Acceso usuarios
Simon Faets
This article argues that the distinction between law and non-law implies a colonial structure. According to Christoph Menke, the difference between law and non-law is the fundamental, yet paradoxical distinction, by which law founds itself as a normative order. It is paradoxical because the very foundation of law necessarily implies an act of violence. First, I reconstruct Menke’s critique of the violence within the law. Second, I connect Menke’s critique to the postcolonial discourse with the claim that the state of exception in the overseas colonies can be understood as a paradigmatic historical concretion of the violent logic of law. Third, I critique Menke’s approach with regard to its own colonial implications. Therefore, reflecting on Menke’s understanding that the distinction between law and non-law is the difference between norm and nature, I claim that the modern concept of nature implies a colonial dimension because it is intrinsically linked to the modern discourse about barbarism that evolved during the colonial era. Menke’s critique of law fails to acknowledge this implication. Thus, his approach needs to be decolonized with respect to the law’s fundamental concepts on a terminological level. The article develops the basic outline for such decolonization with particular regard to the notion of non-law understood as nature.
