Acceso usuarios
Umberto Tulli
This article analyses the political debate that developed within the European Economic Community (EEC) about the so-called Dehousse Convention (1960), the first concrete proposal to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage. It argues that both supporters and opponents of the Dehousse Convention justified their stance through a blend of domestic experiences and European aspirations. More precisely, the article argues that the Dehousse Convention was deeply rooted in the model of parliamentary democracy which triumphed in Western Europe after the Second World War and that it aimed at favouring the federal evolution of the community; through the introduction of direct elections it would have been possible to strengthen the European Parliament which, eventually, would have turned the EEC into a federation. To fully understand Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of the Dehousse Convention, this article argues that his hostility to the supranational evolution of the community was strengthened by his long-standing criticism of the limits of parliamentary democracy. These two visions clashed and intertwined, shaping the political evolution of the EEC in the following decades.
