El caso Loper Bright y el problema de interpretación constitucional del moderno estado administrativo en los Estados Unidos de América

• Autores: José Ignacio Hernández
• Localización: Revista general de derecho constitucional, ISSN 1886-6212, Nº. 42, 2025
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The loper bright case and the problem of constitutional interpretation of the modern administrative state in the united states of america
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• Resumen
  • español

    Desde 1937, la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos toleró tácitamente la expansión de las agencias, basándose en decisiones pragmáticas, como sucedió en 1984 en el caso Chevron. En ese caso, la Corte estableció una regla práctica que describe el nivel de deferencia que las cortes deben ejercer al revisar las decisiones de las agencias que interpretan conceptos jurídicos indeterminados utilizados por la Ley. Este caso inspiró una doctrina adoptada por las cortes de distrito y de circuito para restringir el alcance del control judicial de las decisiones técnicas dictadas por las agencias, lo que atrajo las críticas orientadas a cuestionar la constitucionalidad del moderno Estado administrativo que surgió después del New Deal. A partir de 2021, la Corte Suprema comenzó a adoptar una interpretación más limitada de las funciones del Estado administrativo, lo que anticipó un cambio en la doctrina Chevron y eventualmente, un retroceso significativo en los precedentes que toleraron tácitamente el ascenso del Estado administrativo. En 2024, la decisión de la Corte Suprema en el caso Loper Bright llevó a la revocatoria del precedente Chevron para así poner fin a la doctrina utilizada por las cortes al revisar las decisiones de las agencias. Sin embargo, la regla de deferencia de Chevron fue reemplazada por una nueva regla de deferencia, igualmente amplia, basada en el control judicial del ejercicio de potestades discrecionales, una vez más, sobre la base de un enfoque pragmático. El caso Loper Bright destaca la fragilidad de las bases constitucionales del Derecho administrativo de los Estados Unidos. Asimismo, revela la ausencia de un método de interpretación constitucional coherente para delinear los límites del Estado administrativo moderno, que, por ahora, ha sobrevivido al escrutinio de la Corte Suprema.

  • English

    Since 1937, the Supreme Court tacitly tolerated the agencies’ expansion, based on pragmatic decisions, which happened in 1984 with the Chevron case. The Court established a practical rule outlining the level of deference courts should exercise when assessing agency decisions based on vague concepts used by the statute. This case inspired a doctrine adopted by district and circuit courts to narrow the judicial review scope of technical decisions adopted by agencies, drawing scrutiny regarding the constitutionality of the modern administrative state that rose after the New Deal. Starting in 2021, the Supreme Court began to adopt a more limited interpretation of the administrative state's authority, thereby anticipating a shift in the traditionally broad Chevron doctrine and eventually a significant reverse in the precedents that tacitly tolerated the rise of the administrative state. In 2024, the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright led to the overturning of Chevron to end the doctrine used by courts when reviewing agencies´ actions. However, Chevron's broad deference rule was replaced by a new and broad deference rule based on reviewing the agency's discretion, once again, based on a pragmatic approach. The Loper Bright case underscores the frailty of the constitutional underpinnings of U.S. administrative law. It reveals the absence of a consistent constitutional interpretation method to delineate the boundaries of the modern administrative state, which, for now, has survived the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.

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