The Black Sheep: the Revisionist Union and the Zionism of the Interwar Era

La oveja negra: la Unión Revisionista y el sionismo de entreguerras

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Abstract

The early Revisionist movement had a number of specifics that distinguished it from the rest of the contemporary Zionist spectrum as well as from the post-independence Israeli right. Established by a group of Russian-Jewish émigrés, the Revisionist Union considered the post-1922 settlement in Palestine to be a failure. Though focused on Palestine, the activists themselves were usually based in the diaspora and disseminated much of their output in non-Jewish languages. Merciless criticism and mockery of Zionist officialdom were interwoven with practical proposals challenging the settlement methods and showing a preference for private capital initiatives, an urban-based economy and small-scale, export-oriented intensive farming. The activists made no secret of their ultimate goal (i.e. a Jewish majority in the country) and the primacy of the national interest, yet their version of ethnic nationalism included liberal notions and was also inspired by certain progressive reforms that had taken place in post-WWI East Central Europe.

Keywords: Israeli right, Revisionist Zionism, Palestine Mandate, interwar Jewry, Vladimir Jabotinsky.

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Resumen

El movimiento revisionista temprano tenía una serie de características específicas que lo distinguían del resto del espectro sionista contemporáneo, así como de la derecha israelí posterior a la independencia. Fundada por un grupo de emigrados ruso-judíos, la Unión Revisionista consideró que el acuerdo en Palestina posterior a 1922 fue un fracaso. Aunque su máxima aspiración política se concentraba en Palestina, los propios activistas estaban radicados en la diáspora y difundían gran parte de su producción en idiomas no judíos. Las críticas despiadadas a la burocracia sionista se entremezclaron con propuestas que cuestionaban los métodos de asentamiento y mostraban una preferencia por las iniciativas de capital privado, una economía basada en la ciudad y una agricultura intensiva en pequeña escala y orientada a la exportación. Los activistas no ocultaron su objetivo final (es decir, una mayoría judía en Palestina) y la primacía del interés nacional, pero su versión del nacionalismo étnico incluía nociones liberales y también estaba inspirada por ciertas reformas progresistas que habían tenido lugar en Europa Central y Oriental después de la Primera Guerra Mundial.

Palabras-clave: derecha israelí, Sionismo Revisionista, Mandato de Palestina, Judería de entreguerras, Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Introduction

The continuity of succession between Revisionist Zionism and the Israeli right is not linear. The Herut party, established in 1948, originated in para-military groups[1]. The predecessor of today's Likud (1973), it had no direct precursor in any of the Revisionist (pre-war or post-war) political parties. For obvious reasons, the attention of historians has largely been oriented to actors with links to (or a place in) the mindset of the Israeli right, be they radical activists or militaristic groups. The original appeal came to be identified with the personal story of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, seen by Herut's founder and the later prime minister, Menachem Begin, as a mentor to himself[2]. In stricter historical terms, the assimilation of Revisionist Zionism by the post-independence Israeli right is problematic. Among other things, it has blurred the pluralist, polyglot and primarily diasporic character of the (early) Revisionist movement. Until the late 1930s, the activists based in Palestine constituted a vocal yet relatively small minority. The political headquarters of the movement were located in Berlin, Paris and London while the followers resided primarily in Eastern Europe, namely Poland.

The current paper intends to add some balance to the picture by focusing on the formative and least documented phase of the movement's history, associated with its liberal (ethno)nationalist founders and covering a period from approximately the first quarter of the 1920s to the early 1930s. It shows that the ostracism of the (early) Revisionist movement within Zionism had more to do with internal quarrels than any greater humanist concerns of its immediate political foes. The founders of the Revisionist Union (RU) aimed to revise the trend of Jewish settlement from a gradual and small-scale process to a "mass colonization". Though unacceptable to the Palestinian Arabs, the ultimate aim of a Jewish demographic majority was, on its own, not extravagant by Zionist standards. The means of achieving this end were to be political while the finer tones included the notion of agrarian reform, which was supposedly intended to benefit the indigenous peasant population as well. It was the endless chain of mockery, accompanied by counterproposals in the realm of the economy and budget spending, that challenged the RU's Zionist rivals. The paper is divided into three sections. The first is an overview of the key characteristics of Revisionist Zionism during the (entire) interwar era, while the two sections that follow focus mainly on the issues of settlement methods and intercommunal relations, each within a restricted timeframe. These two cases aim to demonstrate that the early Revisionist movement comprised many diverse voices. The various proposals that were made were not always doctrinaire, and Jabotinsky was not the only noteworthy figure. At times, he was not even the most dominant.

The limits of the hard-line microcosm

The modern Jewish settlement in Palestine has been marked by tensions practically since the start. Palestine was not an empty land awaiting resurrection. The issuance of the Palestine Mandate, entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations in 1922 and reiterating the idea of "a national home" for the Jewish people, which had first appeared in the Balfour Declaration (1917), set Jewish-Arab relations on a clear collision course. Unlike in other Mandates, the British were to watch over the interests of a community of European settlers while any political aspirations of the majority population were ignored. The wording of the Mandate could thus be regarded as conflicting with the usual imperial policy of the time[3]. The Jewish settlers differed from the usual European colonists. They were bringing resources into (rather than taking them out of) the country and had no single colonial metropolis to which they could refer[4]. The bulk of the immigrants originated in Eastern and Central Europe, having little connection with the British Empire. Recent scholarship has emphasized that

all of Europe participated in the overseas expansions in one way or another. At least indirectly, via the expats working in the service of the colonizers, through privileged access to goods, knowledge and technologies that capitalized on the expansions or by sharing Eurocentric attitudes. This included Empires with no colonial possessions, such as Austria-Hungary, and even peoples with no history of statehood (before the Great War), like the Finns[5]. Whether they realized it or not, the Jewish settlers were part of a broader story with a bitter taste. Chaim Weizmann, president of the Zionist Organization (ZO) from 1920 to 1946 (except for the years 1931–1935), opted for a strategy that was unreservedly pro-British and toned down the Jewish-Arab strife in public. This did not forestall the Colonial Office (CO) from becoming distrustful of the Zionists with the advent of the 1930s, noting a "contrast between the professions of the Jewish Agency of their anxiety to work harmoniously with the Arabs and the tactlessness of their practice"[6]. If nothing else, the settlement process intensified the social problems. Dislocation of the peasant population took on considerable proportions by the mid-1940s. 70 per cent of the Palestinian Arabs in Jaffa lived in slum conditions; in Haifa, it was over 40 per cent[7].

Established after several years of debate in 1925, the RU (formally the Union of Zionists-Revisionists) was an open opposition bloc. The rejection of the enlarged Jewish Agency (JA) project, based on parity between the Zionists and the non-Zionists, constituted its main rallying point. At the time, the RU did not represent a faction with a distinct ideology along the lines of Labour or the Religious Zionists. It remained part of the mainstream, the General Zionists, until 1929. Electorally, the RU scored its best result in 1931, taking around 21 per cent of the delegates at the Zionist Congress[8]. Among its key figures were former members of the Zionist Executive (ZE), such as Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky and Richard Lichtheim, and a number of Russian-Jewish activists – Julius (Iulii) Brutzkus, Vladimir Tiomkin, Meir Grossman, Josif Schechtman, and Israel Trivus[9]. Later arrivals included the former head of the Radical Zionists in Austria, Robert Stricker and Max Bodenheimer, a close collaborator of Theodor Herzl. The RU was no club of pistoleros, bent on seizing Palestine by force, as some of the reinterpretations by the Israeli right might suggest[10]. The activists' proper involvement in Jewish diaspora politics coincided with brief periods of parliamentary democracy in Eastern Europe. Brutzkus, to mention one case, served as minister for Jewish affairs in the government of Lithuania from 1921 to 1922. The party operated democratically until 1933. The demise of the original body mirrored an internal schism (i.e. the secession from the ZO) that was unrelated to global politics.

Even if we confine our interest to the interwar era, a whole set of actors was associated with Revisionism or could claim its legacy. This included the founders, a group that fell apart in the mid-1930s. Some followed Jabotinsky

to establish the New Zionist Organization (NZO) in 1935, some continued to carry the banner of Revisionism inside the ZO, establishing the Jewish State Party in 1933, and others abandoned politics. Inside the RU, the first open challenge appeared at the turn of the 1920s/30s. Two Palestine-based factions – the radicals, headed by Wolfgang von Weisl, and the maximalists, headed by Abba Achimeir – had emerged. On the external flanks of the Revisionist formation was the Betar youth movement, established independently of the RU in 1923. Inspired by the Polish brand of right-wing nationalism, Betar also posed a generational challenge[11]. Irgun, a para-military force established in 1937 in Palestine, was to have the ultimate say over the Zionist right in the future. Incongruent as it was, the Revisionist movement did not pull in the same direction. The respective personalities, such as Jabotinsky, Begin or Achimeir, did not even share the same worldview[12]. Positioning the movement within the right-wing spectrum is not easy. Spanning four continents, it comprised both supporters of parliamentarianism and proponents of fascism.

The activities of the Betar and the Irgun sidelined the political bodies in the second half of the 1930s. This was not the first time in history that a military wing had hijacked a political movement. The case of the Committee of Union and Progress in the late Ottoman Empire can serve as a good example. The alliance between Jabotinsky, a central yet elusive figure, and the radicals, leaning towards militarism and authoritarianism, seems more puzzling[13]. The absence of any real centre of power played an important role. Moreover, the RU had a large number of distinctly anti-establishment traits from the start. It wanted to introduce a new style of politics, going straight to the public and with a focus on the youth. Disclosing the shortcomings of the Palestine Mandate to everyone, including a non-Jewish audience, was among its aims. Both the ZO and the Mandatory Administration soon identified Revisionism with trouble. The youth interpreted the combative rhetoric in its own way. Overall, the RU was not just any opposition group. It embodied a challenge to the existing way of doing Zionist politics.

As it sought to accommodate newcomers, the RU downgraded some of its early core issues, such as the struggle against "Weizmann regime", in favour of new slogans. The third world conference (1928) could be seen as a turning point, introducing the so-called "national monism". The definition was simple: the attainment of the Jewish majority in Palestine represented "the highest ideal, to which all the other imaginable ideals, regardless whether they are just and pure, are subordinated"[14]. Michael Stanislawski has traced its origins to a crosscurrent in Jabotinsky's thought between Jewish nationalism and the teachings of the Monist philosophical fraternities in pre-WWI Austria[15]. One could also say that the RU elevated the notion of a Jewish majority from a postulate, as it had existed until then, to the status of the supreme ideal. This

outcome had effects on its relations with the Labour movement in particular. Not only individual but also class interests were subordinated to the idea of achieving a majority. Any class tensions were to be solved via compromise and the institution of national arbitration[16]. Gideon Shimoni has summarized the feelings of many when speaking of an "unmistakable imprint of contemporary Fascist corporative models"[17]. Detailed enquiries into the matter were less categorical – all we can say for sure is that Jabotinsky showed an interest in the socio-economic model adopted in Italy[18].

The shift is further evident in the emblematic trademarks of Revisionism – the rejection of the White Paper of 1922 and the idea of the Legion. The (re) inclusion of Transjordan in a territory open to Jewish settlement was supported by the entire Revisionist spectrum. Scholars have earmarked the notion of Greater Israel as the essence of the Zionist/Israeli right throughout its history[19]. The genealogy of the "no" was more complex. The activists had been vocal on the subject of Transjordan since 1923/24, yet the frontal attack against the White Paper of 1922 reached its peak only after the Palestine riots of 1929. Jabotinsky did not list the White Paper among the reasons for his resignation from the ZE in early 1923[20]. By the spring of 1924, the critics described the exclusion of Transjordan as a de facto erection of a "Pale of Settlement" within an entity aiming to become a Jewish state[21]. Following the riots, the RU provided declarations on the subject with increased frequency and virulence. At the world conference in 1930, the White Paper of 1922 was castigated as the onset of an attempt to demolish Zionism and curtail the territory available for settlement[22]. In the press, it was assumed that the ZO had never accepted the document proper, only giving consent to act in accordance with it under certain conditions, something that constituted a vague obligation on its part[23]. The story of "Legionism" followed a similar trajectory. Jabotinsky presented the idea of the (re)established Jewish Legion with relatively simple reasoning in 1924 – using British soldiers and money for the protection of Jewish interests had created a "great discomfort", both politically and on the practical level. Simultaneously, he repudiated the idea of a home guard operating unlawfully[24]. Jabotinsky thus recommended the reestablishment of the three Jewish battalions that had been dissolved after WWI. These were to be trained and armed by the British, paid and staffed by the Jews, and constitute part of a permanent British garrison. He put their strength at 3,000 men[25]. The notion was an antithesis of the Hagana (the predecessor of today's IDF), a force unrecognized by the British and then affiliated to the Labour movement, as well as of the Irgun, created later as an underground organization. The idea acquired a new dimension in the early 1930s. It came to embody the spirit of the movement, with "Legionism" being described as the "basis" of Revisionism[26]. In his calls to the youth, Jabotinsky, the RU's president, stated it was to represent a pillar

of their training. An "elementary military preparation" of all boys and girls was seen as a precondition of any national education[27]. Grossman and Lichtheim, the RU's vice-presidents, questioned the new trend. Jabotinsky refused to give up uniforms and parades for the sake of disgust with Hitlerism, as he put it privately[28]. Speaking on the subject in public, Jabotinsky assumed the RU had to support the "spirit of armed readiness", but confessed he was unsure how this could be used in any practical sense[29].

The attempts of the RU leaders to defend democracy were neither fully successful nor entirely convincing. The world conference in 1932 became a scene of bitter infighting. Referring to Oswald Mosley, Achimeir declared that democracy was an ideal that was finished and "bankrupt". He called for the enthronization of a dictatorial model instead: "I am bringing you a new form, free of principles and free of party pressure. I am bringing you a unity in the fight, which shall save us […] the principle of a Führer"[30]. Jabotinsky rejected the institution of any "Führerschaft". He did not fail to deliver a personal blow to Achimeir: "Tell the youth under your influence […] that I shall not walk alongside it and do not want to have anything in common with it. I believe in a higher principle and consider you to be a petty man"[31]. Grossman accused Achimeir of spreading "nihilist ideas". Such phantasms had little in common with reality: "We cannot have a Duce, because we have no Italy. If your leader sends 200 letters, he will get 25 replies"[32]. Stricker asked the radical factions to leave the party altogether: "We are democrats, we cannot be adherents of dictatorship, who take Hitler, Mussolini or Lenin for their model"[33]. Overall, however, the existence of fascist tendencies in the midst of the Revisionists was taken for a fact. In March 1933, less than a year later, Jabotinsky "dissolved" the RU's executive due to its refusal to back secession from the ZO.

Much of the later controversy is due to one often-neglected aspect – Jabotinsky and most of his peers were dissident émigrés who made their living as publicists. They were not full-time politicians, diplomats or academics. Jabotinsky had no effective control over his admirers. Less than two years after the party's creation, the central office had to be transferred from Paris to Berlin as personal frictions "would have made any normal work impossible"[34]. Even the top party organs were sometimes unable to convene as few members showed up; the rest were sick, out of reach or felt offended[35]. The founders, including Jabotinsky, faced growing criticism at major political venues from 1930 onwards. Resignations were on the rise. According to observers, the RU had divided into three mutually antagonistic currents by 1932 – a group around Jabotinsky, a group around Grossman and Lichtheim, and the extremists from Palestine[36]. The state of the party's finances was described as "scary"[37]. For a movement seen by many as an emulation of the European radical right, it is astonishing how little discipline its supporters showed when it came to

donations. Jabotinsky pleaded desperately (1930): "To every member of the Union who reads this, or hears this read out, I say, pointing my finger at him or her: 'I mean you. Not just the Union at large, but you'"[38]. Out of around 1,000 application forms dispatched afterwards, 80 were returned and just 30 individuals began paying the membership fees[39]. Privately, he estimated that about one per cent of RU members contributed to the party coffers while 90 per cent could afford to do so[40]. In Poland, Jabotinsky attracted a mass audience. Police assistance was often required to handle the crowds. Though he was nominally in charge of the Betar and the Irgun, it remains uncertain if he played any direct role in the negotiations with the Polish authorities regarding the acquisition of arms (1938/39). It is quite likely that he was left in the dark about the training of the officer corps in the Carpathians (1939)[41]. The insurrection in Palestine (1936–1939), marked by terrorist attacks on both sides of the Arab-Jewish divide, revealed the imaginary character of his command. His conduct convinced neither the British nor the hotheads. Jabotinsky's English contacts were assured that he "hates these indiscriminate bombings of women and children" while their perpetrators were being eulogized by the Revisionist propaganda as martyrs[42].

The inward-looking challenge

Like any opposition group, the RU criticised those in power. Unlike many others, it refined criticism to the state of perfection – a first-rate blend of sarcasm, mockery and insight. Its immediate Zionist foes took the lion's share of its invective, particularly in the 1920s. The term "crisis" was ever-present. The "leading circles" of the ZO had been "unable either to work out a systematic plan or to appropriately head the Jewish pioneer's initiative", stated the critics in 1925[43]. "Weizmann and his Executive do not know after 12 years in power whether it is possible to settle 50,000 Jewish families without harmful consequences to the Arabs", they mused in 1929[44]. Given the current tempo of progress, it would take 10,000 years to settle Palestine by the Jews, they joked in 1932[45]. Overall, the RU perceived contemporary settlement as a failure. While Jewish labour and Jewish capital had been used, it was not a Jewish Palestine but a new English colony that was being built, the critics argued[46]. This critique was not without foundation. As Henry Laurens has pointed out, the relative calm of the 1920s could not conceal the fact that the progress of the national home had been slower than that of other European settlements, such as the French in the Maghreb or the British in East Africa[47]. In the years 1927–1930, the share of Jews in the population of Palestine was in decline.

Broadly speaking, the RU accused the ZO of having betrayed the Herzlian legacy. In its terms, the organization was permeated by "the mentality of the enemies of political Zionism", characteristic of "the Jews of the old ghetto"[48]. It was the political settlement which mattered the most and which could never be replaced by social engineering or a cultural agenda alone. The critique did not exclude an affirmative set of counterproposals, however. These may not make for the most exciting reading from a contemporary perspective, but to their immediate rivals, the proposals in the realm of the economy, settlement and budget spending sounded like a declaration of war. As Lilly Weissbrod has noted, the struggle between the Revisionists and Labour actually started as a clash over the redistribution of finances[49]. It was Trivus who introduced the idea of combining political aims with the principles of the capitalist economy. To summarize, he suggested a reorientation from public spending towards creating better conditions that would enable profitability and stimulate development. The Jewish economy in Palestine had to be erected on two pillars: competitiveness with other markets and production based on economic models that had been tested in developed countries.

The first shots against the economic policy based on subsidies, voluntarism and self-sacrifice were fired during the first quarter of 1922. These were developed in greater detail between the years 1924 and 1928. In the article "Our bank", published in May 1922, Trivus introduced the idea of transforming the ZO's financial arm, the Jewish Colonization Trust (JCT). According to Trivus, the JCT had to open branches in all the major centres of commerce and float its stocks on the stock exchange. The ultimate aim was to turn the bank from a plain and static cash holder into a promoter of all major financial, construction and economic activity in Palestine[50]. The initial idea was developed in March 1924 in the article "The financial system", which covered four sheets. In essence, the JCT was to serve as an investment bank. It was to be transferred into a central managing and consulting institution whose aims consisted of surveying and analysing the economic potential of Palestine and promoting capital investment which might have otherwise headed elsewhere. Its stock options were to be made available on all the major markets and its shares were to be designed to circulate as currency in Palestine. The launch of a wide range of JCT branches followed the logic of establishing liaisons between Palestine and Jewish financial centres in the diaspora, interconnecting Palestine with the entire capitalist world[51]. An additional element of the transformation was the so-called national loan. Trivus pointed out that no colonization had succeeded in the past without the support of international capital. The loan was to be grounded in a set of international agreements with financial markets where diaspora Jews were present. The legal guarantees were to be assumed by a group of (unspecified) governments and the League of Nations, while the

financial ones were up to the Zionists. The size of the loan could be determined based on the value of property owned by the Zionists, mused Trivus[52].

The above went hand in hand with the challenge to the prevailing economic paradigm of the Jewish settlement. The emphasis upon the due place of commerce, crafts and the urban economy appeared quite early on. These clashed not only with the policies of Zionist officialdom but also with the network of Labour-affiliated enterprises, its (then primarily) rural power-base and the value system. As was characteristic of their political style, the critics minced no words on this occasion. As Brutzkus stated bluntly in 1922, using public money to meet the "proletarian needs of the communes" was equal to bankruptcy[53]. In the article "Our economic demands", published in March 1924, he further asserted that the commercial talent of the Jews could transform Palestine into the trading hub of the entire Near East[54]. Trivus elaborated on the idea, advocating for commerce over social experiments in the article "Our centre", published in April 1924. Overall, he criticized the privileged position of labour and everything it stood for: "This one-sided colonization policy, based solely upon the interests of the workers' groups, is profoundly wrong and pernicious"[55]. "In the class sense we have no workers, but artisans", argued Trivus further. Emphasizing the role of the "merchant estate" in industrialization, he then envisioned turning Palestine into a centre of small and light industry for the entire region[56]. In an article aptly entitled "The forgotten", he further claimed that nothing was being done to promote the artisans' cause[57]. Brutzkus voiced similar arguments, accentuating the untapped economic and demographic potential of urban development[58]. The above views resonated in demands related to the ZO's budget. At the world conference in 1926, Grossman asserted that the existing budget was destined for "communist experiments" the Zionists could not afford. Instead, he suggested allocating more than half of the annual budget to the augmentation of the liquidity of the JCT and the support of Palestinian exports. He then lambasted the subsidies allocated to healthcare, culture, education and religious institutions[59].

In the spring of 1927, Trivus launched a frontal assault in the article "The crisis of colonization", divided into two parts. The Zionists were accused of introducing "phantasm-like projects" that had little connection with reality. He assumed that the movement had to choose between two alternatives: an individualist economy or a collectivist one. Attempts to fuse both systems had had no parallel in colonization as undertaken by any other nation[60]. Jewish workers could indeed demand a higher salary, but only once the value of their production was higher than that of non-Jews, concluded Trivus[61]. Within the ranks of the RU, such hard reckoning with the collectivist economy was not accepted unreservedly. His speech at the world conference in 1925 led to a stormy reaction on the part of many delegates[62]. In May 1927, Schechtman

disqualified the earlier affront as "incorrect, unjust and unnecessary". According to Schechtman, Trivus blamed the workers for all the "sins" which had been perpetrated by the officialdom, turning them into the prime culprit of the economic malaise in Palestine. "The capital, in itself, is not the [only] salvation and the attack upon the Labour movement and its 'economic illusions' is wrong", asserted Schechtman. "We are no party of business circles", stressed the RU founder further[63]. It is noteworthy that Jabotinsky himself was non-committal on a number of important issues. Rather than setting the tone of the debate, he mediated between the contending camps, stressing the party's (then) neutrality regarding class and religion. In substance, he castigated the political methods of the Zionist Labour movement, not a set of creeds held by the socialists. In the article "The leftists" (1925), Jabotinsky actually recognized that there had hardly been an alternative to settlement in rural communes in the early 1920s, perceiving the question of whether collectivism was the best economic model or not as "irrelevant"[64]. In the article "The class problems" (1927), he rejected the notion of a minimum wage, but backed the idea of co-funding housing and healthcare for immigrants. The Revisionists, in his view, had no clear preference for either of the two contending economic models[65]. His much acclaimed article "We, the bourgeoisie" (1927) deserves attention precisely for the issues it avoids. Jabotinsky firstly lamented the demise of democracy and liberty in the contemporary world. He then associated his fate with that of the bourgeoisie, defined in the vaguest terms as a class of the "ideologues of individualism"[66]. It was in the early 1930s that the RU's president entered into an unrestrained confrontation with the Zionist left. Be that as it may, the "interim [economic] programme", presented at the world conference in 1928, included the preference for private capital initiatives, the emphasis on profitability, the end of deficit spending, the allocation of credit loans to the settlers and the capitalization of the JCT[67]. One year before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the RU endorsed the idea of raising finance for the Zionist endeavour on the international markets.

The focus on a profound change of paradigms characterized the proposals in the realm of agriculture as well. In sum, the idea hovered around the notion of small-scale intensive farming and the preference for export-oriented produce with high added value. The main argument, supported by statistics from some European countries, assumed that small and medium-sized farms were more effective, generating more employment opportunities and higher yields[68]. The debate got into full swing once Selig Evgenii Soskin, a renowned Zionist agronomist, enlarged the ranks of the RU. Regarding the new methods of farming, Soskin emphasized the importance of the climate and irrigation. The list of innovations contested practically all the policies pursued by the official agencies. Soskin stressed the need to focus on the cultivation of precious

commodities destined for export, which, due to a favourable climate, tended to grow faster in Palestine than in Europe. The cultivation of cheap cereals, cattle breeding and dairy production supported by the system of extensive farming, all of which had characterized the rural economy of Jewish Palestine thus far, were dismissed as useless. Soskin recommended setting up fruit orchards, vegetables groves and poultry breeding instead[69]. He further suggested that the Zionists should follow the example of California, a region with expensive land and high labour costs. Excellent examples of intensive farming utilizing the beneficial conditions of particular climates could also be found in China, Japan and Korea[70]. The world conference in 1928 represented a natural outcome of the above. Soskin openly challenged Shlomo Kaplanski, Labour's political expert in the field. In brief, the focus on mixed farming on large tracts of land was, according to Soskin, "meaningless" given the subtropical climate and the high standard of living the European settlers had been accustomed to. It made no sense to enlarge the existing parcels when the return on investment had not improved. The cultivation of fruits, vegetables and "special plants", such as wine, almonds and bananas was the only way to assure profitability and increase the number of small farms and settlers, with around a third of the farms to be set on irrigated land. Ultimately, he repeatedly warned against an excessive focus on oranges, Palestine's key export commodity[71]. The above had implications in the realm of settlement policies. According to the pre-war calculations of Arthur Ruppin, a key figure in the land acquisitions in Palestine, agriculture could absorb up to 80 per cent of the Jewish workforce[72]. Soskin estimated that about a third of the workforce was to be engaged in agriculture, whereas the remaining two thirds would work in "urban professions"[73]. Zionist agencies invested massively in the "conquest of land" in the Emek region and the Galilee while Soskin recommended a detour towards the coastal region instead[74].

History has vindicated the critics to some extent. The Jewish economy in Palestine suffered a major meltdown in 1926/1927, forcing the ZO to approach the British for a one-time bailout. The expansion of irrigation and the cultivation of vegetables made headway in the 1930s. The area covered by citrus groves rose tenfold during the interwar era, yet the export price of the commodity decreased by a half[75]. Once Jewish migrants started to flow to Palestine en masse, they showed a clear preference for the cities. This does not imply that the critics were immune to wishful thinking. The national loan can serve as a case in point. According to Michael Cohen, the idea of a British guarantee of any such loan was rejected by "an across-the-board consensus among all the officials in the relevant government departments"[76]. Trivus' scheme relied on the support of international Jewish capital. What made him think that big Jewish investors, most of whom had been opposed to Zionism, could have had

any serious interest? In any case, the criticism of the Zionist project made the RU many enemies. After the Revisionists departed from the ZO in the next decade, the disinheritance from the Zionist family was complete.

Confronting the outside world

The Revisionist motto of Jewish Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River has retained its spell over generations. Most of the softer aspects have not. In substance, the RU repudiated the tactics of gradual penetration, which were seen as being associated with a political and legal vacuum. The founders of the RU sought an arrangement backed (ideally) by the British, supported by international (i.e. Western/European) public opinion and based upon the rule of law. Majority status was to be achieved by mass immigration of Jews and not via the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs. Like many before them, the founders claimed that the indigenous population had something to gain from unlimited Jewish migration. Unlike most, they came up with a concrete list of rights and benefits. Their models for advancing the Jewish settlement originated in (post-WWI) Eastern Europe and not in the overseas colonies.

As one may expect, the contemporary state of Zionist-British relations did not go down well with the critics. Weizmann and his allies were in turns accused of "innate defeatism", "political impotence" and "passivity at all levels". To use a favourite expression of the Russian-speaking activists, the ZO was afraid "to whistle up a bear from his lair". Moreover, the critics accused the ZO of having failed to employ modern communication methods, sway public opinion and use the power of the press. They did not intend to end the British presence in Palestine but to transform it. After all, it was assumed that a Jewish Palestine was "in the interest of the [British] Empire and humanity alike"[77]. The results of the eventual campaign were mixed, to say the least. For much of the 1920s, the RU's declarations of "loyalty" towards Britain went together with criticism of the Administration in Palestine. The distinction between an abstract ideal of the British people and imperial officialdom continued to be part of Jabotinsky's mindset for the rest of the interwar era. The RU was always ready to remind the authorities of the text of the Mandate. As Grossman put it in 1925, Britain's obligations did not oblige it to act as an impartial arbiter but to become an active participant[78]. The activists even expected the ZO to have a say in the selection of the High Commissioner and the appointment of officials[79].

At the world conference in 1928, the RU endorsed the notion of Jewish Palestine as the so-called Seventh Dominion of the British Empire. The terms were obvious: self-administration was to be in the hands of the Jews while the British would retain the upper hand in the areas of foreign affairs and defence.

Jabotinsky hailed the notion as a "splendid concept"[80]. Following the riots of 1929, the tone of the declarations changed. The resolutions of the fourth world conference (1930) referred to "the last attempt at unreserved cooperation with the British government".[81] The issue of Zionist-British relations was to reveal the inconsistency of the Revisionist body in the years to come. Jabotinsky continued to stress the idea of common interests. Simultaneously, he warned against exaggerating the potential for opposing the British, suggesting that it was possible to wage a political and legal struggle instead[82]. He did not abandon this course even after establishing the NZO. Other founders thought differently. Schechtman resigned (1932) from the executive in protest, as, in his view, Britain needed to radically alter its attitude or leave Palestine altogether[83]. At conferences, Jabotinsky faced the dismay of delegates over his continued confidence in "the conscience of the civilized world". On the streets of Poland, supporters vandalised British targets. The RU's propaganda machine, operating in different languages and from several centres, disseminated contradictory messages. Jabotinsky himself experienced the effects of a communication strategy aimed at stirring up the public. Following his speech in Tel Aviv on 23 December 1929, Jabotinsky was expelled from Palestine, eventually for good. The CO reclassified him from a "perfectly honest enthusiast" in 1928 to an "explosive person" in 1935[84].

The RU defined the attainment of a Jewish majority as "the first and the ultimate aim of Zionism". Jabotinsky was its foremost promoter, presenting the slogan tirelessly, on countless occasions, to any audience and in any language. As he put it in the article entitled "Majority" (1923), the real aspirations of the Zionists were apparent to the indigenous population, regardless of their social background or level of education[85]. The alternative consisted of creating "one more Jewish minority in an Oriental milieu", leaving the problem of Jewish migration unsettled, as Grossman put it in 1931[86]. To achieve the goal, the activists demanded the introduction of political, legal and fiscal changes favourable to the settlers and they did not hesitate to employ the term "colonization".

The issue of Zionist-Arab relations was not the primary focus of the RU's agenda, however. Opinions among activists varied. Jabotinsky's alliance with extremists had its roots in other motivations. In fact, references to a "historical right" of Jews over the "Land of Israel" were rare in official proclamations. Moreover, they were characteristic of Grossman, not Jabotinsky. The positions of the founders were not set in stone. The case of Schechtman provides a good example. Later in life, Schechtman became an advocate of a population transfer that would lead to the departure of the Palestinian population from the Jewish state. In mid-1922, he saw things in quite a different light. Considering various perspectives shortly after the approval of the Palestine Mandate, Schechtman

urged the Zionist readership to abandon the "psychology of conquerors", calling for "a reasonable and permanent compromise with the Arabs" and "a well-considered and consistent revision of all our maximalist enthusiasms regarding the state"[87]. He expressed his (then) convictions as follows: "Palestine is and shall be a state of both the Jews and the Arabs. We are not striving for its transformation into an exclusively Jewish national homestead; a mono-ethnic Jewish state with a loyally tolerated Arab element […] Palestine shall have as much of a Jewish and Arab character as Switzerland has of a French, German and Italian one"[88].

Jabotinsky revisited the subject of Zionist-Arab relations on several occasions, elaborating some specific elements of the message between the years 1923 and 1931. The central theme was simple – putting the Palestinian Arabs in front of the dire fact of Jewish settlement, backed by a solid political structure and a protective security shield. As Jabotinsky put it bluntly in a letter to Lichtheim in March 1922, sooner or later the Jews would have to be ready to "clear out Palestine or to face a fight". According to his prognosis, "the main struggle" would come once the Jews constituted 30 per cent of the population, aspiring to become a majority[89]. The above did not prevent him from envisaging a bicameral parliament based on universal suffrage for the lower chamber, and the prevalence of Arab-Jewish parity in the security forces and the administration[90]. The article "The iron wall" (1923) has become something of a trademark of Jabotinskian thought and the essence of his political testament. The crude wording and brutal logic have fascinated many, and scholars have been no exception. Ian Lustick set the tone of the debate by describing Jabotinsky's article as "the most enlightening example of how clear-eyed the early Zionist leadership was in its assessment of Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism"[91]. Avi Shlaim used the term "the iron wall" for the title of a book, as a sort of capsule designating the attitudes and rationale behind the Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the Arab world in general[92]. One may rightfully ask if the actual contribution aimed that high. In November 1923, Jabotinsky held no formal position, operating as a "freelance critic of Weizmannism"[93]. The first English translation was published no earlier than 1937[94]. The very article commented on realistic and unrealistic expectations of any Jewish-Arab rapprochement at length, but recommended little direct action.

In sum, the article "On the iron wall: we and the Arabs", as it was entitled, contains four main ideas. First, Jabotinsky rejected the right of the indigenous population "to meddle" in the implementation of the Mandate. The only question was whether the implementation was to be assured by a British, a Jewish or any other armed force (hence the title), as he put it. Second, he asserted there was no "misunderstanding" between the Jews and the Arabs.

Their demands were mutually exclusive. Third, Jabotinsky insisted on speaking in direct terms about true objectives as, to use his words, the local population were neither "woodenheads" nor a "venal stock". They had an identity of their own, centred on Palestine. Fourth, he asserted that the principle of the equality of peoples was universal. "Palestine shall always be inhabited by two peoples […] I am ready to swear on my part, as well as on the part of posterity, that we shall never experiment with expulsion or oppression", declared Jabotinsky on this occasion[95].

The above excluded surrendering the ultimate aim (majority), even for the sake of a bi-national model of the state. As Jabotinsky put it, the European dominance of the time made any such compromise unnecessary[96]. The accent on minority rights was to add some balance to the above. In essence, Jabotinsky emphasized that he would demand for the Arabs of Palestine the same rights he had demanded for the Jews in diaspora. Regarding the future Jewish state, both the Arabs and the Circassians were to enjoy wide-ranging autonomy[97]. Within the orbit of Russian-Jewish intelligentsia, the reference to minority rights was no empty phrase. At the time of the Russian revolution of 1905, the Zionists came up with the so-called Helsingfors (Helsinki) programme. This programme, drafted in December 1906, fitted into the environment created by the October Manifesto (1905), which had limited the scope of imperial despotism. The list of minority rights the activists called for encompassed political representation, self-administration in "all the spheres of national life" and the right to use vernaculars in schools, public life and the courts[98]. Jabotinsky was its key architect; Brutzkus, V. Tiomkin and Trivus were also involved. The issue reappeared after WWI in the context of minority rights in the new nation-states of Eastern Europe. The idea of communal, linguistic and cultural autonomy for the Jews of Eastern Europe acquired backing from the Zionists and (Western) integrationists alike[99]. Jabotinsky's pledges regarding the rights of any presumed non-Jewish minority coincided with a wide-ranging yet short-lived (1919–1926) Jewish autonomy in Lithuania. The eventual stance combined the experience of the revolutionary years of 1905–1907, marked by calls for constitutionalism at one end and (intercommunal) violence at the other, with the ethnic nationalism that had become dominant in Central and Eastern Europe[100].

The main addition to the existing discourse on the part of the founders came with the notion of agrarian reform, addressed by several activists during the years 1924–1927. It was centred on the idea of terminating large land holdings. In April 1924, Schechtman provided the first comprehensive treatment of the subject. He argued that 95 per cent of state-owned land was unsuitable for farming. Demanding its transfer to the settlers would do no good. Moreover, the existing farmland had mostly been occupied by the tenants. The eviction

of these people was, in his view, unthinkable[101]. It was the speculative nature of land ownership which needed to be tackled. Schechtman advocated the introduction of a special tax, equal to a fine, on the ownership of uncultivated soil. The landed property tax was to be levied according to the market value of the land and not the current yield. A progressive system of taxation, targeting the large holdings, was to be applied. Overall, the progressive tax was to force the big landowners to sell their surplus land at reasonable prices to all those who were land-hungry, i.e., both the Jewish colonists and the local peasants, Schechtman assumed[102]. Other founders, such as Brutzkus, Jabotinsky and V. Tiomkin, argued similarly – the existing policy of the tithe was obsolete and had to be replaced by a landed property tax. The purchases pursued by the ZO had only caused prices to skyrocket to unprecedented heights. Trivus supported the argument of a "radical agrarian reform in Palestine" with a survey (1925), divided into four parts. In his view, Palestine was not a space beyond economic reality. The process of agrarian reform had been carried out in 22 countries. The ultimate goal was obvious – putting an end to large land holdings[103]. Trivus based his recommendations on the examination of reforms undertaken in post-WWI Eastern Europe, namely Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Baltic States. Regarding the Czechoslovak case, he stressed the role of the state as a regulator that redistributed land, under firm and precise legal conditions, to new owners via a land fund. The former owners were compensated at fixed rates while small landowners could turn to the state for assistance in acquiring a mortgage[104]. In the case of Romania, he noted that the agrarian reform had directly contributed to a 50 per cent reduction in uncultivated soil[105]. Referring to Lithuania, Trivus tried to demonstrate that the limit on the size of land holdings was necessary and that fixed rates for compensation were being set well below their actual market value[106].

As on other subjects, opinions were not uniform. Regarding the rights of the existing owners, Soskin and V. Tiomkin supported expropriation while Jabotinsky, Schechtman and Trivus preferred compensation. Funding hung in the air as the RU expected the Mandatory to do the job. Interestingly enough, the critics rejected the common policy of evicting the Arab tenants from the land acquired by the Jewish public agencies. As Jabotinsky put it: "In the 20th century, in front of the eyes of the civilized world, it is simply impossible to purchase the land, occupied by a muzhik [peasant], from a big land owner, as if there was no resident whatsoever". Citing the example of a recent land acquisition around Afula, Jabotinsky noted there had been nothing wrong with it from a legal perspective, yet with such jurisprudence the Zionists "would fail in the court of universal opinion in the end"[107]. Pondering agrarian reform, both Trivus and Soskin concurred on the need to get the indigenous peasants onto the side of the settlers. Trivus suggested that the Mandatory would serve as

the agency for land redistribution, enabling payment in long-term instalments, which would be open to both the colonists and the indigenous peasants. The peasants were also to receive the land they had toiled on and possess an unspecified right to "round up" the land to the maximum limit of ownership set by the law. He further reminded his Zionist readership that meeting the just needs of the peasants was in the very interest of the Jewish settlement if it were to succeed: "Material independence is a buttress of moral self-sufficiency. A peasant-fellah [fellakh], gratified by the agrarian reform, will soon be emancipated from the influence of the big land owners and, possibly, will reassess his attitude towards Jewish colonization"[108]. Soskin pointed out that there was an obligation to halt the exploitation and end the ongoing "pillage". As self-proclaimed protectors of the Palestine poor, the Zionists were: "to gain on our side the fellahin [fellakhi] whose interests we are defending […] there is no better way of liberating the Arab masses than by liberating them from the oppression of the land owners"[109]. At the world conference in 1925, the RU restated that: "We shall demand that the land already occupied by a fellah is granted to him"[110].

The common line adopted by the RU leaders following the riots of 1929 and the British policies of the first half of the 1930s was to blame the Mandatory Administration for the contemporary state of intercommunal tensions. As Jabotinsky put it, peace, "based not on mutual love, which is impossible, but on objective factors", could only come after the Administration had fulfilled its obligations[111]. In his two main articles on Zionist-Arab relations – "Peace" (1929) and "A round table with the Arabs" (1931) – the RU's president adhered to the basic line of the 1920s. He did not fail to reinstate the principle of equality: "We all imagine the future arrangement of Jewish Palestine in the following terms: the majority of the citizens will be Jewish, but the equality of all citizens shall not only be guaranteed [by the law] but also put into practice"[112]. This time, the list of minority rights included "a sufficient number of employment opportunities"[113]. Regarding any compromise, Jabotinsky emphasized that their counterparts desired real concessions and not bribes, as Zionist officialdom, nurturing "an abysmal disrespect towards the Arab soul", had imagined. It was impossible to offer anything tangible, such as a halt on immigration or support against the colonial powers[114]. One could well say that Jabotinsky reduced his demands to a single point. As he put it elsewhere, free immigration constituted the ultimate red line. Though a deal with the Arabs was "a good and an inevitable thing" in principle, free immigration was not up for grabs[115]. Lichtheim backed this stance, asserting that establishing "friendly relations" with the locals was necessary, but a political deal was possible only after the national home had become an irreversible fact. Then would come the time to overcome "egoism and chauvinism in our midst"[116].

At the top party meetings, the RU leaders did not speak with one voice. Addressing the world conference in 1930, Jabotinsky reiterated that he was in favour of an agreement with the Arabs if such a compromise did not amount to sacrificing the right to free immigration. The Jews did not desire so much, in his view, as Palestine only constituted one 170th of the Arab territory[117]. Grossman approached the subject differently, retorting that it was the Arab nationalists, and not the Jews, who carried the torch of imperialism, a claim he failed to support with any elaboration. He summoned up the point as follows: "We cannot allow a situation where an Asian administration, an administration of the natives, would rule over a white population, which has not yet reached a position of the colonizer in itself"[118]. According to Bodenheimer's interpretation, presented at the meeting of the RU cadres in 1931, the ultimate goals were to be achieved strictly via peaceful means and without harmful consequences for the existing population. The RU ought to seek the civic, political and religious equality of all the inhabitants of Palestine under the supervision of the League of Nations[119].

One may easily question the rationale behind the RU's proposals. Palestine was controlled by the British. The decisive majority of its population was not Jewish. The RU did not represent Zionism and the Zionists were just one of many actors operating among the Jews. The British authorities were in no mood to sponsor any segment of the Palestine population, whether Arab or Jewish[120]. The Zionists often alleged that there was enough space for everyone in Palestine. The RU, for its part, earmarked Transjordan as the key to solving the land question and economic problems[121]. Jabotinsky mused that there was nothing fantastic about bringing as many as 11 million Jews to the country thereafter[122]. As publicists, the RU founders could apparently afford the frankness prohibited to the official leadership. There was more than bluntness in their claims. The British imperial bureaucracy discovered the importance of the (dis)possession of land only a decade later. It was in 1935 that the Administration decided to abolish the tithe altogether, dividing the land into 16 categories with a property tax reflecting the category of the soil[123]. The proposals rectified some of the pitfalls of the reference models. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the agrarian reform worked largely against the interests of the German minority. The RU aimed (claimed) to gain the Arab peasants on its side. Such assertions appeared not only in its public output but also in documents classified as confidential[124]. In a fashion characteristic of the European settlers, "the Arabs" were seen as a passive object and not as a partner who could say no. There was no shortage of cultural stereotypes, with the local population being labelled as "backward" or "uncivilized". Jabotinsky concluded that Jews were teaching the Arabs hygiene while documents destined for public use did not hide a sense of disgust when describing the ingrained habits of the locals[125]. Still, they were said to be treated like any state recognized minority in Europe.

Conclusion

The RU challenged the official line of the ZO on a plethora of subjects – from the lack of a robust political campaign to the overproduction of oranges. The issues that may seem the most controversial did not necessarily set the RU apart. After having admitted in public that the idea of a national home might not entail a Jewish majority in Palestine, Weizmann was not re-elected as president of the ZO in 1931. The territorial contours of the Jewish settlement were seen as renegotiable by a number of activists, including Weizmann, for much of the 1920s. Following the riots of 1929, Weizmann himself referred to the right to self-defence on the part of the Jews in terms similar to those of the Legion. In an unofficial proposal presented to the CO in 1930, he suggested bolstering the ranks of the police and the Tranjordanian Frontier Force with an additional 2,000 men, 1,300 of whom would be Jewish[126].

After a series of setbacks, the ZO stood on the edge of an abyss at the turn of the 1920s/30s. A counterfactual historian may well ask what the fate of the Zionist endeavour in Palestine would have been had Nazism not ascended to power in Europe. The crisis, which had been predicted by the critics for a long time, transformed the RU from a forum into a force in Zionist (and to a lesser extent Jewish) politics. Yet, it did not escape the aftershocks. The notion of "mass colonization", as conceived in the 1920s, was clinically dead less than a decade later. There was no alternative to an active British (international) involvement and the leaders, with Jabotinsky at their helm, had no viable "plan B". By the second half of the 1930s, Jabotinsky was left with only a rump of his early collaborators and of the initial project. The mass appeal failed to save doomed political initiatives. The NZO lacked personalities. Its founding convention was close to collapse due to the differences between the religious and the secularists[127]. Jabotinsky himself came to channel (and epitomize) the growing frustration of the Jews in Eastern Europe. For future generations of historians, Revisionist Zionism, deprived of its original context and reinterpreted by the Israeli right, would come to resemble a riddle.

Notes:

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2 For one of the first critical treatises on Jabotinsky, see Yaacov Shavit, "Fire and Water: Ze'ev Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement" in *Studies in Zionism*, 4 (1981), pp. 215–236.
3 William M. Mathew, "War-Time Contingency and the Balfour Declaration of 1917: An Improbable Regression" in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 40.2 (2011), pp. 26–28.
4 Derek Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870-1914*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 3.
5 Walter Sauer, "Habsburg Colonial: Austria-Hungary's Role in European Overseas Expansion Reconsidered" in *Austrian Studies*, 20 (2012), pp. 5–23; Raita Merivirta, Leila Koivunen, Timo Särkkä eds., *Finnish Colonial Encounters: From Anti-Imperialism to Cultural Colonialism and Complicity*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
6 "Detailed Comments on a Memorandum by Mr. Leonard Stein, 'The Palestine White Paper of October, 1930'", p. 2, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA) CO 733/183/10.
7 Issa Khalaf, "The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29.1 (1997), p. 102.
8 For a broader framing, see Amir Goldstein, "The Zionist Right: From a Centrifugal to a Centripetal Movement, 1925–1965" [in Colin Shindler ed., *Routledge Handbook on Zionism*, London, Routledge, 2024], pp. 148–163.
9 For a general setting, see Brian Horowitz, *The Russian-Jewish Tradition: Intellectuals, Historians, Revolutionaries*, Boston, Academic Studies Press, 2017.
10 Cf. Yaacov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, 1925–1948*, London, Frank Cass, 1988, pp. 229–230.
11 See in particular Daniel Kupfert Heller, *Jabotinsky's Children. Polish Jews and the Rise of Right-Wing Zionism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2017.
12 For more, see Colin Shindler, *The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 14–31, 88–109, 149–171.
13 On Jabotinsky's ideas and related historiography, see Dmitry Shumsky, *Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2018, pp. 124–171.
14 *Protokoll der III. Weltkonferenz der Union der Zionisten-Revisionisten*, Paris, 1929, p. 48.
15 Michael Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from Nordau to Jabotinsky*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001, pp. 215–216.
16 "Resolutionen der dritten Weltkonferenz der Union der Zionisten-Revisionisten", p. 2, Jabotinsky Institute, Tel Aviv (hereafter JI) G1-4.
17 Gideon Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, Hanover, Brandeis University Press, 1995, p. 254.
18 Vincenzo Pinto, "Between Imago and Res: The Revisionist-Zionist Movement's Relationship with Fascist Italy, 1922–1938" in *Israel Affairs*, 10.3 (2004), p. 94.
19 Ilan Peleg, "Zionist Right and Constructive Realism" in *Israel Studies*, 10.3 (2005), pp. 128–129.
20 "Rezoliutsii V. Zhabotiskogo" [The resolutions of V. Jabotinsky], *Rassviet*, January 28, 1923, p. 12.
21 Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Politicheskaia offensiva" [The political offensive], *Rassviet*, March 2, 1924, p. 4; Ivan Klinov, "Transiordanie" [Transjordan], *Rassviet*, March 9, 1924, pp. 6–7.
22 "Das Referat von M. Grossman 'Rekonstruktion der Zionistischen Politik'", p. 2, JI G2-III/1/7; "Das Referat von V. Jabotinsky 'Die Krise im Zionismus und die Aufgaben der Zionistischen Bewegung'", p. 1, Ibid.
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24 V. Jabotinsky, "Legion" [The legion], *Rassviet*, March 9, 1924, pp. 4–5.
25 V. Jabotinsky, "Legion" [The legion], *Rassviet*, March 16, 1924, p. 5.

26 “Circular Letter”, no. 2/II, September 19, 1930, p. 2, JI G2-1/2.
27 V. Jabotinsky, “Molodiozh gertslevskogo sionizma” [The youth of Herzlian Zionism], *Rassviet*, August 8, 1930, p. 3.
28 Letter from V. Jabotinsky to R. Lichtheim [in German], October 19, 1932, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA) A56/20.
29 “Generaldebatte. Mittwoch den 31. August 1932. Herr Vl. Jabotinsky”, pp. 3–4, JI G2-III/4/7.
30 “Generaldebatte. Dr. Achi Meir”, pp. 1–2, JI G2-III/4/7.
31 “Generaldebatte. Jabotinsky”, pp. 8–9, 11, JI G2-III/4/7.
32 “Grossman beantwortet die Generaldebatte am 30. und 31. August 1932”, p. 13, JI G2-III/4/7.
33 “Generaldebatte. Dienstag, 30. August 1932”, p. 3, JI G2-III/4/7.
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37 Letter from J. Schechtman to M. Grossman [in Russian], November 12, 1928, JI P59-9/108/2.
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63 Josif Schechtman, “Drugoe basta” [The second basta], *Rassviet*, May 29, 1927, pp. 4–5.
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