Acceso usuarios
[1]
;
Dias Cardoso, Luiz Eduardo
[1]
Brasil
This article aims to analyze the legislative innovations and the changes that occur in the individuals’ incentives, which results from Law no. 13,871/2019. We investigate, through legal analysis, the goals of the policymakers on including new paragraphs in Maria da Penha Law and, through the Economic Theory of Crime, we elaborate a hypothetico-deductive analysis over the individuals’ incentives. We conclude that Law no. 13,871/2019 follows the initial principles that underlie Maria da Penha Law, which does not only restrict itself to the criminal sphere, but also expands the punishments to the civil sphere. In economic terms, we understand that simply raising the severity of the punishments will have little effect on combating violence against women, besides creating opposite incentives to victims that seek medical help. At last, a few considerations about future research on this theme are made.
