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研究目的 本研究擬探討行政總裁的權力，若因有不可或缺的股東 - 即國家和具影響力的實業家 - 的存在而受到約束時，其權力會否影響俄羅斯公司以賬簿為基礎和以市場為基礎的表現 研究設計/方法/理念 管理權分為結構性的、所有權的、專家的和聲望的。提出的權力指標不但包括行政總裁，也涵蓋或會限制或增加行政總裁權力的董事會特徵。本研究的實證分析法是基於90間股份被納入莫斯科股票交易廣泛市場指數的大型俄羅斯上市公司樣本，觀察期由2012年至2019年 研究結果 面板數據分析顯示、較高的董事會所有權和較長的任期或會限制行政總裁的權力，這因此有利於提升企業績效。我們亦看到，在具影響力的企業家擁有的公司裡，行政總裁權力對市價淨值的影響是較負面的，而國有制沒有把它減低。就隸屬採掘業的公司而言，基於政治經驗和任期的行政總裁權力指標，會對企業績效帶來不同的影響 研究的原創性/價值 (一) 我們考慮在新興市場公司可取得額外資源的兩個途徑：行政總裁和具影響力的所有者。(二) 我們基於芬克爾斯坦 (Finkelstein, 1992) 的管理權分類，以及 Bebchuk et al. (2011) 所提出相對功率的學說，建立了權力指標。憑著這權力指標，我們可鑑定董事會會限制、抑或增強行政總裁提升企業績效的權力。(三) 我們分析發展中的俄羅斯市場，其為測試我們問題的良好地方，而探討俄羅斯的實證研究較為稀有 (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018) 。(四) 我們特別關注在採掘業的行政總裁權力，而採掘業對俄羅斯經濟來說、是具有重要戰略意義的
Purpose This study examines whether CEO power influences the book-based and market-based performance of Russian companies when it is restricted by the presence of essential shareholders, namely, state and influential businessmen.
Design/methodology/approach Managerial power is divided into structural, ownership, expert and prestige. The proposed power metrics include not only CEOs but also the board of directors' characteristics that may restrict or enhance CEO power. The empirical analysis is based on the sample of 90 large traded Russian firms, which shares are included in the Moscow Stock Exchange Broad Market Index (MICEX BMI), observed from 2012 to 2019.
Findings Panel data analysis suggests that higher board ownership and tenure may restrict CEO power, which in turn would be beneficial for corporate performance. the authors also see that in companies owned by influential businessmen, CEO power influence on M/B value is more negative, while state ownership does not moderate it. CEO power metrics, based on political experience and tenure, affect corporate performance differently in companies affiliated with extractive industries.
Originality/value First, the authors consider two channels through which a company in emerging markets may get additional resources: CEOs and influential owners. Second, the authors develop power metrics based on Finkelstein's managerial power classification (1992) and the idea of relative power proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2011). It allows identifying whether the board of directors' may constrain or enhance CEO power to raise corporate performance. Third, the authors analyze developing Russian markets that represent a good ground for testing the question, whereas empirical research on Russia is relatively scarce (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018). Fourth, the authors pay particular attention to the CEO power in the extractive industry, strategically important for the Russian economy.
