

## Articles

# The role of policy design and administration in non-take-up of minimum income schemes: social workers' perceptions of the Valencian Inclusion Income

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## ABSTRACT

Relevant literature on non-take-up, i.e. a situation in which individuals entitled to a benefit do not receive it, has traditionally focused on the claimant's perspective. However, more recent theories propose a holistic model that emphasizes how the administration and policy design of benefits influence the rational decision to claim. These models highlight that factors unrelated to the claimant could generate information costs, application barriers or stigma that may discourage individuals from applying. Despite these advances, there is limited knowledge about the perspective and opinion of social workers involved in managing minimum income benefits. This research, using a survey-based approach to social workers, provides some relevant results based on their opinions. Firstly, the perception of non-take-up among social workers is lower than its actual magnitude. Secondly, the interactions and coexistence of schemes administered by different levels of government, but with similar objectives and target population, appear to contribute to the non-take-up of the regional benefit. Thirdly, a complex application procedure linked with a lack of information provision, together with perceived staff shortages and inadequate training, contribute to increasing non-take-up. However, for social workers, the existence of exceptional routes to access the benefit is seen as a positive factor in mitigating this problem.

**Keywords:** non-take-up, minimum income schemes, Renta Valenciana de Inclusión, social workers, social assistance.

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## INTRODUCTION

Spain introduced the Minimum Vital Income (MVI) in 2020, running alongside a regional Minimum Income Scheme (MIS). This resulted in two similar benefits being administered at different levels of government. This situation poses significant challenges, as differences in the design of the two policies may lead to disparities in their implementation. Moreover, the common objective of these benefits, targeting the same population, creates governance tensions, as it requires coordination between two administrations at different levels and with different competencies (Prieto-Lobato & De la Rosa, 2023).

In addition, MIS is associated with the issue of non-take-up, a situation in which individuals or households do not receive the benefit to which they are entitled (van Oorschot, 1991). As the objective of this research is not to estimate the non-take-up of benefits, a general definition of non-take-up will be used.

Traditionally, this phenomenon has been explained in terms of a cost-benefit trade-off, with responsibility placed on the individual for not applying (Kerr, 1982). However, more recent theories have developed a multi-level framework in which the role of public administration, policy design of the benefit and the broader social and legal context are considered crucial factors (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022).

Studying non-take-up is relevant because it undermines the effectiveness of public policies, hinders the achievement of equity and social protection goals (Almeida et al., 2025). It also poses a significant challenge for the design and implementation of benefits (Eurofound, 2015). Furthermore, the proportion of the population eligible for MIS in Europe who do not take it up ranges between 40% and 70% (Fuchs et al., 2020).

An analysis of the determinants of non-take-up is essential for implementing changes that reduce this issue. In this regard, the literature has mainly focused on individual-level factors, such as a lack of awareness of benefits, self-perception of non-need, the time and effort required to apply, or stigma associated with receiving a benefit, all of which play a key role in explaining non-take-up (Eurofound, 2015). However, the role of benefit design, administrative barriers and application processes have received less attention (Moynihan et al., 2016; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). There are instruments that can be used to measure the costs associated with applications relating to information, processes and stigma (Janssens et al., 2021). Although there is a research field addressing the role of social workers in the administration of public provision (Lipsky, 2010), there is still a clear gap in theoretical and empirical research concerning the non-take-up of benefits from the perspective of social workers involved in MIS administration (Dewanckel et al., 2022).

This is particularly pertinent given the governance challenges arising from the implementation of the MVI, as the existence of two similar benefits with different requirements may increase non-take-up of one of them (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024). The study therefore focuses on the perspective of social workers involved in managing these policies, with the aim of analyzing the administrative and policy design factors contributing to non-take-up of benefits. A case study of the Valencian Inclusion Income (RVI) will be conducted to identify barriers and generate useful evidence for the design, implementation and improvement of MIS in Spain and other comparable contexts.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, a review of the minimum income schemes in Spain is presented with a focus on the interaction between schemes. Second, we review the relevant literature about non-take-up. In section three, we present the method and data used in the research, followed by results. The final section presents the main conclusions of the analysis and discusses policy recommendations.

## MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES IN SPAIN: THE CASE OF THE VALENCIAN REGION

Traditionally in Spain, MIS have been developed at the regional level. These benefits were first introduced in the late 1980s. Shortly afterwards, all Spanish Regions implemented their own programs, driven by varying levels of political will, budgetary constraints, and socioeconomic conditions (Ayala et al., 2016; Aguilar-Hendrickson & Arriba, 2020).

This process resulted in a fragmented system of benefits characterized by significant differences in coverage levels, eligibility criteria, administrative procedures (Ayala et al., 2021), and levels of non-take-up (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025). The historical and regulatory development of these programs, together with their policy design and, in some cases, limited political willingness to support their implementation, has contributed to widespread under-coverage and high levels of non-take-up among those entitled to receive them (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). Consequently, these schemes have had a limited impact on their core objectives of reducing poverty and promoting social and labor market integration (Ayala et al., 2016; Hernández et al., 2022).

Following the introduction of the Minimum Vital Income (MVI) in 2020, minimum income schemes in Spain have gained institutional and social relevance (Arriba & Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2021). The MVI was introduced with the aim of establishing a common minimum income base, while enabling regional governments to complement this benefit with their own regional schemes (AIReF, 2022). Consequently, the current MIS landscape is experiencing a change and evolution as regional governments continue to adapt their systems to the MVI (Prieto Lobato & De la Rosa Gimeno, 2023), with different outcomes in each region (Albert et al., 2024).

Prior to the introduction of the MVI, the scheme in place in the Valencian Region was the RVI, introduced in 2018 as part of a broader reform of regional social policies. The RVI was designed following the experience of the MIS implemented in the Basque Country and Navarre, which were considered the most developed regional programs in Spain at that time (Bergantiños et al., 2017). The scheme was conceived as a broad social assistance benefit aimed at covering a large share of the population in situations of economic need. The amount of the benefit is linked to the statutory minimum wage and, at the time of its introduction in 2018, the basic benefit corresponded to 70% of this indicator, increasing with the household size up to 120% for six or more members. The RVI is granted as a subjective right and can be maintained for an indefinite period as long as the situation of neediness persists, although renewal must be requested every three years. Eligibility generally applies to individuals aged between 25 and 65, although several exceptions exist, for example in households with minors or in situations such as orphanhood, human trafficking or gender violence. In addition, the residence requirement prior to the application was established in 12 months, with further exceptions for specific vulnerable situations.

A distinctive feature of the RVI is that it combines economic support with professional social inclusion services, reflecting an approach that integrates income protection with personalized social intervention pathway. Beneficiaries may also have access to complementary support measures, such as childcare services, school meal grants, textbook assistance or university fee exemptions (Caravantes López de Lerma et al., 2026). Finally, the scheme is structured into four different modalities grouped into two main categories: minimum income guarantees and income supplements. The first group includes the Minimum Income Guarantee (RGIM) and the Social Inclusion Guarantee Income (RGIS), the latter requiring the signing of a social inclusion agreement. The second group includes income complement schemes that either supplement non-contributory benefits or labor earnings. In particular, the in-work income complement modality represents an innovative element in the Spanish context, where minimum income schemes have traditionally been incompatible with labor income. However, this modality has never been in place. The RVI established a new

right to social inclusion and access to an economic benefit, an aspect that was previously underdeveloped in the region (Caravantes López de Lerma et al., 2026). However, despite the positive aspects of this change, the RVI also faces administrative challenges. The complexity of administrative procedures and a lack of sufficient social workers may generate problems in its implementation (Muñoz-Higueras & Granell, 2020).


Regarding the administrative process, social workers are responsible for the initial assessment of each case. After a first meeting with the potential applicant, further intervention is usually required before the formal application for the RVI can be submitted. During these meetings, the documentation requirements, the intervention process, and the obligations associated with the benefit are explained. This preparatory process may take between one and three months and typically involves more than three meetings with each applicant.

Social workers offer support with document collection and fill out the application form. Once the application has been submitted, it is assessed and resolved by the Generalitat Valenciana (through its Territorial Departments), independently from the social workers. The resolution process may take up to six months and operates under a positive administrative silence rule. However, the benefit is recognized from the date of application rather than from the date of the administrative decision. In exceptional cases, such as situations involving gender-based violence or asylum, the resolution period may be reduced to one or two months. There is an emergency procedure established by law, which allows the applicant and their household to be considered as being in a situation of special vulnerability<sup>1</sup>.

The number of MIS beneficiaries quickly increased after the RVI was implemented in 2018, reaching a peak of 75,493 beneficiaries in 2021.

Figure 1 shows that the implementation of the RVI has led to a rapid increase in the number of people receiving a minimum income benefit in the Valencian Region. Recipients refer to the individuals who are formally granted the benefit, while beneficiaries include all members of the household covered by the benefit. According to the latest available data, the RVI still has more recipients than the MVI. However, this gap may close as the MVI develops further. Assessing the number of households receiving both benefits would be highly relevant; however, the lack of available data does not allow us to understand that.

**Figure 1. Beneficiaries of a minimum income scheme in the Valencian Region**



Source: own elaboration with data from Regional Ministry of Social Services, Equality and Housing of the Valencian Community and the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration (2025).

1 Article 42 of Law 19/2017, of 20 December, on Valencian Inclusion Income.

## NON-TAKE-UP OF MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES

Non-take-up of public provision is recognized as a problem for social policy protection. It impacts both effectiveness (i.e., poverty and inequality reduction) and efficiency (in terms of the cost-benefit ratio of policy implementation) while also creating vertical inequalities within the eligible population (Hernanz et al., 2004). Furthermore, while short-term savings may be achieved through non-take-up, the long-term costs may be more significant due to their impact on healthcare and equal opportunities for people (Eurofound, 2015).

Different estimations of non-take-up are calculated. Although these estimates vary depending on the type of benefit analyzed and the data used (Goedemé & Janssens, 2020), non-take-up is estimated to range from 20% to 80% in the USA, from 40% to 75% in Europe, and from 30% to 65% in Asia (Fuchs et al., 2020; Ko & Moffitt, 2024). This highlights the importance of addressing non-take-up to achieve social policy objectives.

In relation to Spain's broader set of MIS, research on non-take-up is limited. Regarding the implications of non-take-up, the study by Hernández et al. (2022) emphasizes the negative impact of non-take-up on poverty reduction in MIS; Muñoz-Higueras et al. (2023) explore the role of policy design and benefit features on non-take-up and coverage of MIS. The European Anti-Poverty Network, (2024) concludes that, among others, the higher the degree of neediness, the higher the non-take-up and defends the necessity of close social services.

Moreover, other research estimates non-take-up rates of benefits. Laín & Julià (2022) report a 47.7% non-take-up rate in the B-MINCOME pilot project in Barcelona. Noguera et al. (2024) estimates non-take-up at 75% of the MVI, with differences between regions and AlReF (2023, 2024) provides annual non-take-up estimates for the MVI of around 56%. For regional MISs, estimates based on administrative data indicate that non-take-up ranged between 55% and 95% in 2019, depending on the scheme analysed (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025).

As previously mentioned, a particular feature of the Spanish system is that two similar benefits can be received simultaneously. This may have a negative impact on take-up, as potential interactions between benefits can create confusion about eligibility for compatible schemes or concern about the loss of one benefit when applying for another (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024; European Anti-Poverty Network, 2024).


### Overview of determinants of non-take-up

Traditional literature distinguishes between two types of non-take-up. Van Oorschot, (1991) defines primary non-take-up as a situation in which an eligible individual or household does not claim the benefit. Secondary non-take-up occurs when an eligible begins the application process but ultimately does not receive the benefit. Secondary non-take-up refers to administrative factors, such as the application procedure, information channels, errors in the resolution process or budget constraints.

Literature proposes several theories to explain non-take-up. In the broadest sense, the take-up of benefits is the result of a trade-off between the costs (e.g. information costs, administrative burden and social stigma) and the benefits (the amount and duration of the benefit or other in-kind benefits). Consequently, eligibles will only apply if they perceive that the benefits will outweigh the costs (Kerr, 1982; Matsaganis et al., 2010).

New theories have identified four main sets of determinants that can be considered when explaining non-take-up: client, administration, policy design (van Oorschot, 1996) (see

Figure 2) and broader social and legal context (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). These sets of determinants have been extensively investigated (Fuchs et al., 2020; Hernanz et al., 2004; Ko & Moffitt, 2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024; van Oorschot, 1991, 1996). However, research into the role of administration and policy design in explaining non-take-up has received less attention (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Ko & Moffitt, 2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). In particular, there is a lack of research from the point of view of social workers who manage benefits (Dewanckel et al., 2022).



Source: Janssens & Van Mechelen (2022)

### **Client**

At the individual level, the decision to claim benefits often involves a trade-off between perceived costs and benefits. Several determinants have been identified. Households are less likely to apply if the expected benefit level is low or the duration of eligibility is perceived to be short (Hernanz et al., 2004; Bruckmeiner & Wiemers, 2012).

The costs associated with claiming a benefit could be grouped into different categories. Information cost include the time and effort required to understand eligibility rules and benefit conditions. Process costs refer physical or administrative hurdles involved in applying, such as filling out complex forms or traveling to offices (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). A lack of knowledge about the benefit also contributes to non-take-up, particularly among individuals experiencing higher levels of social exclusion (EAPN, 2024).

Other relevant costs include psychological and social costs, such as the stigma associated with receiving social assistance. These costs tend to be higher in the case of means-tested benefits (Baumberg, 2016).

Finally, social networks play a crucial role in shaping awareness of entitlements, as information about available benefits often circulates through informal channels. Factors such as residential segmentation may therefore affect individuals' access to information and ultimately influence benefit take-up (Bertrand et al., 2000).

### **Administration**

The literature has traditionally highlighted the impact of administrative and organisational set-up on non-take-up of public provision. Administrative features can create additional barriers to application (Peeters, 2020). In this case, the degree and quality of information provision, the user-friendliness of the application procedure and both the internal and external organization of agencies charged with policy delivery may have an impact related to non-take-up.

Improving the information provided by public administrations regarding eligibility criteria and application procedures is key to increasing the take-up of social benefits. Targeted outreach strategies, such as large-scale mailing campaigns, direct contact with potential claimants, or

sending social service workers to households, can significantly reduce non-take-up, particularly when communication avoids stigmatizing narratives (Finn and Goodship, 2014; van Gestel et al., 2022). In addition, effective collaboration between public administrations, for example between employment and social services or between agencies managing similar programs, can facilitate access and reduce administrative fragmentation (Raeymaeckers & Dierckx, 2012). While online application can reduce transaction costs for many applicants, they may be less effective for certain groups, such as older individuals or households experiencing severe poverty (Kopczuk & Pop-Eleches, 2007). Finally, the availability of high-quality and linked administrative data plays a crucial role in identifying potential beneficiaries, enabling targeted outreach strategies and opening the possibility of developing automatic enrolment mechanisms (Janssens & van Mechelen, 2022; EAPN, 2024).

### **Policy design**

At the level of policy design, the eligibility rules, entitlement conditions and benefit structure are all defined. It is also the role of policymakers to decide how the policy will be administered, within the constraints of the available budget. This in turn affects the costs and incentives that potential claimants consider.

These design choices limit the eligible population and indirectly influence take-up through political communication, administrative priorities, and client relationships (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). Literature indicates that targeted programs tend to generate higher non-take-up rates (van Oorschot, 2002), as they are associated with more stigma and increased informational and procedural costs (Bruckmeier & Wiemers, 2012). For instance, complex criteria to assess applicants' means require additional time and effort, while longer waiting periods further reduce take-up (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). In contrast, cash transfers are more likely to be claimed than in-kind benefits (Schanzenbach, 2009). While administrative discretion allows for flexibility and more personalized targeting, it also increases the risk of errors and claimant uncertainty (Peeters, 2020).

Furthermore, the way in which policies are designed has a significant impact on the conditions under which behavioral barriers, trigger events and network effects are more or less likely to occur. Targeted benefits aimed at specific population groups often involve complex eligibility rules, which can lead to increased procedural and informational costs for applicants (Bruckmeier & Wiemers, 2012).

### **Social context**

The client, administrative and policy design levels are shaped by the broader social and institutional context (Eurofound 2015; Janssens and Van Mechelen 2022). This wider social environment directly influences the psychological costs that potential claimants weigh when deciding whether to apply for benefits.

Public discourse and media representations play a significant role in this regard, as the fear of stigma is strongly influenced by dominant narratives about individual responsibility (Baumberg, 2016). When the media presents benefit recipients in a negative context, the perceived social cost of claiming benefits tends to rise. Cultural norms also influence these perceptions by defining when it is considered socially acceptable to request assistance (Reijnders et al., 2018).

The present study thus focuses on the perspectives of social workers regarding the non-take-up drivers that have been presented. In addition, it explores how the features of policy design and administration of the RVI could act as determinants of non-take-up of policy.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research aims to analyze the administrative and policy design factors that contribute to non-take-up of benefits, based on the perceptions of social workers. In this sense, the study does not consider the perspective of potential beneficiaries who are not taking-up the benefit. To this end, a case study of the Valencian Inclusion Income in the Valencian Region will be conducted. Although this approach does not generate causal inference, this study may also help to better understand other benefits affected by non-take-up, as administrative processes are consistently identified as a key factor in non-take-up analyses (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). Therefore, the aim of this study is to provide not only empirical evidence of existing barriers, but also useful tools for improving the design, procedures and implementation of these policies in different contexts.

### Questionnaire and data

The questionnaire used to gather the necessary data is entitled 'Management and Governance Models of Regional Minimum Income Schemes' (*modelos de gestión y gobernanza de las rentas mínimas autonómicas*). It combines structured Likert-scale questions with two open-ended questions, enabling the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data.

The questionnaire was not specifically designed to study non-take-up. Instead, it was originally developed to analyze issues related to the implementation and co-governance of regional and national MISs, and the processes involved in their administration. However, it includes a specific section of questions related to barriers to access to the benefit and non-take-up. The questionnaire enables an in-depth analysis of social workers' perspectives in primary social services on the administrative processes and policy design of the benefit. It was distributed online across several Spanish regions in June 2024. In the case of the Valencian Region, 190 participants completed it.

No specific sampling procedure was applied. The questionnaire was distributed to all social workers in primary social services who are responsible for managing the RVI. No financial or employment-related incentives were offered for completing the questionnaire.

The Regional Ministry was responsible for the distribution of the questionnaire to social workers; consequently, data related to the response rate cannot be provided. Nevertheless, after conversation with an administrator of the Regional Ministry of Social Services, Family and Childhood of Generalitat Valenciana has confirmed that our sample represents around 13.76% of social workers in primary social services administration of the RVI. It is not possible to establish whether this sample is balanced in terms of gender, municipality size and years of expertise in managing MIS. The non-probabilistic design and the percentage of responses align with the study conducted by AReF (2019). The questionnaire contains 26 questions, grouped into five thematic blocks, as shown in the Table 1. The questionnaire is presented in the Appendix.

The results of this research are mainly based on blocks 1, 2 and 3 as these address questions related to the non-take-up directly. The open-ended question is also analyzed.

The questionnaire uses a Likert scale from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the most positive / strongly agree perception and 4 representing the least positive / strongly disagree perception.

**Table 1.** *Questionnaire design*

<b>Block</b>	<b>Objective</b>	<b>Questions</b>
1. Benefit design	Analyze the design of MIS regarding to access criteria	9
2. Institutional design	Study the internal organization of management of MIS and the relation with other areas	7
3. Barriers to access	Reasons why people entitled to MIS do not apply it	3
4. Coexistence of benefits	Changes on policy design after MVI implementation	6
5. Open-ended question	Other relevant ideas not asked previously	1

*Source:* own elaboration

Additionally, the responses have been analyzed based on the participants' personal and contextual variables, such as gender, municipality size, and years of experience in managing these benefits. This analysis was conducted following evidence that these factors may influence the perception of non-take-up and its determinants (Sabag & Levin, 2023).

## Measuring and data analysis

This research adopts the conceptual framework developed by Janssens & Van Mechelen (2022) and presented in the theoretical framework to categorize non-take-up into different levels and sub-levels. This enables a structured analysis of the determinants of this phenomenon, with a focus on social workers perceptions of administrative and policy design factors.

The analysis focuses on the policy design and administration of the RVI, while also considering the broader social and legal context presented. Each questionnaire question is linked to a specific sub-level of non-take-up, as detailed in Table 2. In addition to these questions, open question (Q19) complements the analysis by exploring underlying reasons and general observations.

Quantitative analysis assesses social workers' perceptions of the factors contributing to non-take-up. Descriptive and multivariate techniques are used to identify patterns and priorities. Meanwhile, a qualitative analysis of open-ended responses reinforces the quantitative findings by offering a deeper understanding of the identified barriers and providing additional perspectives that may not have been captured in the survey.

However, it should be noted that the study is not without its limitations. The present study is constrained by the perspective of social workers, which may be subject to bias due to their involvement in the administrative process and their personal biases (Dubois, 2016). It would be very interesting to compare the results of the social workers' survey with the perspective of the RVI beneficiaries to see if the identified limitations are similar in both groups. Furthermore, it is important to consider the opinion of the policymakers, as they are directly involved in policy design and some of the limitations that have been identified. A future research line could be developed in this sense.

**Table 2.** *Non-take-up evidence*

<b>Non-take-up level</b>	<b>Sub-level</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Academic reference</b>
Policy design	Degree of targeting	1	(Holford, 2015)
		2	(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
	Benefit type and structure	8	(van Oorschot, 2002)
		18.4	(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024)
		18.9	(Manchester & Mumford, 2009)
		12, 13	(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024)
Degree of discretion	3	(Peeters, 2020)	
Administration	Degree and quality of information provision	5	(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
		18.2	(Janssens et al., 2021)
		18.3	(Janssens et al., 2021)
	User-friendliness of the application procedure	4	(Finn & Goodship, 2014)
		9	(Bertrand et al., 2006)
		18.5	(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023)
		18.8	(Kopczuk & Pop-Eleches, 2007)
	Internal organization of agencies charged with policy delivery	6	(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
		7	(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
		18.6	(Bell & Smith, 2022)
External organization of agencies charged with policy delivery	18.11	-	
	11	(Raeymaeckers & Dierckx, 2012)	
	18.10	(Fuchs, 2007)	

## Methodological approach

The stated objectives are addressed through a methodological approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques.

### **1. Data processing: Question categorization and correlation analysis.**

First, responses that generated outlier values (e.g., “Don’t know/No answer” or “Not applicable”) were transformed into missing values<sup>2</sup>. Second, the survey questions were categorized according to the levels of non-take-up identified in the literature (see Table 3) and followed a Likert scale ranging from 1 (lower incidence) to 4 (highest incidence) on non-take-up. A correlation analysis was then performed within each category to identify redundancies. Questions with a high correlation ( $r \geq 0.7$ ) were considered redundant and were either removed or combined, resulting in three questions being eliminated and/or merged to simplify the questionnaire and ensure its accuracy.

### **2. Descriptive and open-ended responses analysis.**

Once the questions had been selected, a basic descriptive analysis was conducted, including a mean, median and standard deviation comparison across subcategories, to identify elements that respondents considered to potentially contributed to non-take-up. Open-ended responses of Q19 were analyzed using content analysis to complement the quantitative data. This qualitative approach helps to identify key ideas and suggestions that enhance the interpretation of the results.

### **3. Group comparison analysis by gender, municipality size, and years of expertise in benefit management.**

Perceptions of non-take-up were assessed based on variables such as gender, municipality size, and years of expertise. These differences were analyzed using statistical tests such as ANOVA or t-tests. These categories were defined based on the information collected in the survey.

This methodological approach combines the identification of factors related to non-take-up with a more interpretative analysis, ensuring robust and relevant results for improving the RVI and similar schemes. The data collected and techniques employed address the research objective of analyzing administration and policy design factors that contribute to non-take-up from the perspective of social workers.

## **RESULTS**

This section presents the main survey findings on the administrative and policy design factors that, from the perspective of social workers managing the RVI, influence the non-take-up.

Before presenting the results highlighting the factors influencing non-take-up from the perspective of social workers, it is important to provide context on their overall perception of the phenomenon. Question (Q17) of the survey addresses this issue directly, revealing that 55% of respondents believe that there are ‘few’ eligible individuals not claiming the benefit and 7% consider that non-take-up does not even exist, with an average response of 2.57. In addition, related to the open-ended question (Q19), one specific comment is that: “*Here in the Valencian Region, everyone applies and when I say everyone, I mean EVERYONE*”.

This perception contrasts with previous estimations of non-take-up presented in the theoretical framework, none of which were below 55% (AlReF, 2023, 2024; Noguera et al., 2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025). This discrepancy may be due to different factors:

One potential explanation for this phenomenon relates to the limited scope of

<sup>2</sup> These responses are treated as missing values, as they do not represent a significant percentage of the responses. The missing values range from 0% to 6.31% of the total number of responses. Consequently, we consider that data does not have a significant impact on the outcomes.

interactions with potential beneficiaries. Social workers primarily interact with individuals who have already been identified as being in need of social services, particularly those who are connected to their own social center. Consequently, their experience is based on a subset of the population that has already established contact with the system. Individuals who are eligible but never approach social services remain largely invisible to them, which makes it difficult to perceive the full magnitude of non-take-up. This finding aligns with the broader literature on non-take-up, which shows that administrative systems primarily capture individuals who actively claim benefits, leaving the eligible population outside the system largely unobserved (van Oorschot, 1991).

Secondly, the working conditions of street-level bureaucrats may also influence their perceptions. As Dubois (2016) highlighted, frontline workers operate within significant organizational constraints, limited resources and cognitive biases that shape how they interpret the functioning of public provision. Research on street-level organizations shows that these institutional constraints strongly influence frontline behavior and perceptions of policy outcomes (Brodkin, 2011). In the context of Spain, other research has demonstrated how elevated workloads and shortages of resources within social services can have a significant impact on this phenomenon (Serrano & Arriba, 1998). These pressures may reduce the time and capacity for reflection about the existence of individuals who remain outside the system.

A third element is the lack of clear institutional benchmarks regarding the size of the eligible population. In many cases, there are no official estimates of how many people should potentially receive a given benefit. Without a reference point, social workers tend to evaluate program performance based on the cases they manage rather than on the gap between beneficiaries and the eligible population. This complicates the identification of potential beneficiaries who are not claiming the benefit.


## Descriptive and open-ended responses analysis

After responses were aggregated across levels, a descriptive analysis was conducted to identify the factors that social workers perceived as being the most influential in non-take-up determinants.

Figure 3 shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the responses, according to the non-take-up levels and sub-levels analyzed. Policy design factors are highlighted in dark gray while administration factors are highlighted in light gray.

This information can be complemented with the open-ended question. It allows respondents to share any information that was not previously addressed. Given the multidimensional nature of non-take-up, this is particularly important in this context.

To maintain the structure of the analysis, the open-ended responses were grouped using the same categorization as before, i.e. according to administration and policy design levels. While the information provided is more challenging to categorize, similar responses can still be linked to different categories.

**Figure 3.** Descriptive of non-take-up sub-levels

A total of 70 comments were collected, representing 36.8% of the sample. Some comments refer to more than one determinant of non-take-up. Finally, 81 items are considered.

Other responses could be linked with the previously analyzed categories, but it is necessary to expand on them from the client's perspective, as new items have been found.

The results of both analyses indicate that, from the perspective of social workers, even when considering the client perspective, it is evident that administrative-level and policy design factors have an influence on non-take-up of RVI.

In terms of policy design (dark gray), social workers consider that the benefit type and structure and the way of targeting represent the most influential factors.

**Benefit type and structure (2.44):** The survey refers to the social inclusion pathway. Thus, the RVI has an in-kind part (intervention and inclusion pathway) and a monetary part (amount received) of the benefit. Social workers consider that this process is not being carried out correctly, as the level of support could be higher, particularly in programs that refer to support for employment. Furthermore, from a social workers' perspective, being a beneficiary of the scheme and following the integration pathways could potentially lead to a stigmatization of beneficiary households (9.88%).

One respondent notes: *"Because they are ashamed to go to the municipal social services"*.

Finally, there is a clear result relating to the coexistence of the two benefits. The MVI only provides economic support, whereas the RVI also offers a social inclusion pathway. Social workers are considering (20.99%) the fact that only the RVI intervention and social inclusion pathway is presented, and that this is increasing non-take-up of the scheme because eligible households may prefer to apply only for the MVI, which has no obligations.

**Table 3.** *Information of open-ended question.*

Level	Sublevel	Item	Frequency
Client (20.98%)		Informal economy	4.94%
		Lack of knowledge	16.05%
Policy design (51.85%)	Degree of targeting	Selection criteria	14.81%
		Way of targeting	6.17%
	Benefit type and structure	Stigma	9.88%
		Intervention	20.99%
	Degree of discretion		-
Administration (27.16%)	Degree and quality of information provision	Information provision	9.88%
		Digital gap	1.23%
	User-friendliness of the application procedure	Application process	8.64%
	Internal organization of agencies charged with policy delivery		-
	External organization of agencies charged with policy delivery	Interaction between schemes	7.41%

**Way of targeting (2.42):** Respondents consider that the specific access conditions are inadequate. This scheme seems to be extremely strict in some areas, such as household composition and previous cohabitation, which are not linked with reality. They also note that the calculation of incomes and assets does not reflect the real situation. Highly selective programs can also increase the associated stigma, resulting in non-take-up of the benefit. All these factors make it more difficult for social workers to manage applications. For 6.17% of respondents, the design of the policy is increasing non-take-up.

**Degree of targeting (2.27):** This is linked to the previous point. Overall, social workers believe that the requirements for accessing the scheme are too restrictive and do not align with the needs of households in poverty and/or social exclusion situation. They also consider that the selection criteria are excessively focused on long-term poverty (14.81%).

**Degree of discretion (1.55):** In this case, the lower the score, the more the respondent agrees. Even if they are not mentioned in open-ended questions, exceptionalities are considered a way to facilitate access to benefits. In the RVI, social workers can consider a household to be in a situation of special vulnerability, in which case access to the programme is easier and waiting periods for a resolution are reduced. Social workers can create a situation of positive discrimination, which they also consider to be beneficial for managing the scheme.

In terms of administration factors (light gray) there are fewer differences between sub-levels.

**User-friendliness of the application procedure (2.68):** It has the highest score of all categories and is also presented in 8.64% of open-ended responses. This category refers to the complexity of formal procedures and the impossibility for applicants of completing them independently and directly online. This increases the application cost of the scheme. Without the support of a social worker, potential applicants would find it very difficult to fulfil the official requirements.

One respondent considers that non-take-up exists because: *“Due to the high DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED BY PRIMARY SOCIAL SERVICES”*.

**Degree and quality of information provision (2.45):** Social workers consider that the eligibility criteria are not clear enough for potential applicants, which is probably why applicants consider that the RVI is not designed for them. This is also linked to the idea that the system does not provide clear and accurate information about entitlements and requirements (9.88%).

**Internal organization of agencies charged with policy delivery (2.53):** Social workers consider staff shortages and insufficient training to be important internal problems. This sometimes results in a lack of support for potential clients when they apply. In this sense, a lot of changes to the normative characteristics of the RVI and the implementation of other benefits, such as the MVI, are being considered.

**External organization of agencies charged with policy delivery (2.37):** While social services that manage the RVI are linked with employment and housing services, the coordination with others, such as education or the third sector, could be improved. Social workers consider that the multi-level organization of MIS, with the regional RVI and national MVI, is resulting in difficulties when applying the RVI. The two benefits are not coordinated (7.41%), which has a negative impact.

An open-ended question summarizes the opinion of this percentage with the statement *“Because they already have the MVI, which has no monitoring or intervention pathway.”*

Finally, even at the client level, there were no questions in the survey. The open-ended question provides some interesting and commonly referred results.

The lack of knowledge about the RVI is presented on 16.05% of responses. There is the traditional determinant of non-take-up. It is also interesting that 4.94% consider the presence of the informal economy to be a disincentive for potential users to apply for the scheme. In this regard, social workers consider that the RVI must be compatible with labor market earnings.

## Differences between groups

Due to the characteristics of the sample, differences may be observed depending on the respondent's gender, the size of their municipality or their years of experience in benefit management. For this reason, the sample's characteristics are also presented.

Table 4 shows information about the sample and its characteristics. The predominant characteristics are female gender (85.26%), cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants (64.20%), and novel workers with less than five years' experience of managing benefits (45.26%).

Overall, there are no significant differences in the responses, even when differentiated by personal and geographical characteristics. However, the ANOVAs show that there are statistical differences between respondents' personal characteristics in relation to some specific questions.

Firstly, in terms of benefit type and structure, men have a higher and more significant mean. This suggests that male respondents believe potential beneficiaries do not receive sufficient support in understanding the benefit. This is similar to how men perceive the organisation of external agencies, which they consider to be the worst. This may influence non-take-up.

Secondly, an interesting relationship exists between municipality size and degree of discretion. The significant result of this is that the larger the municipality, the greater its influence on non-take-up. This suggests that there is more contact between social workers and applicants in smaller cities. This close relationship can reduce non-take-up.

Finally, in relation to the years of expertise of social workers, new recruits may consider use this degree of discretion to a greater extent than others. As they gain more experience, they become more critical of discretion, perhaps because they identify more structural or bureaucratic problems in the granting of benefits. Regarding the application procedure, a notable finding was observed: novel and more experienced workers find it easier than medium-expertise workers. There may be different reasons for this. Firstly, novel workers have only worked with RVI, so fewer or no legal changes have occurred. On the other hand, workers with more expertise may have sufficient knowledge to cope with procedural changes.

## CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This study examines the institutional and administrative barriers that may contribute to the non-take-up of minimum income schemes, with a particular focus on the perspectives of social workers involved in their administration. As a limitation, the perspective of potential beneficiaries who are not taking up the benefit is not considered. The case study used was the Valencian Inclusion Income (RVI), which was implemented in the Region of Valencia. The analysis therefore provides evidence from a specific institutional context characterized by the coexistence of a national minimum income scheme (Minimum Vital Income, MVI) and a regional program.

Our findings reveal a significant discrepancy between the perceived by social workers and the estimations by institutions and researchers regarding non-take-up. According to the responses provided by social workers, the perception within the administration is that the level of non-take-up is relatively limited. However, previous estimations suggest that the real magnitude may be considerably higher (AReF, 2024; Noguera et al., 2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025). This difference may be explained by an observation bias and the institutional position of social workers. As social workers mainly interact with individuals who already reach social services. Individuals who are eligible but never contact the administration remain largely invisible to the system, which may generate a gap between institutional perception and the real magnitude of non-take-up. Furthermore, institutional constraints have been shown to influence frontline behavior and perceptions of policy outcomes (Brodkin, 2011). In the case of the RVI, social workers are demanding more resources and training. Finally, the absence of clear institutional benchmarks regarding the size of the objective (eligible) population results in a situation in which social workers evaluate the program based on the cases they are managing. This interpretation is consistent with previous research highlighting that administrative and observational perspectives may underestimate the extent of non-take-up when potential beneficiaries remain outside institutional contact (Hernanz et al., 2004).

Following the multilevel approach of Janssens and Van Mechelen (2022), the research highlights the crucial role of administrative and policy design factors in influencing non-take-up. These findings should be interpreted as reflecting the perceptions and experiences of social workers involved in the implementation of the scheme. Social workers identified the complexity of the application process as the main barrier. Cumbersome documentation

**Table 4.** *Disaggregated results by social worker's characteristics.*

Sub-level	Gender		Municipality Size				Years of expertise				
	Male	Female	>0 <9,999	>10k <19,999	>20k <99,999	>100k	1 to 5	6 to 10	11 to 20	21 to 40	No
	27	162	44	24	68	54	79	39	28	29	15
(%)	14.21	85.26	23.15	12.63	35.78	28.42	45.26	22.10	10.52	14.23	7.89
Degree of targeting	2.18	2.29	2.22	2.37	2.35	2.18	2.3	2.28	2.42	2.10	2.2
Way of targeting	2.49	2.40	2.36	2.54	2.41	2.43	2.36	2.44	2.51	2.42	2.50
Benefit type and structure	2.68*	2.39*	2.39	2.5	2.49	2.40	2.38	2.38	2.57	2.62	2.33
Degree of discretion	1.33	1.59	1.38	1.25*	1.63*	1.72*	1.49*	1.64	1.6	1.44	1.73
Degree and quality of information provision	2.66	2.42	2.38	2.60	2.49	2.40	2.54	2.38	2.48	2.13	2.78
User-friendliness of the application procedure	2.67	2.68	2.70	2.69	2.58	2.78	2.66*	2.80*	2.72*	2.42*	2.9*
Internal organization of agencies charged with policy delivery	2.50	2.54	2.43	2.72*	2.42*	2.67*	2.56*	2.52	2.58	2.29	2.81
External organization of agencies charged with policy delivery	2.67*	2.31*	2.54	2.5	2.34	2.24	2.36	2.41	2.46	2.28	2.58
Mean	2.39	2.32	2.3	2.39	2.33	2.35	2.33	2.35	2.41	2.21	2.47

\* ANOVA test (p&lt;0.1)

requirements, long waiting times, and other administrative burdens discourage potential beneficiaries, a finding that is consistent with the literature on administrative burdens and claiming costs associated with social benefits (Janssens et al., 2021; Moynihan et al., 2016).

More specifically, the perceptions suggest that non-take-up may emerge from the interaction between procedural complexity and organizational capacity within implementing agencies. Internal organizational challenges within social service agencies, including perceived staff shortages, inadequate training, and frequent regulatory changes, further exacerbate the problem. When complex procedures are combined with limited administrative capacity, the effective burden faced by applicants may increase. These issues contribute to a poor user experience and hinder effective policy implementation, reinforcing previous findings on the role of administrative design and organizational capacity in shaping access to social benefits (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Bell & Smith, 2022).

Policy design factors also play a role. The features and structure of the benefit and the way in which targeting is implemented were identified by social workers as contributing factors to non-take-up. The RVI is a selective benefit with multiple eligibility conditions and behavioral requirements, including participation in social inclusion pathways. While these requirements are intended to promote labor market integration and social inclusion, they may also increase the perceived costs of participation and may discourage some potential beneficiaries from applying. In addition, the complexity of eligibility criteria can generate uncertainty regarding entitlement, particularly among individuals with unstable or irregular economic situations (van Oorschot, 1991; Matsaganis et al., 2010).

Another important factor identified in the analyses is the coexistence of the RVI and the MVI. The existence of two programs introduces an additional layer of complexity that can lead to confusion and discourage claims. This situation may be interpreted as a form of multi-level governance friction, where the coexistence of programs administered by different levels of government generates additional information and coordination costs for potential beneficiaries. As a result, individuals may delay or avoid applying for one of the benefits due to uncertainty about possible interactions between them or concerns about losing an existing benefit. Similar coordination challenges between overlapping schemes have been identified in previous studies on the interaction between MISs in Spain (Prieto Lobato & De la Rosa Gimeno, 2023).

Despite these challenges, the study also identifies some elements that may help mitigate non-take-up. While the degree of discretion afforded to social workers in benefit management potentially creates inconsistencies, this was perceived as a positive aspect. The existence of alternative access routes to benefits appears to offset the negative effects of cumbersome regulations, improving take-up of policies. This finding is consistent with literature highlighting that discretionary practices within street-level bureaucracies may sometimes facilitate access to social rights when rigid administrative rules would otherwise create barriers (Bell & Smith, 2022).

Our analysis shows that a multi-level approach is needed to analyze the issue of non-take-up and provide the necessary recommendations to reduce it. Key steps include simplifying the application process, improving information provision and increasing inter-agency coordination. Addressing staff shortages and providing social workers with adequate training are also essential for effective implementation. In addition, improving coordination between national and regional programs could reduce the administrative complexity generated by overlapping schemes, an issue highlighted in previous research on the governance of minimum income policies (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Prieto Lobato & De la Rosa Gimeno, 2023).

The findings of this study have several policy implications. Firstly, the simplification of

administrative procedures has the potential to significantly reduce the barriers currently associated with the application process for benefits. This includes the simplification of documentation requirements, the clarification of eligibility criteria, and the reduction of processing times. Secondly, it is imperative to reinforce the organizational capacity of primary social services. The increase in staff resources and the provision of adequate training would allow professionals to devote more time to casework and improve the quality of information and support offered to potential applicants.

Improving information provision is also a key element in reducing non-take-up. Clear and accessible communication about eligibility conditions and application procedures can help potential beneficiaries better understand their entitlements. In this regard, proactive outreach strategies, such as targeted information campaigns or direct contact with potentially eligible households, may be particularly effective in reaching individuals who are not currently in contact with social services (EAPN, 2024).

Moreover, a key consideration in such contexts is the importance of enhancing coordination between different administrative levels, particularly in scenarios where multiple benefits coexist. Greater institutional cooperation between national and regional administrations could reduce duplication, clarify eligibility and facilitate the exchange of information between programs. The increasing availability of administrative data provides a new opportunity to reduce non-take-up through more proactive policy approaches. The use of integrated administrative records has the potential to facilitate the identification of potentially eligible households by public authorities. In the longer term, this could lead to the development of automatic or semi-automatic enrolment mechanisms.

Although the results are based on a specific case study, they may contribute to understanding non-take-up in contexts that share similar schemes or institutional characteristics, such as the coexistence of multiple income support schemes. Future research should explore the perspectives of potential beneficiaries themselves in order to develop truly effective policies. This will help to ensure that these vital social safety nets reach those who need them most.

## AI USE STATEMENT

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## APPENDIX

### LOS MODELOS DE GESTIÓN Y GOBERNANZA DE LAS RENTAS MÍNIMAS AUTONÓMICAS (RMA)

Se le invita a participar en una encuesta relacionada con los modelos de gestión y gobernanza de los programas autonómicos de renta mínima. La encuesta se enmarca en el proyecto “Los retos de gobernanza y gestión inclusiva de los programas de renta mínima en el nuevo contexto social e institucional (REGIRM)”, financiado por la Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), con referencia PID2021-125710OA-C22 y coordinado por el Equipo Alter de la Universidad Pública de Navarra.

Su objetivo es profundizar en el conocimiento sobre los modelos de gestión y gobernanza de las Prestaciones de Renta Mínima en un contexto de convivencia con el Ingreso Mínimo Vital. Contar con su opinión es fundamental para ello. La encuesta tiene una duración estimada de 15 minutos. Toda la información que nos proporcione será tratada de forma confidencial y anónima. Los datos y opiniones compartidos solo se divulgarán de manera agregada, preservando así el anonimato de todas y todos. Agradecemos de antemano su tiempo y experiencia compartida, sin la cual sería imposible valorar esta cuestión. Muchas gracias.

### POLÍTICA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS

La participación en la actividad es de carácter voluntario, por lo que se precisa a continuación su consentimiento al respecto (clicando la casilla siguiente).

La encuesta ha sido diseñada teniendo en cuenta la normativa aplicable en materia de protección de datos [RGPD (UE) Y LOPDGDD (LO 3/2018)]. El acceso a la encuesta comporta el tratamiento de los datos de acceso electrónico a internet, conforme al enlace previsto seguidamente (<https://bit.ly/3Uo8lNX>). Las respuestas facilitadas resultarán accesibles sólo para el equipo de coordinación, erigiéndose la UPNA como responsable del Tratamiento de cualquier dato.

He leído y acepto la política de privacidad ( )

A continuación, encontrará 25 preguntas referidas al programa de renta mínima de su Comunidad Autónoma, divididas en cuatro bloques: A) Diseño de la prestación, B) Diseño institucional, C) Barreras de acceso y D) Convivencia con el Ingreso Mínimo Vital (IMV).

Al final del cuestionario, tendrá a su disposición un campo abierto para incorporar cualquier comentario o sugerencia que considere oportuno realizar.

### DISEÑO DE LA PRESTACION

En este bloque queremos abordar el diseño de los Programas de Rentas Mínimas Autonómicas (en adelante PRMA) en lo referido a los criterios de acceso.

1. ¿En qué medida cree que los requisitos de acceso al programa de renta mínima se adecuan a los perfiles de necesidad que acuden a su servicio?

Muy adecuados (1)	Adecuados (2)	Poco adecuados (3)	Nada adecuados (4)
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2. Señale, para cada uno de los siguientes requisitos de acceso y/o permanencia al PRMA de su CCAA, en qué medida cree que son adecuados para las personas potencialmente beneficiarias

	<b>Nada adecuado (1)</b>	<b>Poco adecuado (2)</b>	<b>Bastante adecuado (3)</b>	<b>Totalmente adecuado (4)</b>	<b>No procede en este programa (5)</b>	<b>NS/NC (6)</b>
Edad (2.1)						
Empadronamiento (2.2)						
Periodo de residencia legal (2.3)						
Determinación de la unidad familiar (2.4)						
Tiempo de convivencia en la Unidad Familiar (2.5)						
Cálculo de ingresos (2.6)						
Cálculo de patrimonio (2.7)						
Haber solicitado prestaciones previas a las que tuviera derecho (2.8)						
Estar inscrito como demandante de empleo (2.9)						
Disponibilidad para la formación y el empleo (2.10)						
Comunicar cambios de circunstancias (2.11)						
Causas de suspensión (2.12)						

Manifieste, por favor, su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones:

3. Las excepciones de acceso se configuran como una vía de ingreso ágil a la prestación (Ej. Situaciones de violencia de género; exclusión social grave, etc.)

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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4. El procedimiento de acceso al PRMA es comprensible para las personas solicitantes

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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5. El sistema encargado de la tramitación informa correctamente sobre el proceso de solicitud al PRMA

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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6. El personal dedicado a la gestión/tramitación de la Renta Mínima Autonómica en su servicio es suficiente

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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7. El personal de su servicio está suficientemente formado en la gestión/tramitación de la Renta Mínima Autonómica

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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8. El proceso de tramitación es ágil y sencillo para las personas responsables de gestionarlo

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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9. La solicitud de la prestación podría ser realizada directamente por las personas solicitantes a través de la sede electrónica

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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## DISEÑO INSTITUCIONAL

En este bloque queremos abordar el diseño institucional de los programas de rentas mínimas autonómicas y de las políticas de inclusión. Es decir, la organización interna de las áreas responsables de la gestión de las RMA y su relación con otras áreas o servicios responsables de llevar a cabo acciones orientadas a la inclusión social, como salud, vivienda, empleo, etc.

10. ¿Desde qué sistema deberían gestionarse, a su juicio, las prestaciones económicas de los PRMA?

- Sistema de Empleo (1)
- Sistema de Servicios Sociales (2)
- Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (3)
- Debería crearse un sistema específico (4)
- Otra opción, especificar: (espacio en blanco para rellenar) (5)
- No sabe/No contesta (6)

11. ¿Cómo valora el grado de coordinación de su servicio con las siguientes áreas o servicios a la hora de abordar los itinerarios de inclusión de las personas perceptoras de la prestación?

	Alto (1)	Medio (2)	Bajo (3)	Inexistente (4)	No procede, trabajo en ese servicio (5)	NS/NC (6)
Empleo (11.1)						
Servicios Sociales (11.2)						
Vivienda (11.3)						
Salud (11.4)						
Seguridad Social (11.5)						
Educación (11.6)						
Tercer sector (11.7)						

12. Durante la percepción de la prestación la persona beneficiaria recibe apoyo adecuado para su incorporación laboral

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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13. Durante la percepción de la prestación la persona beneficiaria recibe apoyo adecuado para otras problemáticas no vinculadas con el acceso al empleo

Totalmente de acuerdo (1)	Parcialmente de acuerdo (2)	Parcialmente en desacuerdo (3)	Totalmente en desacuerdo (4)
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14. ¿En qué medida considera que los siguientes servicios contribuyen a la salida del Programa de Renta Mínima? Puntúe de 0 (no contribuye en nada) a 10 (contribuye plenamente).

- Ordénelos de más a menos.
- La orientación e intervención de los servicios sociales (0 a 10 / NS-NC)
- La orientación e intervención de los servicios de empleo (0 a 10 / NS-NC)
- La aplicación de estímulos al empleo (0 a 10 / No Procede / NS-NC)
- La aplicación de programas de empleo protegido (0 a 10 / NS-NC)
- Las subvenciones o ayudas a empresas para la contratación de personas beneficiarias (0 a 10 / No procede / NS-NC)
- Otras (abierto) (0 a 10 / NS-NC)

15. Si su programa contempla estímulos al empleo ¿Considera que éstos fomentan la incorporación laboral de las personas beneficiarias?

Fomenta mucho (1)	Fomenta algo (2)	Fomenta poco (3)	No fomenta (4)	No procede
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16. Si su programa no contempla estímulos al empleo ¿Considera que éstos contribuirían en su territorio a la incorporación laboral de las personas perceptoras?

Fomentaría mucho (1)	Fomentaría algo (2)	Fomentaría poco (3)	No fomentaría (4)	No procede
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## BARRERAS DE ACCESO A LOS PROGRAMAS DE RMA

En este bloque queremos abordar los motivos por los que personas con derecho a solicitar la prestación no la solicitan

17. ¿Cree que existen personas potencialmente beneficiarias que no solicitan la prestación en su CCAA?

Muchas (1)	Bastantes (2)	Pocas (3)	Ninguna (4)
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18. En caso de que haya respondido que existen personas potencialmente beneficiarias que no solicitan la prestación, valore, por favor, el grado de importancia de las siguientes razones:

	<b>Mucha (1)</b>	<b>Alguna (2)</b>	<b>Poca (3)</b>	<b>Ninguna (4)</b>
Desconocimiento de la existencia de la prestación (18.1)				
Falta de claridad de los criterios de acceso (18.2)				
La persona presupone que no le corresponde (18.3)				
No solicita por cercanía de sus ingresos con el umbral - cuantía (18.4)				
Complejidad del procedimiento de solicitud y tramitación (18.5)				
Falta de apoyo en la solicitud (18.6)				
Barrera idiomática (18.7)				
Brecha digital (18.8)				
Estigmatización (18.9)				
Falta de derivación de otros servicios (18.10)				
Obstáculos del personal de gestión a su tramitación (18.11)				
Rechazo a someterse a ser controlado/a (18.12)				

19. ¿Podría señalar, por favor, alguna otra razón por la que personas potencialmente beneficiarias no solicitan la prestación? ¿Cuáles? \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

## CONVIVENCIA CON EL INGRESO MÍNIMO VITAL (IMV)

En este bloque queremos abordar los cambios sobrevenidos con la puesta en marcha, a nivel estatal, de una prestación de ingresos mínimos a nivel estatal, como es el Ingreso Mínimo Vital. El objetivo es conocer los cambios en el diseño de los programas, en el diseño institucional y en la gobernanza de los Programas Autonómicos de Renta Mínima.

20. ¿En qué medida considera que ha cambiado el perfil de las personas receptoras del programa autonómico de renta mínima tras la aprobación del IMV?

Mucho (1)	Bastante (2)	Poco (3)	Nada (4)
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21. ¿En qué medida considera que la aprobación del IMV ha producido los siguientes cambios en la gestión del programa de renta mínima de su territorio?

	<b>Mucho (1)</b>	<b>Bastante (2)</b>	<b>Poco (3)</b>	<b>Nada (4)</b>	<b>NS-NC (5)</b>
Incremento de personas receptoras de IMV en programas de inclusión (21.1)					
Complementos del IMV con otras prestaciones autonómicas/locales (21.2)					
Incremento de solicitud de información respecto a IMV (21.3)					
Desarrollo de estrategias formales de coordinación con la Seguridad Social (21.4)					
Desarrollo de estrategias informales de coordinación con la Seguridad Social (21.5)					
Cambios en las directrices de gestión (21.6)					
Reducción de presupuestos destinados a RMA (21.7)					
Ampliación de presupuestos en programas de inclusión (21.8)					

22. ¿Cuáles serían, a su juicio, los principales aspectos que deberían reformarse en la prestación RMA para la convivencia con el IMV? (Ordene del 1-10 (siento 1 lo más importante y 10 lo menos importante, según su prioridad)

- Modificar los criterios de acceso para cubrir a la población que no accede al IMV (1)
- Aumentar la cuantía para complementar el IMV (2)
- Definir un periodo de percepción más amplio (3)
- Reducir burocracia en el proceso (4)
- Mejorar la vinculación con programas de empleo (5)

- Conectarla con otros programas de inclusión distintos del empleo (vivienda, educación, participación, etc.) (6)
- Mejorar la información y conocimiento por parte de profesionales y de las personas potencialmente usuarias (7)
- Incrementar la agilidad en la suspensión y reactivación de la prestación (8)
- Reorientar el presupuesto hacia programas de inclusión social (9)
- Aumentar los mecanismos de control y las penalizaciones en caso de fraude (10)

23. ¿Ha asumido tu CCAA la gestión del IMV?

Sí (Filtro en caso de SI: ¿cómo lo valoras, espacio abierto?)

No (Filtro en caso de NO)

24. Filtro en caso de NO. ¿Consideras que sería positivo que tu CCAA asumiera la gestión del IMV?

Sí Filtro en caso de SI

No

25. Filtro en caso de SI ¿Consideras que es viable que esta se asuma en el corto o medio plazo?

Sí

No

## OTROS COMENTARIOS

26. Dejamos a disposición un espacio para recoger ideas, comentarios o reflexiones que considere relevantes y no hayan sido apuntadas en los apartados anteriores.

Espacio abierto

## DATOS DE LA PERSONA ENCUESTADA (marcamos respuestas obligatorias con\*)

27. Sexo\*:

- Hombre (1)
- Mujer (2)
- No sabe/No contesta (3)

28. Año de nacimiento: (campo numérico desplegable)
29. Comunidad Autónoma donde trabaja\*:
- Comunidad Foral de Navarra (1)
  - Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (2)
  - Comunidad Valenciana (3)
  - Castilla y León (4)
  - La Rioja (5)
  - Otra opción, especificar: (espacio en blanco para rellenar) (6)
30. Tamaño de su municipio
- Entre 0 y 5.999 habitantes
  - Entre 6.000 y 9.999 habitantes
  - Entre 10.000 y 19.999 habitantes
  - Entre 20.000 y 49.999 habitantes
  - Entre 50.000 y 99.999 habitantes
  - Más de 100.000 habitantes
31. Formación de base:
- Dipl./Grad. en Trabajo Social
  - Diplo./Grad. en Educación social
  - FP Integración Social
  - FP intervención sociocomunitaria
  - Lic./Grad. en Psicología
  - Otro (especificar)
32. Años de experiencia laboral relacionada con gestión de prestaciones económicas\*:
- (Campo numérico desplegable)
  - No gestiono este tipo de prestaciones económicas.
33. ¿Estaría dispuesta/o a participar en otras fases del estudio para profundizar sobre sobre las cuestiones tratadas en este cuestionario?
- Sí (1)
  - No (2)

34. ¿Desea tener devolución de los resultados del estudio?

- Sí (1)
- No (2)

35. Si has respondido sí en al menos una de las dos preguntas anteriores, indica por favor:

Nombre: (espacio abierto para rellenar)

Correo electrónico: (espacio abierto para rellenar)

Desde el equipo de investigación, queremos agradecerle encarecidamente su tiempo y su participación en la cumplimentación de esta encuesta de forma desinteresada. Su contribución es esencial para la generación de conocimiento y la mejora continua de las rentas mínimas en España.

## Glosario de conceptos

- **Coordinación:** la coordinación en el ámbito de las políticas de inclusión se refiere a la existencia de un modelo de gobernanza basado en la existencia de mecanismos y esfuerzos que se articulan para desarrollar una acción común. Esta coordinación implica a la alianza, armonización y el diálogo de todos los agentes implicados en la consecución del objetivo perseguido. En este caso, la coordinación requiere la buena armonización de prestaciones y programas destinados a favorecer la inclusión social. Para ello es indispensable contar con personal técnico que conozca los distintos programas, así como, con procedimientos que faciliten el encuentro y la información entre agentes implicados
- **Programas de inclusión:** entendemos por programas de inclusión aquellos recursos, servicios o dispositivos que incluyen acompañamiento profesional orientado a promover la inclusión social de las personas en situación o riesgo de exclusión social
- **Condicionabilidad:** La condicionabilidad en los programas de renta mínima hace referencia a la exigencia que la percepción de la prestación implica para las personas beneficiarias. Generalmente, esta condicionabilidad va vinculada a la disponibilidad para el empleo, la formación o a la suscripción de acuerdos y compromisos de incorporación sociolaboral entre la persona beneficiaria y el personal técnico gestor.