstheorie des Rechts

• Kähler, Lorenz ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Bremen

     University of Bremen

     Kreisfreie Stadt Bremen, Alemania

     
• Localización: Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, ARSP, ISSN 0001-2343, Vol. 107, Nº 3, 2021, págs. 392-416
• Idioma: alemán
• DOI: 10.25162/arsp-2021-0020
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Neither idealism nor naturalism: about the objective of an ideality theory of law
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Law is an ontologically ideal entity. This feature shall be explored in order to explain why law cannot be perceived by the senses, why its contents can remain constant over time, why it can in principle be translated and why it does not have a dual nature. Due to law’s ontologically ideal nature it is independent from time and space, normative in kind and open for rational arguments. Although law can in many regards be abstract, its ontologically ideal nature has to be distinguished from abstractness.