Acceso usuarios
Vincenzo Pinto
The article deals with the problematic relationship, in the società per azioni, between the principle of efficiency in the management of the company and the protection of shareholders’ interests regarding fundamental business transactions. In this regard, the work identifies two alternative models for the protection of the shareholders’, focused respectively on directors’ duty and liability or on shareholders’ rights, the breach of which entitles to claim for invalidity of Board’s resolutions under Section 2388, paragraph 4, of Civil Code. This second model is deemed preferable not only with a view to the effectiveness of protection, but also because of its systematic consistency with the principle of the exclusive competence of the directors in the management of the company.
1. Il problema delle operazioni di “interesse primordiale”. – 2. I modelli di tutela degli azionisti. – 3. Il paradigma del caso Holzmüller. Protezione giurisprudenziale delle minoranze ed efficienza della gestione. – 4. La tutela partecipativa come dovere degli amministratori. – 5. La tutela partecipativa come diritto degli azionisti. – 6. Operazioni di “interesse primordiale” e tutela risarcitoria.
