

South-South Cooperation, Brazil and Cape Verde: Implementation Assessment (1995–2016)*

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Abstract: The Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff governments established South-South Cooperation (SSC) as a cornerstone of Brazil's international insertion, despite their distinct political-strategic biases. Based on foreign policy goals, high-level National Defense documents, and cooperation agreements, Brazil sought to project leadership and induce security in the South Atlantic. The choice of Cape Verde is justified by its strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea — an area rich in resources but vulnerable to “new threats,” such as piracy and transnational crime. The research hypothesis posits that this public intervention faced significant implementation gaps, depending on internal and external circumstances. The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the implementation of Brazil-Cape Verde SSC (1995–2016) using Vedung's evaluation framework, comprising four pillars: intervention theory, the goal attainment model, stakeholder mapping, and the eight problems approach. Fundamentally, the analysis transcends government rhetoric by employing a triangulation of data, including diplomatic telegrams, defense documents, and interviews with military personnel. By treating the historical mapping of the three administrations as foundational empirical evidence, the study identifies the structural gaps that hindered the full achievement of Brazil's strategic objectives in the South Atlantic.

Keywords: Brazil; Cape Verde; Gulf of Guinea; South Atlantic; South-South Cooperation.

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Cooperación sursur, Brasil y Cabo Verde: evaluación de la implementación (1995–2016)

Resumen: Los gobiernos de Cardoso, Lula y Rousseff establecieron la Cooperación SurSur (css) como piedra angular de la inserción internacional de Brasil, pese a sus distintos sesgos políticoes-tratégicos. A partir de los objetivos de política exterior, documentos de alto nivel en materia de Defensa Nacional y acuerdos de cooperación, Brasil buscó proyectar liderazgo y generar seguridad en el Atlántico Sur. La elección de Cabo Verde se justifica por su ubicación estratégica en el Golfo de Guinea, una zona rica en recursos pero vulnerable a “nuevas amenazas” como la piratería y el crimen transnacional. La hipótesis de investigación plantea que esta intervención pública enfrentó brechas significativas de implementación, dependientes de circunstancias internas y externas. El objetivo principal de este artículo es evaluar la implementación de la css Brasil–Cabo Verde (1995–2016) mediante el marco de evaluación de Vedung, compuesto por cuatro pilares: teoría de la intervención, modelo de logro de objetivos, mapeo de actores interesados y el enfoque de los ocho problemas. En esencia, el análisis trasciende la retórica gubernamental al emplear una triangulación de datos que incluye telegramas diplomáticos, documentos de defensa y entrevistas con personal militar. Al considerar el mapeo histórico de las tres administraciones como evidencia empírica fundacional, el estudio identifica las brechas estructurales que obstaculizaron el pleno logro de los objetivos estratégicos de Brasil en el Atlántico Sur.

Palabras clave: Brasil; Cabo Verde; Golfo de Guinea; Atlántico Sur; Cooperación SurSur.

Cooperação sul- sul, Brasil e cabo Verde: avaliação da implementação (1995–2016)

Resumo: Os governos de Cardoso, Lula e Rousseff estabeleceram a Cooperação SulSul (css) como pedra angular da inserção internacional do Brasil, apesar de seus distintos vieses políticoestratégicos. Com base nos objetivos de política externa, em documentos de alto nível da Defesa Nacional e em acordos de cooperação, o Brasil buscou projetar liderança e induzir segurança no Atlântico Sul. A escolha de Cabo Verde justificase por sua localização estratégica no Golfo da Guiné — uma área rica em recursos, porém vulnerável a “novas ameaças” como a pirataria e o crime transnacional. A hipótese de pesquisa postula que essa intervenção pública enfrentou lacunas significativas de implementação, dependentes de circunstâncias internas e externas. O objetivo principal deste artigo é avaliar a implementação da css Brasil–Cabo Verde (1995–2016) utilizando o quadro de avaliação de Vedung, composto por quatro pilares: teoria da intervenção, modelo de alcance de objetivos, mapeamento de stakeholders e a abordagem dos oito problemas. Fundamentalmente, a análise transcende a retórica governamental ao empregar uma triangulação de dados, incluindo telegramas diplomáticos, documentos de defesa e entrevistas com pessoal militar. Ao tratar o mapeamento histórico das três administrações como evidência empírica fundacional, o estudo identifica as lacunas estruturais que impediram a plena consecução dos objetivos estratégicos do Brasil no Atlântico Sul.

Palavras-chave: Brasil; Cabo Verde; Golfo da Guiné; Atlântico Sul; Cooperação SulSul.

Introduction

International cooperation can be understood under various theories and thoughts. This paper approaches international relations from Morgenthau's (1962) realistic thinking point of view, presented as a political action, an instrument of States' foreign policy, seeking expansion of its power, prestige and economic gains in the International System. This approach aligns with Keohane's (1984) institutional-liberal idea, which suggests that cooperation is not always dissociated from conflict and may sometimes arise from it. Therefore, cooperation should aim to achieve results, either through interdependence among States, or the pragmatism of its objectives, rather than through armed conflict.

In this sense, it is based on the premise that Brazilian international cooperation more effectively embodies the principles of these theoretical schools, without disregarding the constructivist perspective that emphasize humanitarian imperatives and ethical commitments, using soft power as a means of shaping behavior.

First, it is necessary to define the main instruments of International Cooperation for Development (CID), which, according to Iglesias Puente (2010), include: (1) *technical cooperation*, through the exchange of knowledge and transfer of technology; (2) *scientific and technological cooperation* (S&T cooperation), as an incentive to research and exchange technological information; (3) *educational cooperation*, implemented through scholarship programs for foreign students; and (4) *humanitarian cooperation*, in minimizing the effects of natural disasters, epidemics, hunger, etc.

The CID can be classified into three types: (1) *north-south Cooperation*, conducted between developed and developing countries (*Vertical Cooperation*); (2) *Triangular Cooperation*, which is a mixed cooperation; and (3) *South-South Cooperation* or Horizontal Cooperation, carried out between two or more developing countries (Iglesias Puente, 2010). It should be noted that, even horizontally, achieving complete equity in the interrelationship between States is very difficult.

Thus, South-South Cooperation focuses on the compilation of data related to specific activities, projects and programs involving transfer, generation and dissemination of knowledge in the technical, scientific and technological, educational and humanitarian cooperation areas.

From a Latin American perspective, South-South Cooperation has increasingly been viewed as a mechanism of "autonomy through diversification," enabling middle powers such as Brazil to combine development objectives with a strategy of political concertation with other Global South actors, particularly in forums such as IBSA and the G20 (Lechini, 2009; Ayllón, 2020).

Historically, the contemporary concept of South-South Cooperation was consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century, following the Bandung Conference (1955), the Non-Aligned Movement and the creation of the Group of 77 within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This process culminated in the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978), which codified principles such as solidarity, horizontality and mutual benefit (Lechini, 2009; *Chronology and History of South-South Cooperation*, 2014; United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 2017).

This research focuses on South-South Cooperation as a foreign and defense policy instrument for Brazil's projection of power during the administrations of Cardoso (1995–2002), Lula (2003–2010) and Rousseff (2011–2016) governments, encompassing several developing countries, mainly in South America, Asia, and Africa. This was not the only implemented project by the Brazilian State in its international relations. Despite the peculiarities and prioritizations of ideological nuances of the three administrations, they all implemented the expansion of multilateral engagement and the globalization of its foreign relations within the broader geopolitical landscape. The selection of Cape Verde as a case study for evaluating South-South cooperation is justified by its location in the Gulf of Guinea, a region rich in mineral deposits that

been affected by the so-called “new threats,”¹ particularly piracy. Moreover, Cape Verde occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major maritime communication routes in the so-called “Atlantic Basin.”

If, until recently, acts of piracy were confined to the eastern coast of Africa, especially in waters off Somalia, they have since advanced north of its western coast. Furthermore, the political and strategic interests of powers outside the South Atlantic cannot be overlooked, as they may affect the sovereignty of Brazil, Cape Verde and other states bordering the South Atlantic. These States must, therefore, ensure the defense and security of their jurisdictional waters against all kinds of threats.

This strategic need for greater cooperation in the region has fostered the adoption of policies based on South-South Cooperation. Brazil’s renewed emphasis on a foreign policy that favored the south-south axis emerged, more recently, after a brief interruption caused by neoliberal policies in the 1990s. In light of this strategic scenario, this research is guided by the hypothesis that the ssc intervention with Cape Verde proved to be flawed in its implementation, largely due to its dependency on the shifting domestic and international political and economic circumstances of both countries, particularly Brazil. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate the implementation of this policy between 1995 and 2016, employing the public policy evaluation methodology proposed by Vedung and Pedone.

This broader strategic environment reinforces the need for Brazil to frame South-South Cooperation with African partners not only as an instrument of solidarity and technical assistance, but also as a tool of maritime governance and power balancing in the South Atlantic basin, integrating defense cooperation, support to local navies, and initiatives under South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) into a coherent State strategy (Saraiva, 2012; Visentini et al., 2013).

In the specific case of the South Atlantic, these cooperative initiatives unfold in a maritime space marked by growing extra regional presence, including naval deployments by the United States and European Union, the economic advance of China, and the activities of private security companies contracted to protect shipping routes, all of which reshape local security dynamics and sometimes compete with Brazil’s own projection efforts (Zucatto; Baptista, 2014; Stolte, 2015).

This investigation goes beyond descriptive approaches to Brazilian Foreign Policy by adopting a robust methodological framework grounded in the field of public policy evaluation.

The originality of this research lies in the systematic application of the framework proposed by Vedung and Pedone (2021), which enables a multi-layered analysis of South-South Cooperation as a strategic tool. This study is structured around four interdependent methodological pillars that ensure analytical depth and replicability: (1) Intervention Theory, used to map the government’s rationale from strategic inputs — such as the 1977 Basic Agreement and the 2013 Defense Agreement — to final outputs; (2) the Goal Attainment Model, which serves as an efficacy metric by confronting declared objectives in high-level documents with factual results; (3) Stakeholder Evaluation, which identifies the interests and influence of actors such as the Brazilian Navy and BNDES; and (4) the Eight Problems approach, a management technique that strengthens the analysis by refining the questions concerning the program’s purpose and utility.

It is important to emphasize that the empirical data detailed in the historical analysis of the Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff administrations (section 2) serves as the foundational evidence for this study. Rather than a mere chronological narrative, this longitudinal mapping provides the essential “inputs” and “outputs” required to operationalize the four methodological pillars of the Vedung and Pedone framework.

Fundamentally, the analysis does not rely exclusively on official sources; it employs data triangulation, which includes diplomatic telegrams, interviews with military personnel from the Brazilian and Cape Verdean Navies, and defense documents, which

1 They are commonly identified as: terrorism, illegal arms, drugs and people trafficking, illegal fishing, smuggling, embezzlement, piracy, and even terrorist actions.

strengthens the research beyond mere government rhetoric. By categorizing the shifts in political commitment and resource allocation, the study provides a robust empirical basis for the rigorous application of the proposed methodology.

By employing this rigor, this paper transcends historical narrative to offer a critical assessment of Brazil's strategic insertion in the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea, treating security and defense not as peripheral themes, but as the core of technical cooperation and national smart power.

Finally, findings indicate that the political and strategic objectives associated with this international insertion project were partially achieved. Gaps in the implementation of this program were identified, mainly during President Cardoso's first term (1995–1998). These shortcomings were minimized toward the end of his second (1999–2002) and during President Lula's first administration (2003–2006). Implementation problems, however, resurfaced during President Rousseff's (2011–2016), mainly after 2014.

The South-South Brazilian Cooperation Program with Cape Verde

Like most former Portuguese colonies, Cape Verde, following its independence, developed an outward-oriented economy that relied heavily on international cooperation and remittances from the Cape Verdean diaspora to maintain itself. Although this pattern has not changed substantially, new partnerships have been signed in order to transform the country into a logistics hub with Europe and Africa.

The following section discusses the Brazilian South-South Cooperation (ssc) policy with Cape Verde. It begins with a brief historical overview that provides the context for the subsequent analysis of the Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff administrations.

Brief History: The Beginning of Brazilian-Cape Verdean Relations

Cape Verde has a land area of 4,033 km², a coastline of 965 km, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

covering 734,265 km², underscoring the country's strong maritime character. Most of its approximately 530 inhabitants live on Santiago and São Vicente, the country's two main islands. Santiago is the main city, capital, seat of government, and the center of foreign diplomatic representations. Praia, with approximately 140,000 inhabitants, on São Vicente Island, located in Mindelo, is the second largest city in the country. São Vicente has approximately 75,000 inhabitants.

The independence of Portuguese Guinea on September 24, 1973, together with the Carnation Revolution, which overthrew the Salazar dictatorship on April 25, 1974, accelerated the independence processes of the other Portuguese colonies, thereby facilitating Cape Verde's negotiations conducted abroad. As a result, on December 19, 1974, an agreement was signed formally recognizing Cape Verde's right to independence (Rizzi, 2014).

Brazil was one of the first countries to recognize its independence. This position was consisted with the distinguished pragmatic Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) of the mid-1970s and 1980s, when relations with African countries were diversified. Cape Verde also adopted a highly pragmatic and flexible foreign policy during the early years of its independence. Despite the Cold War context, the Marxist-oriented government sought to raise the necessary resources for its development by engaging with a broad range of international partners, although Portugal and the countries of Western Europe remained the main partners during its initial period (Violante, 2017).

During the 1990s, Brazil's foreign policy gave greater priority to relations with the major centers of global power, reflecting the adoption of a relatively late and more moderate form of neoliberalism than that implemented in other Latin American countries. This resulted in a reduced emphasis on relations with Africa, reversing the more assertive engagement that had characterized the previous period. This slowed the expansion of relations with Cape Verde, leading to a period of stagnation in bilateral cooperation.

In this context of decline, we analyze how relations were maintained under the President Cardoso's government.

Cardoso's Governments I and II (1995-2002)

It can be argued that, until the early 2000s, both the Cardoso administration and the Cape Verdean government implemented liberal policies at home and abroad. In both countries, several reforms took place that covered the financial sector, the decentralization of public administration and the opening of the economy to international markets.

In the context of Brazil's relations, the country prioritized relations with the major developed countries while carefully selecting its partners in the developing world. As for Africa, the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP) received greater attention from Brazilian South-South Cooperation under the Cardoso² administration. However, according to Iglesias Puente (2010), cooperation with Africa experienced a significant qualitative expansion during the beginning of Cardoso's second term.

In the case of Cape Verde, a clear turning point towards more assertive relations occurred between 2001 and 2002. Renewed interest in Cape Verde coincided with the inauguration of Prime Minister José Maria das Neves and President Pedro Verona Rodrigues Pires, both members of the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), in January and March 2001, respectively. Neves maintained a particularly favorable view of Brazil, which contributed to strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries.

During this period, a major milestone was the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). The multi-sectoral mission took place in Cape Verde from 24

to 27 of June 2002.³ This initiative coincided with a shift in the focus of Brazilian international relations, driven by disappointment with the benefits of a "beneficial globalization," which had instead proved to be "asymmetric" with developing countries. During the mission, a sectorial assessment of all areas subject to cooperation was carried out in order to realistically increase technical cooperation with Cape Verde. They visualized projects development in water desalination, agriculture, education at distance, health, meteorology, and staff training.⁴

Despite these technical visits, a few relevant projects were implemented under President Cardoso's administration. Nevertheless, several important projects are worth mentioning: (a) strengthened cooperation in the cultural area, with the International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP) and with the negotiations to create the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries' (CPLP); (b) the creation of the Solidarity Literacy program (ALFASOL); (c) health project to combat HIV/AIDS, with the training of diagnostic technicians.⁵ In practice, many of the Memoranda of Understandings, adjustments and mappings carried out in 2002 were effectively transformed into projects in the following years, already during the Lula administration.

With regard to defense-related technical cooperation with Brazil, it has been virtually non-existent. There was no sale of military equipment, nor was there any sustained interest in pursuing more robust negotiations. As of the 2000s, however, cooperation in professional-military training increased, mainly through the Merchant Marine's Maritime Professional Education Program (EPM), administered by the Brazilian Navy (BN), as well

2 During the eight years of the Cardoso administration and in the first three years of Lula's government (which can be considered as low assertiveness in SSC), 94% of the projects and 68.9% of the specific activities in Africa were concentrated in the PALOP (ABC/ MD Data, 2017).

3 The term 'Brasemb Praia para Sere' refers to telegrams exchanged between the Brazilian Embassy in Praia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), specifically its Africa II Division (DAF II). Due to the extensive volume of these diplomatic documents in this research, they will be cited exclusively in footnotes to ensure text fluidity and minimize narrative interruptions. Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 04/07/2002.

4 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 04/07/2002

5 Sere para Brasemb Praia - Telegram, 14/06/2002.

as the increase in the number of training positions in the military in courses offered by the Brazilian Armed Forces. These actions stemmed from the Meeting of the Third Defense Ministers, held in Luanda, in 2000, at which the Brazilian Ministry of Defense decided to adopt a more active role with the PALOP.⁶

Thus, an analysis of all areas of technical cooperation, including defense, indicates that the sporadic initiatives with Cape Verde during the Cardoso administration were largely concentrated after 2000. As a result of this impulse, Cape Verde accounted for approximately 10% of projects and activities in all geographic regions between 1995 and 2002. Within Africa specifically, Cape Verde represented approximately 14% of such projects and activities, ranking second after Angola, which accounted for approximately 20%.⁷

According to data from the General Cooperation Technical Coordination among Developing Countries (CGCTPD) a total of 17 projects/sub-projects and stand-alone activities were performed in Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa and Asia. Total expenditures amounted to only US\$ 70,884.54 (seventy thousand eight hundred eighty-four U.S. dollars and fifty-four cents).

To complement these analyses in addition to technical cooperation, other modalities of South-South cooperation should also be examined. During this time, educational cooperation was the most prominent. This investment, closely associated with public *smart power* diplomacy, involved resources of approximately US\$ 8.5 million and accounted for a total of 25% of students who benefited from all of Brazil's educational cooperation programs.⁸

Humanitarian cooperation with Cape Verde consisted primarily of the provision of tuberculosis medication and the donation of malaria and antiretroviral medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, which intensified after 1999. By contrast, there is little evidence of significant scientific and technological (S&T) cooperation beyond the initiatives already discussed.

Within the context of Brazilian diplomacy toward the PALOP, Cape Verde and the smaller nations remained in the background. From a strategic perspective, Brazil's initiatives were highly limited, relying entirely on a very modest display of soft power rather than robust strategic partnerships.

In conclusion, Brazil-Cape Verde relationships during the Cardoso administration were characterized primarily by formal diplomatic exchanges, complemented by a limited number of meetings, visits and exploratory missions. Compared with Brazil's engagement with other African countries after 2000, progress in relations with Cape Verde was more modest. Nevertheless, this change resulted in the opening of the Cape Verdean Embassy in Brasilia in 2002. More than a gesture of diplomatic reciprocity—following the establishment of the Brazilian Embassy in Praia in 1975—this decision reflected Cape Verde's intention to become a more relevant and strategic partner.

Lula's governments I and II (2003–2010)

As part of the diversification of Brazil's international partnerships, Lula's inauguration marked the return to a more assertive African policy. His proposals complemented those of Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires and Prime Minister José Maria Neves. This is not to suggest that the President and Prime Minister of the previous administration, led by the Movement for Democracy (MpD), had not sought closer relations with Brazil; rather, the political agendas of the two governments did not favor more intense bilateral and multilateral relations.

The greater assertiveness in diplomacy became evident at the beginning of Lula's first term (2003–2006) through a series of high-level visits between the two countries. On June 13, 2003, President

6 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegrams: 01/02/2000, 03/01/2000, 19/07/2000, 11/12/2000; Sere para Brasemb Praia - Telegram, 31/10/2001.

7 South-South cooperation in Cape Verde - Projects. Dados da página da ABC. Available at: <<http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/CooperacaoSulSul/CaboVerde>>; and <<http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreAbc/Direcao/cgpd/Gerencias>>. Accessed on November 25, 2016.

8 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegrams: 20/01/2000 and 15/02/2001.

Pires met with the Brazilian President during the Brazil–Africa forum and the CPLP Forum, both held in Fortaleza, from 9 to 11 June 2003. President Pires paid an official visit to Brazil soon after, on July 13, 2003. During these meetings, the Cape Verdean government requested the presentation of bilateral trade and cooperation projects.⁹

President Lula visited Cape Verde from 28 to 30 July 2004. It was the first visit of a Brazilian president since Sarney in 1986. At the time, the presidents signed adjustments on the 1977 basic cooperation agreement. Concurrently with this visit, a Brazilian business delegation was also in Cape Verde, with the aim of further strengthening bilateral business relations.¹⁰

In late September and early October 2004, President Pires paid another official visit to Brazil. This visit resulted in the Joint Communiqué of 4 October 2004, which listed the main themes of bilateral relations, such as the improvement of cooperation in education and health, in addition to the partnership of the two countries in the international forums of the CPLP, the United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The communiqué also envisaged the possibility of Cape Verde being a commercial projection platform, as a future logistics hub, via the west coast of Africa by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which would benefit Brazil.¹¹

Still in Lula's first term, Cape Verde further strengthened its support for Brazil's multilateral causes, approving the Brazilian candidacy for the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the assessment of the G-20 and the request for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In turn, Brazil also supported the presence of an African representative with a permanent seat at the UNSC, as well as increased African

representation in non-permanent seats, in line with the African Union proposal for this reform.¹²

In technical cooperation, however, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and other development agencies involved in South-South Cooperation lacked substantial budgets. The Brazilian federal government only allocated more significant financial resources to these agencies from 2005–2006 onward.¹³

Therefore, Lula's first term witnessed a small increase in the number of projects. Among the most significant were the complementary adjustments referring to the Third Phase of the Solidarity Literacy Project, the Second Phase of the Cooperation Program on HIV-AIDS and the Higher Education and Science Program (Violante, 2017).

During Lula's second term, the strengthening of South-South cooperation policy was accompanied by a more assertive humanitarian bias to African politics, as well as power projection that devoted greater attention to small PALOP, including Cape Verde. The Brazilian economic situation had improved and was very favorable to new investments. The budget for South-South Cooperation and, mainly, technical cooperation, grew substantially, reaching approximately R\$38 million in 2010.¹⁴

Chancellor Celso Amorim's new visits to Praia in June and November 2008 resulted in the signing of four more adjustments to agreements in the administrative and health sectors, aimed at strengthening institutional and human resources, including: (a) Technical support for a Human Milk Bank implementation in Cape Verde; (b) the strengthening of primary healthcare; (c) institutional strengthening of the Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP); and (d) strengthening and technical training of human resources for the Professional Training System (Phase II) (Rizzi, 2014).

As for professional training, particular emphasis should be placed on the implementation of

9 Sere para Brasemb - Telegrams: 03/09/2003 And 06/06/2003.

10 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegrams: 14/07/2004 and 12/08/2004.

11 Sere para Brasemb Praia - Telegram, 11/11/2004.

12 Brasemb para Sere - Telegrams: 03/11/2003, 23/07/2004 and 27/05/2004.

13 Referring to the evolution of ABC's budget and investments in SSC and CTPD.

14 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 07/12/2006.

the Professional Training Center in Cape Verde, opened in July 2008. This project was the largest ever implemented by Brazil, with an investment of approximately us\$ 2 million.¹⁵

In this vein, the 14th Meeting of the CPLP Council of Ministers, held in Praia in July 2009, was important to further strengthen multilateral cooperative ties between Brazil and the PALOP countries. Another significant milestone was the President Lula's new visit to Praia in July 2, 2010, in the First Brazil-CEDEAO Summit, which aimed to strengthen commercial and strategic relations between Brazil and West African coast countries.¹⁶ At the end of the summit, the Cape Verdean press highly praised Brazil for placing West Africa back at the top of its foreign policy agenda.¹⁷

Therefore, Lula's second term witnessed an increasing curve in technical cooperation with Cape Verde. In 2007, the country ranked first among all African countries and second overall in terms of Brazilian technical cooperation projects, receiving us\$2.3 million, surpassed only by the us\$2.7million invested in Haiti. In 2010, technical cooperation with Cape Verde ranked fifth, behind Mozambique, East Timor, São Tome and Principe, and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁸ This analysis revealed that four out of the five leading recipients were considered small countries, denoting Lula's greater assertiveness and less selectivity in South-South Cooperation.

In the more specific defense-related technical cooperation, Cape Verde continued to pursue different options to develop its security and defense structure. Cape Verde was looking for new ways to increase its maritime security, in response to the increasingly assertive presence of the so-called "new threats." The options under consideration included the adoption of a shared security approach, which would require a greater articulation

between international partners.¹⁹ Indeed, a recurring debate among the Cape Verdean political elite has centered on whether the country should deepen its defense ties with European countries and the United States through more robust defense agreements or maintain a position of greater autonomy.

It can be said that, during this period, Cape Verde sought to participate in all security and defense forums relevant to its strategic environment. Thus, their relations have fluctuated between increased cooperation with the USA and European countries, especially with Portugal and NATO exercises, while also pursuing closer engagement with Brazil, the CPLP, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), UA, the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), etc.

Brazil's direct defense cooperation continued in projects related to military professional training, although these initiatives remained well below the country's capabilities. Donations of secondary military equipment continued, including uniforms, ballistic vests, and equipment intended to be used in Law-and-Order Guarantee (GLO) operations²⁰ (Article 142 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution). More significant, however, were the political dialogues on security and defense, which consistently formed part of the agendas of official visits by the Heads of State and Government, Chancellors, and Ministries of Defense of both countries. These conversations intensified between 2009 and 2010, which contributed to Brazil being the main actor in the reformulation of the Cape Verde Coast Guard, as will be discussed in the analyses of the Rousseff administration.²¹

To conclude this analysis of technical cooperation from 2003 to 2010, including the defense sector, data from the General Coordination of Technical Cooperation and Partnerships with Developed Countries (CGCTPD) indicate that 22 agreements and amendments to the Basic Cooperation

15 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegrams: 12/07/2007, 22/05/2008, 23/01/2009 And 17/12/2010.

16 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegrams: 26/11/2009; 17/02/2010 And 30/04/2010.

17 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram: 21/07/2010.

18 Available at: <<http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/CooperacaoSulSul/CaboVerde>>.

19 The installation of foreign military bases: between shared security and national interest, by Gracinda Fortes. *A Semana* newspaper. Available at: <<http://asemana.sapo.cv/spip.php?article39978>>. Accessed on: Nov. 21, 2024.

20 For more about GLO operations, see Melo e Violante (2020).

21 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 25/10/2010.

Agreement were signed with Portuguese-Speaking countries in Africa and Asia.²² In addition, it is worth highlighting the 2013 Defense Agreement, the beginning of technical cooperation in this area. In total, there were 61 projects, sub-projects, and isolated cooperation activities. Two of these projects were initiated during the Cardoso administration and continued under the Lula administration. The remaining 59 projects, subprojects, and stand-alone activities were launched during the Lula administration, reaching a total value of US\$ 3,232,430.68.

Regarding other types of South-South cooperation, educational cooperation remained very relevant. Between 2003 and 2006, 25% of vacancies in undergraduate courses were granted to Cape Verde. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of students was even more significant, reaching 47% of all vacancies, explained by the 40% increase in expenditure and resources for the sector.²³

As a conclusion, it can be stated that, under Lula's government, there was more a focus and coordination on the South-South cooperation policy as a project of greater international insertion, based on the multilateral nature of the international system.

During this time, Brazilian projected considerable soft power in the country. Despite a greater concern in treating Cape Verde as a strategic partner, few practical actions in the area of defense were seen. Brazil made limited use of its hard power capabilities to support the development of Cape Verde's maritime security. Thus, Brazil was not very successful in the search for a more robust strategic leadership.

Rousseff's Governments (2011–2016)

Regarding Brazil's domestic political issues, the main development was the cohabitation of the two largest governing parties —the Worker's Party (PT) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). In Cape Verde, the legislative elections held on June 2, 2011 gave a majority of seats for the African Independence Party of Cape Verde (PAICV), the party of then Prime Minister Neves. The Presidential election, held on August 21, 2011, brought the Movement for Democracy (MPD) back to the presidency with the election of Jorge Carlos Fonseca as the powerhead of State.

In foreign policy, despite some differences regarding the prioritization of partnerships between the two main parties, foreign relations have been marked by pragmatism rather than exacerbated ideological positions. The diversification of partnerships prevailed (Violante, 2007).

During the Rousseff administration, Brazilian technical cooperation was not sustained at the same level of commitment and resources as under the previous government, despite the continuity of an Africa-oriented policy. In general, technical cooperation with the African continent declined during this period. This decline was less pronounced in Cape Verde, however, despite the difficulties that emerged after 2013, as Brazil continued to regard the PALOP as a strategic priority.

Rousseff continued several projects initiated or launched by Lula at the end of his administration, prioritizing their implementation, execution and completion. An exploratory mission was sent to Cape Verde in August 2011 to identify new technical cooperation projects in Africa. At the end of this visit, the two countries signed a US\$ 3 million cooperation package. This mission led to new agreements and investments in the areas of housing, culture, civil aviation, and telecommunications.²⁴ However, the decline in the numbers of projects/activities and of the allocated resources was already evident in 2012 and continued through the end of her first term in 2014.

22 They are part of the Integrated Consular System – *Sistemas de Atos do Itamaraty*. Available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/lista_ato_todos?form.button.Search=Search&search&keyword=Cabo%20Verde&b_start:int=30&assunto=&captcha=ufieb&aonde_ato=0>. Accessed on: 26 May, 2016.

23 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram 15/05/2007, 25/07/2007; IPEA, 2010; IPEA, 2013.

24 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 06/08/2011.

During her second term, the downward trend continued. There were fewer high-level meetings, the most important of which was held on September 1, 2015, when Chancellor Mauro Vieira attended the Third Meeting of Mechanism of Political Consultations where new possibilities for partnerships were discussed with Cape Verdean Chancellor Jorge Tolentino, President Fonseca, Prime Minister Neves, and the President of the National Assembly, Basílio Mosso Ramos.

The most relevant projects included: (a) Agriculture — the implementation of the *Support for the Development of Horticulture and Fruit* project, which started in 2008 and has yielded continuously good results in the introduction of new crops under technical responsibility of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa); (b) Health — the implementation of the first African Milk Bank in Cape Verde became a reference.²⁵ The fight against malaria and HIV/AIDS continued with the training of technicians. There was also the exchange of experiences and the formation of networks with health authorities, which connected Cape Verde to other African countries; (c) Social development — the project “Support for Housing Development in Cape Verde” implemented the “Casa para Todos” Program (a program similar to “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” in Brazil) and the creation of a unique registry of beneficiaries’ social programs (Violante, 2017).

Regarding Brazilian technical cooperation in defense, Cape Verde’s security and defense concerns continued to grow, especially regarding the “new threats.” As a consequence, Cape Verde sought to enhance partnerships aimed at staff training while acquiring new operational capabilities, technical resources, and strategic infrastructure. At the multilateral level, Cape Verde sought to interact with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and international organizations within the South Atlantic context. With Brazil’s support, Cape Verde assumed the Presidency of the ZOPACAS in 2014. However, the Eighth Meeting that was scheduled to take place in Praia did not take place. This weakened ZOPACAS as an

important security forum in the South Atlantic following its revitalization under the leadership of Angola and Brazil in 2007.

The Cape Verdean government’s concern has been maritime traffic at the intersection of the Atlantic basin and the Gulf of Guinea. Data from the European Union and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) showed that these illicit activities have increased and are no longer restricted to the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden. One response to combating piracy in the region was hiring private security companies. The government has granted a license to Cape Verde Maritime Security Services to exclusively outsource the use of its islands as bases for the loading and unloading of armed security teams.²⁶ However, this decision proved to be palliative and short-termed. Cape Verde, according to Zucatto and Baptista (2014), showed confidence in adopting a new joint maritime strategy that would provide it with greater interaction with regional International Organizations in the training of qualified military personnel of its coast guard.

Thus, solutions sought to reinforce its naval power through multilateral and bilateral channels. Naval cooperation with Brazil has increased in a relationship inversely proportional to the decrease in intensity in other areas of technical cooperation. The strengthening of this partnership resulted from conversations initiated in the previous administration. In September 2012, the Navy Commander expressed the desire to create a precursor nucleus of a Naval Mission in that country, mirroring or replicating the use of this successful model with Namibia, which supported the formation of that Navy. In 2013, the Brazilian National Congress finally ratified the defense cooperation agreement with Cape Verde, signed in 1994.²⁷

26 Seamarshals Gains First License as Cape Verde Fight Against West African Piracy. (2012) *Shipping News and Views*. 07 dez. Available at: <<http://shippingand-freightresource.com/news/2012/12/07/seamarshals-gains-first-license-as-cape-verde-fight-against-west-african-piracy/>>. Access on: July 29, 2021.

27 Available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_96/at_download/arquivo>. Access on: May 29, 2021.

25 Brasemb Praia para Sere - Telegram, 06/08/2011.

In this *continuum*, the Nucleus of the Naval Mission of Brazil in Cape Verde was created, receiving the following tasks:

- a. Carrying out a survey of the real needs of the Cape Verde Coast Guard, in order to prepare a proposal for a Cooperation Agreement between the two countries;
- b. managing the human, material and patrimonial resources under its responsibility; and
- c. advising the Ambassador of Brazil to Cape Verde on matters under the responsibility of the Nucleus (Brazil, 2013, p. 1).

Continuing its efforts to strengthen defense cooperation, Brazil established the Naval, Army, and Air Force Attaché Offices in Praia, on March 20, 2014. Their primary mission is to deepen bilateral ties between Brazil and Cape Verde, notably in defense cooperation, within the context of strengthening ZOPACAS and the CPLP.

The presence of Brazilian military personnel in Cape Verde has played an important role. Unlike the cooperation models adopted by some other countries, Brazil's approach has generally been characterized by its non-interventionist nature and its emphasis on partnership rather than the imposition of norms. This approach aligned mutual political and strategic interests, allowing Cape Verde to strengthen its institutional defense mechanisms while increasing Brazil's geopolitical presence in West Africa (Violante, 2021).

This analysis suggests that the structure set up in Cape Verde can be expanded, as it happened in Namibia, with the transformation of NMNBCV into a *de facto* Naval Mission. These Brazilian support facilities occupy an important logistical positions to provide support for the security of the main maritime routes from South America towards Europe. This cooperation model can be extended to other bordering West African countries, allowing a sum of efforts among friendly countries with common interests in the South Atlantic.

However, the Cape Verde-Brazil defense cooperation is still very small, compared to that invested by China, Portugal and the United States. Influence and power cannot be based only on the

application of *soft power*. For political and geostrategic reasons, the Cape Verdean strategy for defense necessarily involves the interaction of the Archipelago with Europe. For this same reason, Cape Verde has sought partnerships in the South Atlantic, particularly within the scope of the CPLP, that would provide it with greater room for maneuver.²⁸

Therefore, there is space for complementarity that Brazil could explore beyond the solidarity of Brazilian technical cooperation in defense. The strategic importance is relevant, particularly if Cape Verde's claim before the United Nations for the extension of its continental shelf be approved. Such an outcome would extend Cape Verde's maritime jurisdiction to an area in close proximity to the Blue Amazon, thereby reinforcing the strategic importance of bilateral defense cooperation.

In conclusion, considering technical cooperation in all areas, including defense, eleven agreements/adjustments to the basic cooperation agreement were signed between 2011 and 2016,²⁹ in addition to 29 projects/subprojects and isolated activities. Eleven projects started during Lula's term and continued throughout the Rousseff's administration, referring to new phases or new improved projects with programmatic content similar to those from previous administration. Anyway, it can be said that 18 projects/subprojects were initiated by the Rousseff administration. The total value of all projects reached us\$ 1,055,160.98 by the year 2016. According to the IPEA (2016), between 2011 and 2013, the total amount of South-South Cooperation reached R\$ 2,347,876.00 in current values of 2016 (pp. 24–26). Finally, Table 1 shows the number of new projects and the amount invested in technical cooperation in all areas with Cape Verde, during the period analyzed.

28 Violante, 2017 - Interview with Defense Attaché Luiz Fernando [include full name].

29 See the Integrated Consular System – *Sistema de Atos do Itamaraty*. Available at: <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/lista_ato_todos?form.button.Search=Search&search=&keyword=Cabo%20Verde&b_start:int=30&assunto=&captcha=ufieb&aonde_ato=0>. Accessed on: May 26, 2016.

Table 1. Cape Verde – Comparisons of Project and Resource Numbers (us\$) in technical cooperation under the Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff's administrations

Governments	Cape Verde –Number of Projects	Cabo Verde – Resources in us\$
Cardoso	17	70,884.54
Lula	61	3,232,430.68
Rousseff	29	1,055,160.98

Source: Table prepared by Violante (2017), based on data from ABC and COBRADI.

Analyzing other types of South-South cooperation, educational cooperation with Cape Verde remained one of the flagships of Brazilian *soft power* and *smart* strategy of public diplomacy. This country was the main beneficiary of the undergraduate educational cooperation program, which made it possible to send nearly three thousand Cape Verdean students to Brazilian universities.³⁰

In humanitarian cooperation, Brazil regularly provided donations of antiretrovirals, drugs for the treatment of malaria and tuberculosis, as well as food aid, particularly rice. Such assistance intensified mainly after the eruption of the Fogo Island volcano in 2014, which destroyed the villages of Portela and Bangaeira (Ipea, 2016).

In the field of science and technology cooperation, no specific projects were implemented. Nevertheless, since the previous administration, Cape Verde has benefited indirectly from technologies acquired in agricultural research by Embrapa and, in health, by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) (Ipea, 2016).

In conclusion, the analysis of Brazil–Cape Verde relations during the Rousseff administration shows a decline both in high-level visits and in South-South cooperation with Cape Verde from 2012 to 2013. Nevertheless, cooperation levels remained similar to those recorded in 2005, 2006,

and 2007 during the Lula administration, before relations reached their highest level of engagement. The most pronounced decline occurred from 2014 onward. However, the intensified defense cooperation, consistent with the National Defense Policy guidelines and the Foreign Ministry policies, sought to compensate adjustments within the continuity of the previous African politics, even amid the country's economic crisis.

South-South Cooperation Assessment

As discussed previously, this study originated from the identification of a gap in the South-South Cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde, during the period 1995–2016, reflected in the incomplete fulfillment of the political goals derived from the defense and the foreign policy documents. Beginning with the Intervention Theory—which provides a detailed account of governmental action from start to conclusion of any policy, program, or project designed to solve a public problem—, this analysis was guided by an *effectiveness model*, focused on the assessment of goals achievement, and the eight problems evaluation framework.

Theory of Intervention

According to Vedung and Pedone (2021), intervention theory analyzes decision-making processes by addressing the root causes of a problem, allowing policy-driven programs to modify the initial conditions. In this study, the theory is applied to examine the implementation gaps in South-South cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde, highlighting how decisions made by policymakers and state actors can alter these outcomes. In this sense, Pittol Trevisan and Van Bellen (2008) argue that the design of a public program, derived from a public policy, is synthesized, sequentially, in different objectives to be achieved. Figure 1 synthesizes the South-South Cooperation sequence of objectives, based on the analysis of the previous sections, by a complete and expanded Intervention Theory model proposed by Vedung and Pedone (2021).

30 Itamaraty Press Release on Educational Cooperation in August (2015). *Página do Itamaraty*. Available at: <<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/notas-a-imprensa/11076-visitaministroestadaofricaagosto2015>>. Accessed on July 20, 2024.

Figure 1. South South Cooperation Intervention Theory: Brazil and Cape Verde

Source: Prepared by the authors with adaptation from Vedung & Pedone (2021).

The inputs that stimulate the creation of a policy or program are: (a) Exogenous inputs — the strategic scenario, the regional and local reality of each country; and (b) Endogenous inputs — the national strategy and interests favorable to greater international and regional insertion, which can be exemplified in the Basic Agreement on Technical Cooperation in all areas, established in 1977, in the agreement on technical cooperation in defense, established in 2013.

The conversion takes place among government actors. The Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the Ministry of

Defense (MD) and the Brazilian Navy (Brazilian Navy - BN) prepare the program *per se*, represented by projects and activities of South-South Cooperation in respective areas, aiming at the achievement of political objectives.

The main intervention was the 1977 Basic Cooperation Agreement, which allowed for further adjustments and more specific agreements in other areas. Other interventions were the guidelines for foreign policy, national defense policy and strategy, which ratified a strategic approach between countries bordering the South Atlantic. Foreign policy, keeping in mind the particularities of each

government, was based on contemporary Brazilian strategic thinking.


The outputs, such as actions, projects and activities designed to address the factors that gave rise to their creation (the inputs), ultimately prioritized SSC. This priority was most evident during President Lula's second administration and, to a lesser extent, during the Rousseff administration. Only at the end of President Cardoso's term, greater emphasis on South-South Cooperation emerged, mainly through high-level visits and the establishment of an exploratory mission to Cape Verde.

The immediate outcomes derived from these outputs were reflected in an increase in actions, activities, projects, resources, and military exercises. As intermediate (medium-term) desired outcomes, emphasis was given to fostering cooperation in all areas, including defense, adjustments to the basic cooperation agreement, relative and limited reinforcement of the hard power of both countries and a more substantial *soft power* reinforcement. The final desired outcomes were aimed at establishing new or renewed programs and projects to meet Cape Verdean needs and Brazilian political and strategic objectives. The defense cooperation agreement, ratified in 2013, partially fulfilled these objectives by providing

the establishment of the Naval Mission Nucleus in 2013, and the Defense Attaché Office in 2014. These still embryonic projects were more concerned with strategy than with economic aspects. However, a more robust defense agreement has yet to be established—one that would enable Brazil to strengthen its presence in the South Atlantic and consolidate a *de facto* regional leadership. In the short term, the prevalence of rhetoric over concrete actions contributed to the non-realization of these outcomes. This gap was evident throughout most of the Cardoso administration, during Lula's first term, and at the end of the Rousseff administration.

The implementation of South-South Cooperation stemmed from several macro public policies, such as foreign and defense policy, and their subsequent strategies and plans. South-South Cooperation must be understood as a policy or program that results from government decisions aimed at projecting national power in all its dimensions, while simultaneously impacting recipient countries. The elaboration of the South-South Cooperation policy "design" was a multisectoral exercise, with no records of the greater participation of society and other civil institutions for its formulation and decision, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Conception of Decision-Making for South-South Cooperation




Source: Adapted from Vedung (1997); Vedung & Pedone (2021).

The answers to these gaps are clearer with the presentation of the goal attainment evaluation model, which considers the external factors involved, and the stakeholder model, which examines the interest that influenced the decision-making and implementation of the program.

Goal Attainment Model

Did the implementation move towards the desired results? It is subject to external control, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Model for Achieving Program Objectives



Source: Adapted from Vedung (1997). END – National Defense Strategy; PND – National Defense Plan.


This program must be understood as the product of governmental decisions for the acquisition of greater systemic relative power within both the national strategic environment and the vital strategic area. To contribute to the application of the proposed model, external factors — encompassing both the domestic and international spheres — must be analyzed. Government budgetary considerations, together with the fulfillment of the objectives set forth in the cooperation agreement, operate in tandem to achieve the intended outcomes.

The stakeholders — who were interested in achieving the political objectives of this program — influenced its results, as discussed below.

Stakeholders

According to Vedung and Pedone (2021), the stakeholder assessment model begins with the mapping of groups of actors involved or those who have some interest in the execution and results of the evaluated program. Thus, all those interested in government intervention are contemplated, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Stakeholder evaluation model



Source: Adapted from Vedung (1997). See also Vedung and Pedone (2021 p. 120).

The formulation of South-South Cooperation involved agents that exercised direct influence over the decision-making process. The internal decision-makers included the President of the Republic and his direct advisors linked to foreign and defense policy, such as the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Brazilian Navy (MB), given the relevance of the sea for an archipelagic state, such as Cape Verde.

A second tier of stakeholders comprised Brazilian companies and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) — partners in the investment process of the countries receiving cooperation — as well as the

Brazilian Cooperation Agency, which concentrates and organizes the implementation projects and activities with the second and third ministerial echelons. At the conceptual level, universities along with civilian and military strategic research centers were validated as primary institutions for shaping national strategic thinking. In stark contrast, civil society was largely marginalized from this process, playing a very limited role in defining the country's approach to South-South Cooperation.

Evaluation Approach in Eight Problems

Evaluation is a management technique for public organizations, in which there is selection and

fine-tuning of the examined problems and questions to be presented and answered. Therefore, it is exactly these problems and not models or methods that give identity to the evaluation (Vedung & Pedone, 2021). Thus, this tool adds another evaluation approach that ratifies the evaluation models presented in previous sections.

Basic purpose problem. The problem addressed in this paper is the evaluation and analysis of South-South cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde.

Higher purpose problem. This study may contribute to changing the implementation of South-South Cooperation initiatives in Cape Verde and in strategic environment of related countries, as well as in other governments such as a State Project, outlined by the government itself on how to conduct the country in various areas.

Organizational problem (evaluator). The analysis and evaluation were applied according to the following system: initial research > bibliographic review > related news > diplomatic telegrams > defense documents > e-mail interviews with researchers on the subject, Brazilian Navy (BN) military, Cape Verde military > analysis and synthesis of the material obtained.

Valuation object problem. As an object of evaluation, how can public intervention be delimited and characterized? This public intervention was delimited and characterized by the mobilization of specific policy inputs, aiming to defend vital national strategic areas and the South Atlantic from traditional and emerging threats. The conversion process entailed the implementation of the objectives established in the cooperation agreements, the objectives of the Brazilian National Defense Strategy (END), the Brazilian National Defense Policy (PND), and foreign policy in related actions and activities. The output was the prioritization of South-South Cooperation with Cape Verde in many areas.

Implementation problem. The desire of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the academy to project Brazil more assertively in the international system was only partially achieved. Therefore, public intervention failed to fully execute that objective. The main obstacles were

limited economic resources and the insufficient political commitment of senior governments decision-makers, who placed far greater emphasis on reinforcing soft power than on the hard power of either country. Thus, an unbalanced smart power strategy was implemented.

Result problem. The analysis reveals that Brazil integrated its foreign and defense policies through South-South Cooperation as part of a smart power strategy. This approach prioritized adjacent geographic areas by combining diplomatic engagement with the establishment of international agreements. High initial ambitions of the three Brazilian presidential terms failed to materialize the pretensions of regional leadership, greater international insertion, and induction of security in the South Atlantic. The relevance of all areas of cooperation was perceived and not just those specific to defense. Systemic changes have not been envisioned or rehearsed by political power. Brazil participates in international politics in a measured way.

Value problem. This assessment has the descriptive value of the problem. Prescriptive analyses are presented at the end of the research, highlighting the need to reinforce Brazilian hard and soft power to help South Atlantic neighbors to achieve their national objectives. All analyses took place after the fact, that is, from 1995 to 2016. It was found that the closer the cooperative actions were to the political-strategic objectives, the closer the South-South Cooperation “program” was to achieving a good performance.

As some and important final outcomes were not reached (new agreement in Defense, leadership and induction of regional security, greater projection of systemic power), it is understood that the project of international insertion of a medium and peripheral power, was only partially attended, due to gaps already discussed and presented. It is worth mentioning that the most effective actions of the program took place between 2007 and 2014 (Violante, 2021).

This imbalance between the discursive centrality of South-South Cooperation and the limited investment in defense, maritime infrastructure and productive capacity helps explain why Brazil was

unable to consolidate a more robust leadership in the South Atlantic, even in the period of greatest activism between 2007 and 2014, when other extraregional actors advanced more consistently in the Gulf of Guinea (Visentini; Pereira; Carvalho, 2013; Violante, 2021).

A more critical reading of Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa shows that, in the absence of an explicit State project for the South Atlantic and of stable budgetary commitments, South-South Cooperation initiatives have often depended on presidential diplomacy and short-term political cycles, generating discontinuities between rhetorical ambitions and material delivery on the ground (Saraiva, 2012; Stolte, 2015).

Usage problem (utility). As for its usefulness, we stress the importance of this assessment for the reformulation of an insertion policy through South-South Cooperation with its regional strategic partners. Thus, the research suggests that the achievement of objectives and goals that fit within the real and potential power of the country can only be increased by a more assertive state intervention, as defined in the high-level documents of the defense, the Itamaraty and the Contemporary Brazilian strategic thinking, planned and execute by Institutions inside the government bureaucracy.

Summary of the Program Evaluation

Each of the governmental periods combined their foreign and defense policies with South-South Cooperation projects with Cape Verde, seeking multiple articulations in the most varied multilateral and regional arenas, and in bilateral relations.

Analytically, the Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff administrations operated under distinct domestic and international contexts that conditioned their African policies. Cardoso's liberal agenda of 'autonomy through integration' and macroeconomic stabilization, in a post-Cold War unipolar setting, favored North-South ties and multilateral alignment with the 'Washington Consensus,' relegating Africa and the South Atlantic to a secondary position in foreign policy priorities (Saraiva, 2012; Visentini, Pereira, & Carvalho, 2013).

As a form of insertion, Cardoso, in his selectivity with developing countries, did not reach Cape Verde, disregarding its geostrategic importance. When prioritizing more vigorous economies in Africa, such as Nigeria and Angola, Cardoso failed to connect to important opportunities arising in an increasingly institutionalized Africa, open to new partnerships after many years of ideological, economic, and strategic "confinement."

The most effective return to South-South Cooperation, mainly in Africa, was designed at the end of the Cardoso administration and intensified during Lula's term. Thus, after capitalizing on a good part of the first term (2003-2006), Lula's second administration (2007-2010) marked the renewal of Brazil's strategic engagement with Africa after a period of relative neglect that had persisted since the late 1980s, particularly in its relations with Cape Verde.

A central priority of the Lula administration's foreign policy was to advance the reform of the United Nations, specifically targeted at restructuring the Security Council to secure a permanent seat. Consequently, Brazil adopted a highly assertive posture within its strategic environment, intensifying both bilateral and multilateral South-South relations to build regional consensus, while carefully maintaining its established diplomatic and economic axes with developed nations. According to Soares (2011, p. 84-85) these changes in foreign policy represented more than simple adjustments, but "without the apex of substantive changes in orientations."

As for Rousseff (2011-2016), she sought to continue the cooperative and strategic projects launched by Lula. However, starting in 2014/2015, the political, economic, and institutional crises caused a technical standstill and the extension of their deadlines for completion on a good part of the projects.

As a positive aspect of Rousseff's technical cooperation, it is worth highlighting the continuity of investments in educational exchanges cooperation, which grew even in the period of crisis, in addition to greater assertiveness in defense actions. In this sense, it appears that the Naval Mission Nucleus (2013) and the Defense Attaché Office (2014)

were the main Brazil-Cape Verde technical cooperation projects in terms of defense.

The analysis also indicates that South-South Cooperation was shaped within a hierarchical decision-making structure dominated by the country's highest political authorities. Thus, the officials responsible for implementing Brazil's South-South Cooperation initiatives and projects with Cape Verde had little room for maneuver in the face of the interests already defined by top political power. Therefore, preceding analysis was primarily based on the top-down approach to policy implementation.³¹

However, the external and internal circumstances of cooperation with Cape Verde changed in the period of greater assertiveness, which resulted in significant, if not sensitive, changes in the manner that projects would be implemented in its territory. In this case, the Bottom-Up³² approach, which considers the grassroots actors as key to the success or failure of a policy, program and projects, was also relevant (Violante, 2021).

Final Considerations

The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the process of implementing South-South Cooperation between Brazil and Cape Verde between 1995 and 2016, that is, during the Cardoso (1995–2002), Lula (2003–2010), and Rousseff (2011–2016) administrations. To this end, the research presented the intervention theory, the application of the goal achievement model, the stakeholder analysis, and the “Evaluation in Eight Problems” methodology.

The final considerations of this study ratify the research hypothesis: while Brazilian public intervention in Cape Verde was strategically sound

in its formulation, it presented significant implementation gaps derived from cyclical political and economic instabilities. The application of the Vedung and Pedone methodology leads to the conclusion that the project of international insertion was only partially achieved, revealing a clear mismatch between diplomatic rhetoric and material delivery capacity.

Through the Goal Attainment Model, it was observed that the period of greatest assertiveness (2007–2014) coincided with a favorable external scenario and strong internal political will, resulting in record investments. However, the Eight Problems approach evidenced what can be described as an “unbalanced smart power strategy.” This imbalance prioritized *soft power*—such as the successful educational and health programs—over more robust *hard power* and defense actions, which ultimately limited the regional leadership intended by the Brazilian State in its strategic environment.

Furthermore, the Intervention Theory demonstrated that these implementation gaps were deepest during the Cardoso administration (due to liberal selectivity) and at the end of the Rousseff administration (due to institutional crises and resource scarcity). From a prescriptive standpoint, the study concludes that transforming the Naval Mission Nucleus (2013) into a permanent, *de facto* Naval Mission is imperative to consolidate Brazil's defense architecture in the region.

Measuring the results of cooperation and its effectiveness is very complex, as cooperative models are also competitive and agreements need time and revisions in the face of new circumstances. In technical cooperation, in addition to areas of excellence such as agriculture and health, the defense sector must be further developed. The speeches of the presidents and their chancellors did not always fit with the pressing need to modernize the navies involved.

The defense architecture created in Cape Verde can be expanded, providing positive checkpoints for Brazilian ships transporting a large part of national exports by sea. Furthermore, if Cape Verde succeeds in its dealings with the UN for the inclusion of its Continental Shelf, this maritime area will approach our “Blue Amazon.” The protection

31 Top-Down approach refers to decisions taken at the top of the hierarchical scale, causing the implementation to start and occur as it was decided and formulated, without major interference from agents of other levels (Pülzl; Treib in Fischer et al., 2007).

32 Bottom-Up approach considers that the implementation must also take into account the employees of the other levels, since they are the ones that influence, locally, the implemented policy, program or project (Pülzl; Treib in Fischer et al., 2007).

of these waters against “new threats” is essential for maritime sovereignty, and Brazil cannot ignore the possibility of sending warships in cooperation with Cape Verde or under the auspices of Regional Security Organizations.

Ultimately, this evaluation demonstrates that South-South Cooperation must be viewed as a

vital State tool requiring long-term planning and budgetary continuity to protect national interests in the South Atlantic. Despite the lack of a greater number of resources, this cooperation can be a model for Brazil’s regional projection if it succeeds in strengthening hard power and not just soft power in the region.

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