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Public employee pension management is the nexus of public and private financial management systems that are significant long-term components of public finance. The idea that these pension systems can look quite similar yet perform in quite different and conflicting ways is significant when designing policy; system design templates are not successful in complex systems. Even pension systems within the same city can have radically different states of actuarial health based upon small differences in the rules (or adherence to the rules) establishing them. To better understand such systems, viewing them from a common pool resource perspective is useful. Elinor Ostrom (1990), in her seminal book Governing the Commons, provides eight principles that facilitate governing common pool resources. The general theme running through Ostrom's principles is the need to facilitate the building and channeling of social capital. By facilitating constructive collective choice, the goal of effective, sustainable collective action is achievable. In this study, we examine the political, cultural, and institutional structures that are in place in the pension systems of Dallas and Houston, Texas. We examine the pensions’ governance practices to determine which appear to violate Ostrom's ideal institutional arrangements and their impact on the pensions’ long-term sustainability. Pertinent survey information from pension beneficiaries conducted as part of this research are provided
