EU soft-law: Non-binding but enforceable

• Anne Ausfelder ^[2] ; Adam Eick ^[3] ; Miriam Hartlapp ^[2] ; Romain Mespoulet ^[4] ; Sabine Saurugger ^[4] ; Fabien Terpan ^[4] ; Bartolomeo Cappellina ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Vienna

     University of Vienna

     Innere Stadt, Austria

     
  2. [2] Universität Berlin
  3. [3] Universität München
  4. [4] University Grenoble Alpes

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• Localización: European Law Journal, ISSN-e 1468-0386, Vol. 30, Nº. 4, 2024, págs. 668-684
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12537
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• Resumen

  • Why is soft law followed if it is non-binding? This question is addressed theoretically by highlightingthat an instrument that is non-binding in the legal form can nevertheless contain enforcement mea-sures, which make it ‘binding’ on a different level. These enforcement measures can be causallylinked to national-level usage of EU soft law by drawing on three behavioural logics: enforcement,management and persuasion. Empirically we proceed in two steps. First, we systematically catego-rise a large number of EU soft law instruments and find that despite being non-binding, EU soft lawinstruments frequently contain hard and soft enforcement measures. Second, a survey experimentamong national civil servants shows that instruments with enforcement measures are indeed per-ceived as more binding at the national level. Three case studies complement this data by illustratinghow soft enforcement can play out through persuasion or management while hard duties push softlaw usage through an enforcement logic.