A resolução do paradoxo do teste surpresa

• Valcarenghi, Emerson Carlos ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade Federal do Piauí

     Universidade Federal do Piauí

     Brasil

     
• Localización: Aufklärung: revista de filosofia, ISSN-e 2318-9428, Vol. 9, Nº. 1 (January-April), 2022, págs. 11-42
• Idioma: portugués
• DOI: 10.18012/arf.v9i1.61660
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The resolution of the surprise test paradox
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • português

    Mostraremos neste ensaio que a abordagem mooreana ao paradoxo do teste surpresa não é correta e que o argumento de eliminação do aluno sagaz esconde um erro sutil.

  • English

    We will show in this essay that the Moorean approach to the surprise test paradox is not correct and that the clever student's elimination argument hides a subtle error.

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