Sobre los presupuestos morales de la interpretación intencional

• Ricardo Marquisio Aguirre ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de la República

     Universidad de la República

     Uruguay

     
• Localización: Isonomía: Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho, ISSN 1405-0218, Nº. 61, 2024, págs. 342-383
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • En este artículo se defiende la tesis de que la interpretación del derecho legislado debe orientarse a identificar las intenciones comunicativas de su autor (el cuerpo legislativo relevante). El fundamento radica en que legislar e interpretar son actividades que solo tienen sentido si se reconocen como el ejercicio continuado de una agencia colaborativa, basada en responsabilidades compartidas y en la necesidad de responder a razones comunes, lo que es posibilitado por el nexo normativo que proporcionan el rule of law y los propósitos morales que lo justifican. Mientras el orden institucional cumpla con los requisitos mínimos que identifica el punto de vista de la agencia autónoma y las autoridades satisfagan la expectativa de que actuarán respondiendo a razones, existe una obligación moral para los involucrados en la práctica jurídica de identificar las modificaciones que producen las leyes en el derecho acudiendo a las intenciones de sus creadores

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Alexander, Larry y Prakash, Saikrishna, 2004: “Is That English You're Speaking? Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility”,...
  • Anderson, Bruce y Shute, Michael, 2018: “Identifying “Purely” Interpretative Issues and Activities”, en Novak, Marko y Strahovnik, Vojko (eds.),...
  • Araya Vega, Eval, 2007: “Tópicos fundamentales propuestos en la teoría del significado de Grice: notas sobre la intención significante”, Inter...
  • Asgeirsson, Hrafn, 2020: The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing.
  • Ash, Steve, 2022: Explaining Morality. Critical Realism and Moral Questions, London, Routledge.
  • Berman, Mitchell, 2019: “Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems”, en Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott y Toh, Kevin (eds.), New Dimensions...
  • Bix, Brian, 2018: “Obligations from Artifacts”, en Burazin, Luka, Himma, Kennneth y Roversi, Corrado (eds.), Law as an Artifact, Oxford, Oxford...
  • Bix, Brian, 2021: “Some Heretical Thoughts on Legal Normativity”, en Bertea, Stefano (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Legal Obligation,...
  • Blackford, Russell, 2016: The Mystery of Moral Authority, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Bratman, Michael, 1993: “Shared Intentions”, Ethics, 104(1), pp. 97-113.
  • Bulygin, Eugenio, 2004: “¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del derecho basada en un error?”, Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, 27, pp....
  • Celano, Bruno, 2022: El gobierno de las leyes. Ensayos sobre el Rule of Law, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
  • Dworkin, Ronald, 1986: Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Belknap Press.
  • Dworkin, Ronald, 2011: Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Belknap Press.
  • Ehrenberg, Kenneth, 2018: “Law as an Institution, an Artifact, and a Practice”, en Burazin, Luka, Himma, Kennneth y Roversi Corrado (eds.),...
  • Ekins, Richard, 2012: The Nature of Legislative Intent, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Enoch, David, 2019: “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, en Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott y Toh, Kevin (eds.), New Dimensiones of Normativity....
  • Finnis, John, 1992: “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning”, en George, Robert (ed.), Natural Law Theory. Contemporary Essays, Oxford, Oxford University...
  • Finnis, John, 2011: Natural Law and Natural Rights. Second Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Fish, Stanley, 2005: “There Is No Textualist Position”, San Diego Law Review, 42, pp. 629-650.
  • Fuller, Lon, 1964: The Morality of Law, New Haven, Yale University Press.
  • Gaido, Paula, 2021: “Between Authority and Interpretation: The Scope of Morality in Raz’s Account of Law”, en Fabra Zamora, Jorge Luis y Villa...
  • Gardner, John, 2012: Law as a Leap of Faith. Essays on Law in General, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Greenberg, Mark, 2004: “How Facts Make Law”, Legal Theory, 10, pp. 157-198.
  • Greenberg, Mark, 2014: “The Moral Impact Theory of Law”, Yale Law Journal, 123, pp. 1288-1342.
  • Greenberg, Mark,2020: “Natural Law Colloquium. Legal Interpretation and Natural Law”, Fordham Law Review, 89, pp. 109-144.
  • Greenberg, Mark, 2021: “Legal Interpretation”, en Zalta, Edward y Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/legal-interpretation/.
  • Grice, Paul, 1992: Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
  • Guastini, Riccardo, 2014: Interpretar y argumentar, trad. Silvina Álvarez, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.
  • Guastini, Riccardo, 2016: La sintaxis del derecho, trad. Álvaro Núñez Vaquero, Madrid, Marcial Pons.
  • Hershovitz, Scott, 2015: “The End of Jurisprudence”, Yale Law Journal, 124(4), pp. 1160-1204.
  • Himma, Kenneth, 2018: “The Problems of Legal Normativity and Legal Obligation”, en Himma, Kenneth, Jovanović, Miodrag y Spaić, Bojan (eds.),...
  • Hussain, Waheed, 2018: “The Common Good”, en Zalta, Edward y Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/common-good/.
  • Korsgaard, Christine, 1996: The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Korsgaard, Christine, 2009: Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Laporta, Francisco, 2007: El imperio de la ley. Una visión actual, Madrid, Trotta.
  • List, Christian y Pettit, Philip, 2011: Group Agency. The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Lutz, Matt y Case, Spencer, 2023: Is Morality Real? A Debate, London, Routledge.
  • Manning, John F., 2001: “Textualism and the Equity of the Statute”, Columbia Law Review, 101(1), pp. 1-127.
  • McPherson, Tristram, 2011: “Against Quietist Normative Realism”, Philosophical Studies, 154, pp. 223-240.
  • Marmor, Andrei, 2014: The Language of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Marmor, Andrei, 2018: “Norms, Reasons, and the Law”, en Himma, Kenneth, Jovanović, Miodrag y Spaić, Bojan (eds.), Unpacking Normativity:...
  • Marquisio Aguirre, Ricardo, 2021: “La normatividad como objeto: doctrina, teoría, metateoría”, Revista Anuario del Área Socio-Jurídica, 13(1),...
  • Marquisio Aguirre, 2023: “La autonomía moral y el imperio de la ley: una conexión constitutiva”, Revista Anuario del Área Socio-Jurídica,...
  • Muffato, Nicola, 2015: “Normatividad del Derecho”, en Fabra Zamora, Jorge Luís y Rodríguez Blanco, Verónica (eds.), Enciclopedia de Filosofía...
  • Nagel, Thomas, 1979: Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Nagel, Thomas, 1986: The View from Nowhere, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Núñez Vaquero, Álvaro 2014: “Dogmática Jurídica”, Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, 6, pp. 245-260.
  • Paakunainen, Hille, 2017: “Normativity and Agency”, en McPherson, Tristram y Plunkett, David (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics,...
  • Parfit, Derek, 2011: On What Matters. Volume One, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Perry, Stephen, 2013: “Political Authority and Political Obligation”, en Green, Leslie y Leiter, Brian (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy...
  • Plunkett, David, 2019: “Robust Normativity, Morality and Legal Positivism”, en Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott y Toh, Kevin (eds.), New Dimensions...
  • Plunkett, David y Shapiro, Scott, 2017: “Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry”,...
  • Poggi, Francesca, 2016: “Grice, the Law and the Linguistic Special Case Thesis”, en Capone, Alessandro y Poggi, Francesca (eds.), Pragmatics...
  • Poggi, Francesca, 2020: Il modello conversazionale. Sulla differenza tra comprensione ordinaria e interpretazione giuridica, Pisa, ETS.
  • Railton, Peter, 2019: “‘We’ll see you in court!’: The Rule of Law as an Explanatory and Normative Kind”, en Plunkett, David, Shapiro, Scott...
  • Rawls, John, 1971: A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Belknap Press.
  • Raz, Joseph, 1979: The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Raz, Joseph, 1988: The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
  • Raz, Joseph,, 1991: “Morality as Interpretation. Interpretation and Social Criticism, by Michael Walzer”, Ethics, 101(2), pp. 392-405.
  • Raz, Joseph, 1999: Engaging Reason. On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Raz, Joseph, 2009: Between Authority and Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Redondo, María Cristina, 1996: La noción de razón para la acción en el análisis jurídico, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
  • Redondo, María Cristina, 2005: “Razones y Normas”, Discusiones, 5, pp. 29-66.
  • Rodriguez-Blanco, Verónica, 2018: “What Makes a Transnational Rule of Law? Understanding the Logos and Values of Human Action in Transnational...
  • Roversi, Corrado, 2018: “On the Artifactual —and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions”, en Burazin, Luka, Himma, Kennneth y Roversi, Corrado...
  • Rundle, Kristen, 2022: Revisiting the Rule of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Searle, John, 2010: Making the Social World. The Structure of Human Civilization, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Shapiro, Scott, 2011: Legality, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
  • Skoczeń, Izabella, 2019: Implicatures within Legal Language, Cham, Springer.
  • Smith, Michael, 1994: The Moral Problem, Malden, Blackwell.
  • Smith, Michael, 2018: “Constitutivism”, en McPherson, Tristam y Plunkett, David (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, London, Routledge,...
  • Stavropoulos, Nicos, 2012: “Obligations, Interpretativism and the Legal Point of View”, en Marmor, Andrei (ed.), The Routledge Companion to...
  • Street, Sharon, 2010: “What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?”, Philosophy Compass, 5, pp. 363-384.
  • Tasioulas, John, 2020: “The Rule of Law”, en Tasioulas, John (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law, Cambridge, Cambridge...
  • Toh, Kevin, 2021: “Legal Positivism and Meta-Ethics”, en Spaak, Torben y Mindus, Patricia (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism,...
  • von der Pfordten, Dietmar, 2021: Legal Obligation as Practical Necessity by Law, en Bertea, Stefano (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Legal...
  • Walden, Kenneth, 2017: “Mores and Morals: Metaethics and the Social World”, en McPherson, Tristam y Plunkett, David (eds.), The Routledge...
  • Waldron, Jeremy, 1999: Law and Disagreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Waldron, Jeremy, 2023: “The Rule of Law”, en Zalta, Edward y Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/rule-of-law/.
  • Wallace, R. Jay, 2019: The Moral Nexus, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
  • Walzer, Michael, 1987. Interpretation and Social Criticism, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
  • Wedgwood, Ralph, 2108: “The Unity of Normativity”, en Star, Daniel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford, Oxford University...
  • Williams, Bernard, 1976: Morality. An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Zambrano, Pilar, 2021: “Comprender o interpretar el derecho. El convencionalismo semántico en su laberinto”, Revista Chilena de Derecho, 48(3),...