Aquinas on answering the «is it ?» question about singulars: What the ʼisʼ signifies in the proposition «Socrates is»

• Doolan, Gregory T. ^[1]
  1. [1] Catholic University of America

     Catholic University of America

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Acta Philosophica: rivista internazionale di filosofia, ISSN 1121-2179, Vol. 34, Nº. 1, 2025, págs. 27-48
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.19272/202500701003
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• Resumen

  • In this paper, I respond to the position of Lawrence Dewan and Stephen Brock that the answer to the question « Is it ? » is always made according to the sense of ‘is’ that signifies the truth of the composition of a proposition. Looking at Aquinas’s semantic theory, I argue that one exception to this rule concerns the answer to the « Is it ? » question when asked of a singular substance such as Socrates. In this case, the ‘is’ in the proposition « Socrates is » signifies the actuality of Socrates rather than the truth of the proposition. In the course of this investigation, I clarify aspects of Aquinas semantic theory as regards his views on the copula and its signification.