

Back to the Future? Bolivia after the 2025 elections

¿Regreso al futuro? Bolivia después de las elecciones de 2025



Jonas Wolff
Profesor de Ciencia Política en la
Universidad Goethe de Frankfurt y
Director del Departamento de Investiga-
ción "Conflictos Intraestatales" del Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).
wolff@prif.org
ORCID: 0000-0002-7348-7206

Abstract

It hardly came as a surprise that the 2025 presidential elections in Bolivia put an end to 20 years of only briefly interrupted rule of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). Driven by the schism between president Luis Arce and former president Evo Morales, the MAS party had effectively destroyed itself already in the run-up to the elections. Still, the electoral victory of the centrist politician Rodrigo Paz was hardly foreseen. If anything, it signals a popular demand for a real, but moderate change in course. In political terms, however, the end of MAS rule definitively implies a major shift. Given the serious economic crisis, the new government will also very likely enact significant –and controversial– changes in economic policies as well. This essay summarizes the results of Bolivia’s 2025 elections, discusses the causes that help explain them, and speculates about their implications as the country heads toward an uncertain future.

Keywords

Bolivia; elections; political parties; democracy; economic crisis.

Resumen

No fue ninguna sorpresa que las elecciones presidenciales de 2025 en Bolivia pusieran fin a casi veinte años de gobierno del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Impulsado por la ruptura entre el presidente Luis Arce y el expresidente Evo Morales, el MAS ya se había destruido a sí mismo en la carrera hacia las elecciones. Aun así, la victoria electoral del político centrista Rodrigo Paz era poco previsible. En todo caso, señala una demanda popular de un cambio de rumbo real, pero moderado. Sin embargo, en términos políticos, el fin del gobierno del MAS implica definitivamente un profundo giro. Dada la grave crisis económica, es muy probable que el nuevo gobierno también promulgue cambios significativos –y controvertidos– en las políticas económicas. Este ensayo resume los resultados de las elecciones de 2025 en Bolivia, analiza las causas que ayudan a explicarlos y especula sobre sus implicaciones a medida que el país se encamina hacia un futuro incierto.

Palabras clave

Bolivia; elecciones; partidos políticos; democracia; crisis económica.

1. Introduction

On election night, December 18, 2005, when the quick count results suggested 51,1% for indigenous cocalero leader Evo Morales, his supporters could hardly believe it¹. Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo* – MAS) were on the path to winning the presidential election with an absolute majority in the first round –something unseen in Bolivia since the times of the 1952 revolution. Former president Jorge «Tuto» Quiroga trailed far behind with 31,1% of the vote. Ultimately, Morales won with 53,7% of the vote, 25 percentage points more than his right-wing opponent. What seemed like a miracle to many had actually occurred: Over five decades after the introduction of universal suffrage, and after more than 20 years of continuous democratic rule, Bolivia was, for the first time, to be governed by a president of indigenous origin: a peasant leader who had risen to the presidential palace by helping unite a diverse array of social movements, indigenous organizations, and trade unions, united by an amalgam of socialist, anti-imperialist, indigenous, and national-popular ideas.

When Evo Morales took office as president in January 2006, probably no one imagined he would govern the country for the next 14 years. During this period, Bolivia witnessed its first democratically elected Constituent Assembly, which drafted a new constitution that, among many other things, declared the state to be «plurinational» (Postero, 2017). For the first time, the country's diverse popular sectors –peasants, workers, and people from the vast informal sector, many of whom identified as indigenous– gained a visible presence in, and meaningful access to, democratic institutions and the state apparatus (Wolff, 2018; Zegada and Komadina, 2014). Simultaneously, a commodity-driven economic boom and social and economic policies that departed significantly from the market-oriented («neoliberal») recipes that had dominated for the previous 20 years brought major improvements to the living standards of average Bolivians, reducing poverty and also inequality (Crabtree *et al.*, 2023: 116-125). While the forced resignation of President Morales after the controversial 2019 elections already seemed to mark the end of the MAS era², the party made a surprising return to power just a year later. In November 2020, with Luis Arce being sworn in as president, the MAS returned to the government (Mayorga, 2022).

It is important to recall this era of MAS rule to understand the significance of the 2025 elections (Anria, 2025; Exeni, 2025). As I will summarize in the next section, when Bolivians headed to the vote, the MAS had managed to take itself out of the game of electoral politics, giving Tuto Quiroga yet another chance to return to the presidential palace –but, this time, another surprise candidate made the race.

1. This paragraph is based on the first chapter of the book *Evo Morales de la coca al Palacio: Una oportunidad para la izquierda indígena*, published in 2006 by Pablo Stefanoni and Hervé Do Alto (2006: 17-26). The author acknowledges the research assistance provided by Johana Calle.

2. In the context of this brief essay on the 2025 elections, I cannot discuss the complex chain of events that led to the premature ending of the last Morales government and the subsequent interim government led by Jeanine Áñez (but see Wolff, 2020).

2. The 2025 elections

The 2025 presidential elections were the first ones in Bolivia in the past 20 years in which the MAS, while formally still on the ballot, played no effective role. Driven by the schism between president Luis Arce and former president Evo Morales, the MAS party had effectively destroyed itself in the run-up to the elections. After years of struggle over the MAS leadership, President Arce and his followers finally managed to officially take control of the party. This, however, did not decide the power struggle but merely led to the formation of competing currents and candidates outside the official party structure. Before the elections, four candidates emerged from the MAS camp, even if in the end only two participated in the vote: Andrónico Rodríguez, the young president of Bolivia's Senate from Cochabamba's *cocalero* movement who ran for the newly formed *Alianza Popular* (AP), and Eduardo del Castillo, President Arce's former Minister of Government, who became the official MAS candidate. A third candidate, El Alto mayor Eva Copa, who would have been the only female contender for the presidency, withdrew her candidacy a few weeks before the elections, denouncing «political harassment» against her and her party *Movimiento de Renovación Nacional* (Morena) (El Día 2025). Finally, while it was clear early on that his candidacy would not be accepted by the relevant authorities, Evo Morales tried until the very last moment to get himself on the ballot³. In the end, he did not support his former protégé Andrónico Rodríguez but called for a null vote.

The traditional opposition camp also proved incapable of implementing its original plan to unity behind a single candidate. Ultimately, four candidates emerged as relevant contenders. Frontrunner, according to most opinion polls, was businessman and long-time opposition politician Samuel Doria Medina for *Alianza Unidad*, a center-right electoral alliance formed around Doria Medina's party *Unidad Nacional* (UN) and *Creemos* of imprisoned governor of Santa Cruz Luis Fernando Camacho. The second candidate with serious chances of making it to the second round was former president Tuto Quiroga. His electoral alliance, *Alianza Libre*, brought together factions of different centrist and right-wing parties, including the conservative *Movimiento Demócrata Social* (MDS) of long-term Santa Cruz governor Rubén Costas. Two further candidates received some relevant popular support, according to polls, but were mostly seen as without a meaningful chance to make it to the run-off: Cochabamba governor Manfred Reyes Villa for the newly formed party *Autonomía Para Bolivia* (APB) *Súmate*, and Rodrigo Paz Pereira, son of former president Jaime Paz Zamora, member of the Senate and former mayor of Tarija, who ran on the ticket of the traditional Christian-Democratic party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano* – PDC).

3. In 2024, Bolivia's Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional – TCP) issued a controversial decision that prohibited more than two presidential terms, even if they are not consecutive, whereas the constitution itself only mentions restrictions for consecutive terms. This decision, which effectively disqualified Morales, was reaffirmed by a TCP ruling in May 2025 (TCP 2025). Ultimately, however, this controversial decision didn't matter. Morales was unable to even try to register his candidacy because the electoral tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral – TSE) rejected his attempt to regain control of the MAS as well as his plea to overturn the cancellation of the party (Partido de Acción Nacional Boliviano – PAN-Bol) that would have accepted Morales as its candidate (Brújula Digital 2025).

The loss of power of the MAS was, therefore, a story foretold, but the electoral victory of Paz hardly foreseen. In the end, however, a significant share of those who would no longer vote for the MAS and its competing splinter groups decided to support a centrist candidate. Paz signaled less of a radical change in course, combining social-democratic ideas with calls for liberal economic reforms and an emphasis on decentralization, also promising to reunify Bolivia's polarized society (Jáuregui, 2025). Also, analysts have concluded, Rodrigo Paz's candidate for vice president, former policemen and political outsiders Edman «Capitán» Lara, likely brought him additional votes, facilitating the capture of former MAS voters among Bolivia's popular sectors. Paz and Lara, therefore, offered to voters a kind of «third way» between the MAS and the return of the old, elite-based rightwing forces (Exeni, 2025; Stefanoni and Velásquez, 2025).

Be this as it may, Rodrigo Paz won the first round of the presidential elections with 32,1% before Tuto Quiroga who also made it to the run-off with 26,7%⁴. Doria Medina received 19,7%, and Manfred Reyes Villa 6,8%. The candidate from the MAS camp who received most votes was the young president of the Senate Andrónico Rodríguez (8,5%). Eduardo del Castillo, the official MAS candidate, got a mere 3,2%. In terms of the vote share, the candidate that was banned from participation, Evo Morales, was the most successful one among the former MAS leaders: In the end, almost 20% followed his call for a null vote. While not every null vote can be considered a de facto vote for Morales, the share was significantly higher than in the previous five elections, when it never reached 5% (El Diario, 2025).

On 19 October, Bolivia –for the first time– celebrated a run-off election for the presidency⁵. At the time of finalizing this article, while the votes were still being counted, the electoral authorities had already announced an «irreversible trend» in favor of Paz, who was leading with 54,5% over 45,5% for Quiroga (La Razón, 2025).

In Bolivia's two-chamber parliament, which was elected during the first round of the presidential elections, the PDC will hold 65 of the 166 seats. For a majority, the PDC therefore needs the support of other parties, the most likely candidate being *Alianza Unidad* of Doria Medina (34 seats), who supported Paz in the second round. The second force in the new *Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional* will be Tuto Quiroga's *Alianza Libre* (51 seats). Andrónico Rodríguez' AP won eight seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the MAS will have two representatives, and Reyes Villa's APB *Súmate* one senator. Furthermore, and for the first time since the introduction of special electoral districts for indigenous peoples, an indigenous organization won a seat in the *Cámara de Diputados* without being represented by a political party: the *Consejo Indígena Yuqui Bia Recuate* (Bia-Yuqui) from the department of Cochabamba (El Deber 2025).

The pre-electoral process was characterized by a high degree of polarization and serious conflicts, particularly regarding the dispute over Evo Morales's controversial and ultimately unsuccessful candidacy (Breda, 2025; Qui-

4. For the official results, see OEP (2025) and MOE Bolivia (2025a).

5. The option of a second round for presidential elections was only introduced with the new constitution in 2009.

roga *et al.*, 2025: 41-69). The elections themselves, as international observers confirmed, however «proceed peacefully, orderly, and well organized» (MOE Bolivia 2025b; see also OEA 2025). For this, it was certainly helpful that Morales did not participate, while the government candidate had no chance of winning anyway, and that the results were unambiguous. Still, as Santiago Anria has emphasized, against the backdrop of polarization and the significance of the imminent political change, «the MAS's potential relinquishing of power in accordance with constitutional norms is no small achievement, especially considering all the arguments about how Bolivia was an authoritarian (albeit competitive) regime» (Anria, 2025: 101).

3. Making sense of the results: Triggers and causes

In order to make sense of the election results, in this section I will briefly discuss three key dynamics: first, the gradual demise and ultimate division of the MAS as the erstwhile broad and powerful alliance of sociopolitical forces; second, the crisis of the economic development model that was established during and helped sustain MAS rule; third, the dynamics within the opposition and the electorate.

The conflict between President Arce and his camp (arcistas) and former President Morales and his supporters (evistas), which culminated in the division of the MAS, was basically a power struggle, driven by competing personal calculations rather than ideological differences. Still, it also reflects a longer process of gradual demise of the MAS (see Anria, 2025; Stefanoni and Velásquez, 2025). The MAS's original success was enabled by its (and Evo Morales's) capacity to unite a broad alliance of sociopolitical forces under an agenda that combined a socialist and anti-imperialist, an indigenous and a national-popular agenda. This alliance was institutionalized by the MAS party, which was formed by key campesino organizations, and its alliances with the main trade union confederation (COB) and the country's main indigenous movement organizations CIDOB and CONAMAQ (with the Pacto de la Unidad – Unity Pact) (Anria, 2019). It already started to fracture back in 2011 with the TIPNIS conflict at the latest. In essence, with the new constitution adopted, the MAS agenda of deepening and pluralizing democracy and transforming the state in terms of a plurinational agenda largely came to an end. More and more, securing the endurance in government became the core political purpose. This was accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian attitude towards all kind of dissent and the willingness to circumvent constitutional regulations, such as most notably the established term limits for presidents. In addition to mobilizing a broad opposition movement between 2016 and 2019, this also contributed to dividing the social organizations affiliated with the MAS and demobilizing its constituency. The seeds for the demise of the MAS were, thus, already planted before Arce took power –which was only temporarily reversed as the interim government led by Jeanine Áñez helped reunify the MAS, its allies and constituencies (Mayorga, 2022).

A key factor that sustained popular support for the MAS despite the gradual demise of its original agenda of change was the socioeconomic success of its

neodevelopmentalist policies, which brought significant improvements for vast parts of the population (Crabtree *et al.*, 2023: 116-125; Salazar, 2024). The promise that with Arce the supposed architect of this economic development model would return to power was arguably a crucial element in the electoral victory of 2020. Consequently, the obvious inability of the Arce government to deal with the open crisis of the development model, which proved all-too depended on gas extraction and exports (Agramont, 2025), meant a deadly blow to popular support. Most notably, the severe shortage of US dollars and fuel has led to the emergence of a parallel currency market and long queues at petrol stations, rendering Arce's strategy of simply denying the crisis of the development model untenable (Salazar, 2024). At the same time, while less relevant for public opinion, wildfires also dramatically illustrated the environmental costs associated with Bolivia's resource- and extensive land use-based development model (Agramont, 2025: 71).

In quite a few countries across Latin America, the mobilization against, and the disappointment with left-wing governments have led to the rise of radical right-wing figures like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil or Javier Milei in Argentina. Temporarily, possibilities of a Bolivian Milei were seriously discussed as options, but in the end all opposition candidates with serious chances of winning were mainstream politicians. Among them, Tuto Quiroga promised the most radical change. Quiroga was vice president of Hugo Bánzer, a former dictator later being elected president, and, after Bánzer resigned for health reasons, became president for the remaining term (2001-2002). Ever since, he has remained an influential political figure in the center-right spectrum of Bolivian Politics. Quiroga has a clear-cut right-wing profile, combing social and political conservatism with economic liberalism, calling for austerity, neoliberal structural adjustment under IMF auspices (Brown, 2025). As Stefanoni and Velásquez recall, Quiroga promised «the greatest liberal revolution in history to transform Bolivia's mindset», using not only the «chainsaw», as Milei, but also «machetes and scissors» (Stefanoni and Velásquez, 2025: 15).

Rodrigo Paz, in contrast, is a centrist politician. He entered Bolivian politics in 2002 as a congressman for the party of his father and former president Jaime Paz Zamora, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR), which at that time had become a centrist establishment party. Between 2015 and 2020, he was mayor of Tarija before, in 2020, being elected Senator for Carlos Mesa's party *Comunidad Ciudadana*. In addition to an agenda of decentralization, the keyword of his 2025 campaign was «capitalism for all» (*capitalismo para todos*), suggesting a departure from the statist approach of the MAS while simultaneously marking a difference to the neoliberal agenda represented by Quiroga (Jáuregui, 2025; see also Brown, 2025).

By electing Paz, Bolivians have voted for change, but also against polarization and a radical break with the country's most recent past. This is quite remarkably for a country that has long been regarded as heavily polarized. If anything, the elections therefore signal a popular demand for real, but moderate policy change, a call for stability and calm instead of radical disruption. Meanwhile, the demand for an outsider candidate was met by Paz' running mate Edmand Lara.

4. Outlook

It is hard to overstate the relevance of the elections for Bolivia. While the forced resignation of President Morales after the controversial 2019 elections already seemed to mark an end to the era of MAS rule (Wolff, 2020), the party made a surprising return to power just a year later. Now, however, it is safe to say that Bolivia is entering a new period, in which the social forces and the competing political figures that previously were associated with the MAS will mainly –once again– act from outside the formal democratic institutions.

The new political configuration bears significant similarities to the pre-MAS years: A president without majority in parliament and the need to negotiate pacts with other mainstream political parties, aiming to implement economic reforms that will most likely provoke resistance, in particular from the leftist forces and popular-sector organizations that are –once again– hardly represented in the political institutions but retain the capacity to mobilize protest. In macroeconomic terms, the situation is probably more difficult than it has ever been since the deep crisis of 1982-1985 (Agramont, 2025).

This configuration looks quite conflict-prone (Quiroga *et al.*, 2025: 73-89). The new government will face the need to adopt immediate and certainly controversial measures to address the economic crisis, above all the fiscal deficit and the shortage in US dollars. While Rodrigo Paz has called for a «capitalism for all» and rejected the turn to the IMF, it remains to be seen whether he will be able to avoid the kind of macroeconomic stabilization and neoliberal structural adjustment measures that were implemented after 1985 and pursue a heterodox course that includes redistributive measures and also challenges, e.g., the vested interests of the booming export sectors (gold, agribusiness). The latter might enable Paz to build a broader sociopolitical alliance and govern in a rather inclusive way. Further questions relate to possible politico-institutional reforms. The most urgent one, most observers agree, concerns the judiciary, which is in a state of open crisis.

Whatever the specific path the new government will take, the implications of the end of the MAS era go beyond the end of one specific government. The MAS was a crucial vehicle of political incorporation that has made Bolivian democracy more representative and inclusive (Anria, 2019; Wolff, 2018). A crucial question is, therefore, what will happen to the political and social space previously occupied by the MAS. This concerns the party system, but also the social organizations and movements as well as the general constituency of the MAS. With a view to the party system, the electoral defeat could theoretically present an opportunity for reunification –as during the Áñez government (Mayorga, 2022). At the time of writing, however, not much suggested that key MAS figures –starting with Evo Morales himself– would again show the ability to compromise and unify. The subnational-level elections, scheduled for March 2026, will be a first test in this regard. Perhaps even more important for Bolivian democracy, however, is the fate of the broad range of social organizations and movements that had brought the MAS to power in the first place. Will these organizations, which are currently weakened and openly divided, use the end of the MAS as we know it to reunite and recuperate part of their previous strength? Will they manage to find new

ways of mobilizing and making their voices heard? Will they be accepted as relevant interlocutors also by the new Paz government, or will they rather face a new phase of exclusion and repression?

References

- Agramont-Lechín, D. (2025): «De la bonanza a la vulnerabilidad: Bolivia y los límites del modelo neoextractivista». In: *La Bolivia del futuro: Innovación y diversificación post-extractivista*, pp. 23-95. La Paz: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Anria, S. (2019): *When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anria, S. (2025): «Why Bolivia's MAS Collapsed». *Journal of Democracy*, 36(4): 92-103. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2025.a970351>
- Breda, T. (2025, August 7): «Bolivia Braces for Tense Elections as Ruling Party Implodes». *ACLEDA Election Watch*. Available at: <https://acleddata.com/report/bolivia-braces-tense-elections-ruling-party-implodes>
- Brown, R. (2025, August 18): «Bolivia: Meet the Candidates 2025». *Americas Quarterly*. Available at: <https://americasquarterly.org/article/bolivia-candidates-2025>
- Brújula Digital (2025, July 7): «Presidente del TSE envía carta a Evo en la que confirma que no será candidato en estas elecciones». *Brújula Digital*. Available at: <https://brujuladigital.net/politica/2025/07/08/presidente-del-tse-envia-carta-a-evo-en-la-que-confirma-que-no-sera-candidato-en-estas-elecciones-48396>.
- Crabtree, J.; Durand, F., & Wolff, J. (2023): *Business Power and the State in the Central Andes: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru in Comparison*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- El Deber (2025, August 22): «Por primera vez una organización indígena gana un diputado sin un partido político, destaca el TSE». *El Deber*. Available at: https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/por-primera-vez-una-organizacion-indigena-gana-un-diputado-sin-un-partido-politico-destaca-el-tse_527428/
- El Día (2025, July 28): «Morena y Eva Copa se bajan de las elecciones: quedan ocho partidos y alianzas en carrera». *El Día*. Available at: <https://www.eldia.com.bo/2025-07-28/tag/morena-y-eva-copa-se-bajan-de-las-elecciones-quedan-ocho-partidos-y-alianzas-en-carrera.html>
- El Diario (2025, August 22): «Tres factores explican voto nulo de casi 20%». *El Diario*. Available at: <https://www.eldiario.net/portal/2025/08/22/tres-factores-explican-voto-nulo-de-casi-20/>
- Exeni Rodríguez, J.L. (2025): «Bolivia: el fin del ciclo 'nacional-popular'». *Nueva Sociedad*. Available at: <https://nuso.org/articulo/Bolivia-fin-de-ciclo>
- Jáuregui, L. (2025, August 18): «Rodrigo Paz: las razones detrás de una sorpresa electoral en Bolivia». *El País*. Available at: <https://elpais.com/america/2025-08-18/rodrigo-paz-las-razones-detras-de-una-sorpresa-electoral-en-bolivia.html>
- La Razón (2025, October 19): «Con datos del Sirepre, Paz gana el balotaje con el 54,5%». *La Razón*. Available at: <https://larazon.bo/nacional/2025/10/19/con-datos-del-sirepre-paz-gana-el-balotaje-con-el-545>

- Mayorga, F. (2022): *Resistir y retornar. Avatares del proceso decisional en el MAS-IPSP (2019-2021)*. La Paz: FES Bolivia.
- MOE Bolivia (Misión de Observación Electoral de la Unión Europea Bolivia) (2025a, August 27): «El TSE oficializa resultados y confirma balotaje para el 19 de octubre». Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/moe-bolivia-2025/el-tse-oficializa-resultados-y-confirma-balotaje-para-el-19-de-octubre_es
- MOE Bolivia (2025b, August 19): «Primeras conclusiones de la Misión: Bolivia celebra unas elecciones bien organizadas en un contexto plural y competitivo». Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/moe-bolivia-2025/primeras-conclusiones-de-la-misi%C3%B3n-bolivia-celebra-unas-elecciones-bien-organizadas-en-un-contexto_es
- OEA (Organización de los Estados Americanos) (2025): «Elecciones Generales 2025 en Bolivia: Informa Preliminar. Misión de Observación Electoral de la OEA». Available at: https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2025_BOLIVIA_MOE_Elecciones_Generales_Informe_Preliminar_ESP.pdf.
- OEP (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional) (2025): «Acta de Cómputo Nacional: Elección de Autoridades y Representantes del Estado Plurinacional 2025». La Paz: OEP. Available at: <https://web.oep.org.bo/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ACTA-DE-COMPUTO-OFICIAL-2025.pdf>
- Postero, N. (2017): *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Quiroga, M.S.; Pacheco, H., & Rios, P. (2025): *Del desencuentro a la crisis: Conflictividad política en Bolivia*. La Paz: Fundación UNIR Bolivia.
- Salazar Lohman, H. (2024, April 19): «The Bolivian Crisis and the Downfall of an Unsustainable Economic Model». *Rosalux Netpicks*. Available at: <https://www.rosalux.org.ec/en/the-bolivian-crisis-and-the-downfall-of-an-unsustainable-economic-model>
- Stefanoni, P., & Do Alto, H. (2006): *Evo Morales de la coca al Palacio. Una oportunidad para la izquierda indígena*. La Paz: Malatesta.
- Stefanoni, P., & Velásquez, D. (2025): «El MAS boliviano: ¿un colapso sin pena ni gloria?» *Nueva Sociedad*, 319: 4-16.
- TCP (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional) (May 14, 2025): «Sentencia histórica del TCP cierra toda posibilidad de elección continua o discontinua para presidente o vicepresidente». Available at: <https://tcpbolivia.bo/2025/05/14/sentencia-historica-del-tcp-cierra-toda-posibilidad-de-eleccion-continua-o-discontinua-para-presidente-o-vicepresidente/>
- Wolff, J. (2018): «Political Incorporation in Measures of Democracy: A Missing Dimension (and the Case of Bolivia)». *Democratization*, 25(4): 692-708. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1417392>
- Wolff, J. (2020): «The turbulent end of an era in Bolivia: Contested elections, the ouster of Evo Morales, and the beginning of a transition towards an uncertain future». *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 40(2): 163-186. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2020005000105>
- Zegada, M.T., & Komadina, J. (2014): *El espejo de la sociedad. Poder y representación en Bolivia*. La Paz: Plural.



©Derechos del autor o autores. Creative Commons License. Este artículo está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0. ©Copyright of the author or authors. Creative Commons License. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.