Resumen de Why would a majority agree to adopting supermajority rules when they empower a minority? The institutional choice of the National Assembly of Korea

Gyung-Ho Jeong

• Despite the importance of supermajority rules in protecting minorities, ourunderstanding of supermajority rules has been limited to the experience ofthe U.S. Senate. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding ofinstitutional choice by introducing another case of supermajority-ruleadoption. Once known for legislative brawls, the National Assembly of Koreareformed its procedures in 2012 to require a supermajority to passcontroversial legislation. The evidence presented in this study suggests thatsupermajority rules were adopted in an attempt to reduce chaos anduncertainty in the lawmaking process by shifting the legislature from a norm-based one to a rule-based one. This article demonstrates this by drawing onofficial documents, interviews, and an automated text analysis of newspapers.