Acceso usuarios
In single winner voting elections, the plurality rule is one of the most studied rules. Plurality has been extended to the field of multiwinner voting elections where instead of electing one candidate, k candidates have to be elected. This extension is called the Bloc rule and it consists in voting for the k top preferred candidates. Antiplurality is another common voting rule, where voters vote for all the candidates except their last ranked candidate. In this paper, we introduce an extension of antiplurality in the setting of multiwinner elections and call it the Negative bloc rule. Axiomatic properties of this new rule are studied and compared with other multiwinner voting rules (k-plurality, k-antiplurality, k-Borda and Bloc). This axiomatic analysis is complemented by a probabilistic approach on the similarity of results between the Negative bloc rule and the other four rules. Finally, the behavior of Negative bloc rule according to some Condorcet properties is investigated.
