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In this article, Vittorio Frosini discusses on a theoretical level the unresolved contradictions of any system of representative democracy which identifies sovereign power with the majority vote of an assembly. Such a vote has to be treated as an expression of a consensus, and acquires the status of an unanimous decision, since the minority is committed in advance to accepting the decision as universally binding. The contradictions that arise from this have been evident ever since representative government by majority vote in an assembly was introduced. For example, the danger of a dictatorship of the majority has to be balanced against the equivalent danger of the dictatorship of a minority, if there is a power of veto introduced to protect minority rights. Or there is the case where an assembly is very evenly balanced, so that a small, unrepresentative group can effectively determine outcomes, and in effect usurp the rights of a majority. The article surveys a range of contemporary thinking about such problems, and indicates way in which they might be resolved.
