Acceso usuarios
Joanna Georgios Alexopoulos, Marcelo da Silva Bego
Objective: This paper proposes and empirically tests a novel hypothesis: that the U.S. government responds to volatility in wheat prices.
Theoretical Framework: The hypothesis that the government controls price volatility, as presented in Crain and Lee (1996) and Yang, Haigh, and Leatham (2001), holds only for countries with closed economies or significant market power. In this paper, we propose a new hypothesis: that the government reacts to price volatility. We examine how government farm programs respond to price fluctuations in the wheat market.
Method: Our dataset includes U.S. wheat spot prices from the United States Department of Agriculture and information on fourteen farm programs spanning the period from 1961 to 2014. We provide a detailed description of each program’s role and assess its respective volatility. To test the hypothesis that farm programs respond to price volatility, we employ Granger causality analysis. Additionally, we construct a reaction dummy variable to empirically evaluate the responsiveness of each individual program Results and Discussion: Our empirical findings suggest that the government does, in fact, respond to volatility in wheat prices. When wheat prices are relatively low, government outlays increase in response to price volatility, indicating more active intervention. Conversely, when wheat prices are high, government outlays remain largely unaffected, suggesting a more market-oriented approach with limited government involvement.
Research Implications: Policymakers can leverage these findings to refine the timing and structure of future interventions, enhancing both their efficiency and responsiveness. Budget authorities can better anticipate and manage fluctuations in agricultural spending across different market scenarios. Furthermore, farmers and market participants may adjust their expectations and production strategies based on the perceived pattern of government intervention. The observed lack of response during high-price periods reinforces market discipline, encouraging producers to operate more efficiently and with reduced reliance on government support. Finally, the dual-response pattern identified in this study supports the development of countercyclical policy tools that activate automatically under adverse conditions.
Originality/Value: This study contributes to the literature by proposing and empirically testing a novel hypothesis that U.S. agricultural programs respond not only to wheat price levels but specifically to price volatility. Unlike most existing studies that focus on government reactions to price trends, this work also highlights an asymmetric behavior in which the government intervenes primarily when prices are low and volatile, while allowing the market to operate freely during high-price periods. The relevance and value of this research are evidenced by its potential to improve the understanding of government intervention mechanisms in agricultural markets, particularly how policy responses are triggered by price volatility rather than just price levels. Additionally, the findings offer producers and market participants clearer expectations about government behavior, which can influence production decisions and risk management strategies.
