Like Kant at his time, Jürgen Habermas wants to encourage the reader to use his „reasonable liberty“. There is no doubt, that the philosophical positions of Kant on the one hand and of Hegel on the other hand hold, until today, a key role in the development of the „discourse of modern age“. In order to oppose a short-circuited synthesis of both systems, which are obliged to the idea of liberty quite differently, this essay demonstrates the substantial differences regarding to elementary concepts like peculiarity of the individual will, law and legislation, people and sovereignty of the people. That both philosophers differ in their interest of questioning becomes quite clear regarding to the citizen/state relation. While Hegel tries to describe the reality of the state as a „moral universe“ and therefore as „reality of reason“, Kant is interested in knowing about the potential state togetherness of individuals which have experienced in them the „radical evil“. The differences concerning the estimation of the „subjective“ individual will in its relationship to the „objective“ will of „generality“, concerning also the (Rousseauian) concept of contract and the citizens as „co-legislators“ are culminating in the relationship between „law“ and „morality“. Whereas Kant (wrongly) ignores ethos and history, Hegel is lacking the concept of „intersubjective communication“ (so Habermas states). From both insufficiencies conclusions are resulting which are important for coping with the actual difficulties with „inclusion“ and „integration“.