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SUCCESSSES AND FAILURES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) IN THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)

Abstract

International military forces have maintained a continuous presence in Afghanistan since 2001. Led by the United States through the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and together with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), these international military forces created the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) we see today.

The Forces are now indeed cohesive and are capable of stopping insurgency and providing both stability and security, as was shown during the presidential elections in April and June. But they also have very serious deficits which will need to be resolved over the coming years.

Three major events will take place at the end of 2014: ISAF will finalise their activities, NATO will start its Resolute Support mission, and the ANSF will take over complete responsibility for the security of the country, with less and less support from the international community. The time is now ripe, therefore, to analyse the successes and failures of the implementation of the SSR technical model in the ANSF and, more specifically, in the Afghan National Army (ANA), and to look at the challenges they will face during the so-called Transformation Decade (2015-2024).

KeyWords

Afghanistan; Afghan National Security Forces; ANSF; Afghan National Army; ANA; Security; Security Sector Reform; SSR.

MARITIME INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: LESSONS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) IN THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)

I. INTRODUCTION¹

2014 marks a turning point in the history of Afghanistan.

Firstly, the third presidential elections were held to elect a replacement for President Hamid Karzai, in power since the 22 December 2001. The international community was hoping for an institutional renovation that would provide the necessary democratic framework and progressive social and economic development, as well as a situation of wide-reaching security across the whole of the Afghan territory. In addition to this, there were hopes for appropriate diplomatic relations with the international community as a whole in the future.

The ISAF mission² will also be brought to an end and with it, the complete transfer of security competencies to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ISAF mission to support the government will be transformed into the NATO *Resolute*

1 Point 3.2 of this text explains the structure of the ANSF. Of all of its units, only the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been chosen as a study point on the implementation of the SSR theoretical model. The idea is to study the creation, evolution and current effectiveness of the ANA as one of the essential elements of the ANSF, all within the scope of the SSR process in Afghanistan. Reference will, however, be made to other elements of the ANSF (the Afghan Air Force, AAF and the Afghan National Police, ANP) to provide a better understanding of the subject, to compare the different institutions, etc.

2 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a security mission in Afghanistan led by NATO since 2003. It was established by the United Nations Security Council on the 20 December 2001 by Resolution 1386, as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. The main role of ISAF is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces conduct security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces, and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces through mentoring, training and equipping. In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to benefit the Afghan population. Consulted June 2014 under <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>.

*Support*³ mission which will be mainly focused on offering training, advice and support to the ANSF.

The milestones that will now start being met were agreed upon at various NATO Summits, as well as at the International Conference on Afghanistan which took place in Bonn on the 5 December 2011.

The NATO Lisbon Summit (November 2010) and the Chicago Summit (2012)⁴ established that the Afghan government would agree with the countries deploying troops to ISAF on the gradual transfer of security competencies across Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces before the end of 2014.⁵

In addition, the International Afghanistan Conference decided that following the transition process that is now coming to an end, the so-called “Transformation Decade” between 2015 and 2024 would begin. The international community would continue to provide support to the ANSF for training, equipment, financing and development of their capabilities.⁶

The international community has maintained a presence on this territory for 13 years. Over these 13 years, various strategies and formulae for the reconstruction of this failed state have been put into practice. One of these strategies is the implementation of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) theoretical model in the Afghan National Security Forces by the international community, and particularly by the US military forces during the first years.

There have been many successes and failures related to the creation of the ANSF, which has almost 370,000 personnel. Considering that they will play a vital role in providing internal security and stability to Afghanistan as of January 2015, perhaps the time is now ripe for an in-depth study of the ANA model (as one of the fundamental elements of the ANSF), of its structure, capabilities, equipment, financing, training, recruitment, etc. to understand what has worked well and what mistakes have been made in the implementation of the Security Sector Reform model on the ANA.

3 Once the Transformation Decade comes to an end in 2024, the ANSF should be able to assume complete control of security missions in Afghanistan without any support from the international community.

4 Consulted June 2014 under http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.

5 Resolution 2145 adopted by the Security Council (7139th meeting), on 17 March 2014. Consulted June 2014 under <http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/2145%282014%29>.

6 Point 13 of the conclusions from the: The International Afghanistan Conference. Consulted June 2014 under http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf.

2. WHAT DO WE UNDERSTAND BY SECURITY SECTOR REFORM?

Since the end of the war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in December 2001, the participation of the international community has been vital for the reconstruction of the country. Over these past 13 years, there have been numerous meetings at fora, summits and international conferences in order to pool and coordinate the efforts of all of the participating and donor countries. Afghanistan, as the country on the receiving end of the activities discussed at these meetings, has always been present – which has guaranteed their participation in the reconstruction of their state.

One of the most important elements during the reconstruction of a state is the reform of the institutions dealing with security. But how should these structures that are so vital to a new state be created?

As a response to this question, the international community has dealt with the issue of what is called the “Security Sector Reform, SSR” by publishing manuals, holding conferences, fora, etc. and even by creating think tanks specially dedicated to this broad and complex sector.

There is no single definition of what this concept covers or involves. Many institutions, fora, analysts and academics have proposed very differing definitions, while still having certain elements in common, with specific but similar focuses. Let’s have a look at some definitions:

- The United Nations starts off by defining the concept of the security sector as “a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies”.

The United Nations then goes on to define the concept of SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.⁷

- One of the institutions that has made most efforts in defining and developing the concept of SSR is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

⁷ United Nations. “*SSR Perspective*”. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. Security Sector Reform Unit. (New York: UN, 2012). Consulted June 2014 under <http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/pdf/securityreform.pdf>.

Development, OECD.⁸ In 2005 they published a document “Security System Reform and Governance,⁹ that was complemented by a handbook on SSR (OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: supporting security and justice).¹⁰

In the first of the two above-mentioned documents, the OECD starts by stating how it defines the concept of security: “Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing”.

The OECD considers SSR as including all actors, their actions and responsibilities – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework.

- As an example, SSR expert Michael Brozka confirms that the ultimate aim of the security sector reform is to create uniformed and armed professional forces with clearly defined functions. These forces should be subject to strict control – both objective and subjective – by civilian authorities, even at the lowest functional levels.

As is clear from these three definitions, SSR is a very broad concept that incorporates numerous actors related to security (armed forces, police, customs authorities, reserve units, national defence forces, militias, paramilitary units, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards,...) and related to the institutions that manage and supervise the activities of the above-mentioned actors – and all with the aim of providing a state with internal and external security.

When the reconstruction of Afghanistan began in 2002, the international community had very diverse experiences of SSR. There were previous cases of participation in failed states (Yemen 1994, Ghana 2001, Liberia 2003). But up until that point, this concept had never been implemented comprehensively in a state. In Yemen, over just one year, the multidisciplinary team that participated in the SSR developed a

8 The OECD is an organisation made up of 34 countries that aims to promote economic and social welfare, providing fora for discussion where states can share experiences and seek answers to common problems.

9 OECD DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD DAC, 2004). Consulted June 2014 under www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf.

10 OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007). Consulted June 2014 under www.oecd.org/development/in-caf/38406485.pdf.

programme of support to the police and the judiciary; in Ghana, the Ministry of Defence made a request to the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team for assistance in human resources management in the ministry; and in Liberia, the main activity was a process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, as well as control of existing light arms.

In addition to these particular experiences there were two cases of comprehensive reform in failed states even before 2002, which today are considered to be paradigmatic: Kosovo and East Timor. In both cases (dating from 1999), the United Nations took over the direct administration of these states and created from scratch and as a matter of urgency, some of the SSR-related institutions.¹¹

In 2002, at a time when this concept was still unknown¹² in Afghanistan, efforts to implement it began following the International Donors Conference in Geneva (April 2002). It was at this conference that five countries decided to take on the responsibility for each one of the five fundamental pillars of the SSR process: the United States took on military reform; Germany, police reform; Japan, the disarmament, demobilization,

11 The objective was not to create an army: in Timor, some of the members of the militia (FALINTIL), prepared and trained for combat on this territory, were not demobilised. Instead they became part of a small army (light infantry units) capable of controlling the border with West Timor. In Kosovo, members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) became part of a civilian organisation, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), charged with providing assistance in disaster situations (earthquakes, floods). CADY, Jean-Christian, “The United Nations and Security Sector Reform in Kosovo” in Security Sector Reform: Its relevance for conflict prevention, peace building and development. (Geneva: DCAF 2003). Consulted September 2014 under <http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/36008/527233/file/Cady.pdf>.

12 There is much literature available on SSR. If SSR is to be implemented in the armed forces as well as in a state, the OECD’s handbook on SSR (see footnote 10) sets out eight key issues:

1. 1. Developing democratic control over defence policy and the armed forces, including a constitutional and legal framework and civilian oversight and management.
2. 2. Strengthening the process for reviewing security threats and developing the capacity to respond to them.
3. 3. Delineating clear roles and responsibilities with the police for internal security.
4. 4. Introducing integrated approaches to policy development, military expenditure, human resource planning, and management of military assets.
5. 5. Encouraging civil society debate and citizens’ awareness of and engagement with defence reform issues.
6. 6. Promoting reform in training and the career development of military personnel, and career transition and resettlement plans for those leaving the armed forces.
7. 7. Promoting ethnic and social balances and equal opportunity policies in the defence sector.
8. 8. Strengthening regional arrangements for military co-operation.

OECD DAC, “OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice” (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007). Consulted June 2014 under www.oecd.org/development/incaf/38406485.pdf p. 124.

and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR); Italy, judicial reform; and the United Kingdom, counter-narcotics.

Over these past 13 years, there have been many vicissitudes in the SSR process. Without doubt, the ANSF today are professionals, equipped and in full development, but with numerous limitations, as we will see. But they are indeed capable of fighting insurgency within the country.

So, the SSR process has been completed and now is the time to evaluate its current effectiveness.

3. THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)

At present, the ANSF are a novel element in Afghanistan's current governmental structure and are structured in a way that is completely different from any armed structure that the country has seen in the past. The former military structures influenced by the British, Germans and Soviets during the XIX and XX centuries have completely disappeared. The current ANSF design is the result of the implementation of a western-style model of modern armed forces and police forces in a state that is very different from the nations involved in this fourth ANSF "remodelling".

Many factors were taken into account when setting up a stable and sustainable structure for the ANSF (threats they will need to address; ethnic distribution in line with the existing ethnic distribution in the country, making sure not to expressly favour any one group; deployment throughout Afghanistan's territory,...).

Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police Ethnicity⁸

	Pashtun		Tajik		Hazara		Uzbek		Others	
	ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP	ANA	ANP
Officer	42.4%	40%	39.1%	49%	7.9%	5%	4.5%	3%	6.1%	3%
NCO	51.8%	32%	38.2%	55%	9.6%	5%	3.2%	4%	1.5%	4%
Soldier / Patrolman	43.0%	47%	29.2%	35%	11.0%	4%	8.5%	7%	8.2%	7%
Total Force	45.7%	42%	33.3%	42%	10.2%	5%	6.3%	6%	5.8%	6%
National Avg	44%		25%		10%		8%		13%	

NOTE: ANA numbers as of March 2013, ANP as of December 2011.

Box 1: Ethnic distribution in the ANA and ANP.¹³

The desire to create a fit-for-purpose ANSF was so great that even the foreign personnel that trained, formed and financed these units were given training before being deployed and taught the concept of cross-cultural awareness. This inter-cultural

13 Afghanistan Index. Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. Consulted in June 2014 under <http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index>.

awareness-raising goes much further than simply studying what can and cannot be done in Afghanistan. Likewise it goes much further than understanding and respecting Afghan culture so as not to cause problems or misunderstandings between the personnel of the countries of the international community participating in the project and the local population, given the notable differences between the different cultures.

Adequate inter-cultural preparation requires a broad knowledge of the local culture. A descriptive or simplistic perspective (study of the culture) is not sufficient; rather, the dynamics and causes of behaviours, attitudes, emotions among the local population should be studied so as to be able to anticipate future reactions.¹⁴

3.1 Structure of the ANSF

The ANSF¹⁵ include all security forces under the authority of the Ministries of Defence and Interior.

The forces under the authority of the Ministry of Defence are: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF), as well as the Special Mission Wing (SMW).

The four pillars of the Afghan National Police (ANP) fall under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. These four pillars are the following:

- The Afghan Border Police (ABP);
- The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), with responsibilities in urban areas;
- The Afghan Uniform Police (AUP); which includes the community police, the traffic police and fire-fighters;
- The Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), which includes the anti-narcotics police, the anti-terrorism police and the Department of Criminal Investigation.

¹⁴ For further study of the concept of “Cross-Cultural Awareness”, see Cross-Cultural Awareness Analytical Concept, Objective 4.3 of Multinational Experiment 6. Consulted September 2014 under http://mne.oslo.mil.no:8080/Multinatio/MNE6produkt/43CrossCul/file/4.3%20Cross%20Cultural%20Awareness%20Analytical%20Concept_third%20draft.pdf.

¹⁵ Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces. CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies. P. II. Consulted October 2014 <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of%20the%20ANSF.pdf>.

In addition to these four pillars, there is also the General Directorate of Police Special Unit (GDPSU), its three National Units and 19 Provincial Units.

Also under the Ministry of the Interior are:

- the Afghan Local Police (with almost 24,000 members in October 2013¹⁶) - a kind of grouping of local militias, resulting from a bilateral programme between the United States and Afghanistan, financed by the US. It falls under the responsibility of the MoI as regards its regulation. And
- the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).

Finally, there is also the National Intelligence Agency, called the National Directorate of Security (NDS) which reports directly to the president and is not considered as part of the ANSF for the purposes of this study.

As already explained in note 1, this paper will only study the structure, the material and human resources, and the current effectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as one of the essential elements of the ANSF.

While this paper focuses exclusively on the implementation of the SSR theoretical model in the ANA, reference will at times be made to other bodies, specifically the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). This will allow for a better understanding of the subject, comparison of the institutions, their structures, their material resources, the impact of the number of personnel in one or other institution, etc.

3.2 Creation of the ANSF: CSTC-A AND NTM-A

The creation of the ANSF has followed a complex process: the first initiatives were adopted in the Bonn Agreement (December 2001, Bonn I) and the Petersberg Conference (December 2002, Bonn II). Here, the maximum number of troops (70,000) for the Ministry of Defence (including military and civilian personnel in the Afghan army and air force) was set out, as well as for the police (62,000).

At the Tokyo (January 2002) and Geneva (April 2002) Conferences, the fundamental details of the SSR were defined, and the participating nations adopted responsibility for each one of the five fundamental pillars of the reform of the security sector: the

¹⁶ <http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140514.pdf>.

United States took on military reform; Germany would focus on police reform; Japan would support the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR); Italy took over judicial reform; and the United Kingdom, counter-narcotics.

As regards the ANA, the United States started training the first recruits in the Military Training Centre in Kabul in May 2002. This initial training period lasted 10 weeks and gave rise to the birth of the first kandak (battalion) in July 2002.

Since May 2003, Task Force Phoenix has been responsible for training of the ANA in the areas of leadership, planning, execution of operations, and doctrine.¹⁷

Between 2002 and 2005, very diverse training programmes were implemented. This allowed for the formation of new units in shorter periods of time and thus a greater ability to combat the growing insurgency. The United States was faced with numerous problems (lack of personnel, low quality of human resources, illiteracy, ethnic imbalances, high desertion rate,...) and this prevented them from reaching the maximum quotas fixed for the ANA at the various conferences and summits.

Following the period of basic and advanced individual training, as well as the training of squadron, platoon and company units, in 2004 the United States decided to incorporate US military personnel into the recently created kandaks to provide better training. These teams were called Embedded Training Teams (ETT).

Germany, who had taken charge of training the police, opted for a well-trained police corps to the detriment of accelerated growth in force size.

For the United States, it was incredibly important to address insurgency in a global manner through the joint deployment of the ANA and the police. With this in mind, and taking into account the divergence between the strategies of the two countries, Washington decided to get involved in police training by providing funds and creating a Central Training Centre and seven Regional Training Centres, all of which report to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the US Department of State.

Thus, ANA activities were coordinated through the Office of Military Cooperation Afghanistan (OMC-A), a structure that later became the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A); this Office eventually took on full responsibility for the training of the ANA, as well as cooperating with Germany on police reform.

In April 2006, the OSC-A became the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

17 ARTEAGA, Félix y Carlota GARCÍA ENCINAS, “Las Fuerzas de Seguridad de Afganistán: ¿listas para el relevo?”, Working Document 31/2010 of the Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, September 2010. Consulted July 2014 under <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org>.

The CSTC-A is a multinational military structure that forms part of Operation Enduring Freedom, in which both NATO members and non-Alliance members (New Zealand and Australia) participate. Since 2006, the CSTC-A has been charged with reforming, training and equipping the ANSF under the Afghan Ministries of Defence and Interior.

Also in 2006, NATO decided to complement the activities of the American ETTs through the setting-up of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT).

Between 2006 and 2009, insecurity in Afghanistan increased. Despite the increase in the numbers of soldiers and police, huge problems persisted in the creation of the ANA and the police force: low quality of recruits, corruption, loyalty to the ethnic group of origin, low wages, illiteracy, lack of identification from the side of the recruit with governmental structures, lack of resources (vehicles, weapons, transmissions), etc. Added to these problems were unjustified absences, departures and the incapacity to recruit the necessary staff to reach the maximum authorized troop volumes.

2009 was a crucial year in Afghanistan's transformation: President Obama was inaugurated President of the United States and defined a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He appointed General McChrystal Commander of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A).

During the same year at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, Heads of State and Government decided to set up the Nato Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) with the aim of training, advising and providing assistance to the ANSF. In this way, a permanent and capable force would be created that would be able to protect the Afghan population and stop insurgency in Afghanistan. The NTM-A would be in charge of supervising training and equipping of the ANSF Afghan forces, leaving the CSTC-A in charge of the administrative and financial tasks related to the economic funds put up by the US for operations in Afghanistan.

The NTM-A (formed by personnel from the 29 NATO nations and the 6 non-NATO nations) was formally activated on the 21 November 2009 and was located next to CSTC-A in Camp Eggers, Kabul.

Both were supervised by a single command (at the start by Lieutenant General Caldwell); the single command reported directly to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF (since June 2009, General McChrystal).

NTM-A was tasked with two missions:

- taking over previously implemented training and mentoring programmes for the instruction and training of the Afghan armed forces (particularly the ANA) and police, as well as introducing any necessary changes to ensure positive results; and

- advising these institutions so that they would progressively take over leadership of the reform process.

NTM-A consists of two key branches: Operations and Support:

- Operations is split up into five elements, each responsible for one of the following bodies: the army ANA, the police ANP, special operations forces, the air force AAF, and logistical support of operations.
- Support is broken down into three sections: contract management/audit oversight, ANSF financing, and security assistance programmes.

The NTM-A operates in the zones where the ANSF are deployed, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. Training Advisory Groups are deployed, attached to each ISAF Regional Support Command. The Training Advisory Group carries out operations and support activities.

As highlighted above, 2009 was an important year in the reform of the security sector process in Afghanistan, given that command of ISAF and the US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) was held by the same person, General McChrystal. Directly under this command are the NTM-A and the CSTC-A, also both under the authority of one general – Caldwell. For the first time, all efforts undertaken in Afghanistan to promote SSR are coordinated.

3.3 ANSF maximum troop number

The maximum number of personnel that would form the ANSF was set at the Bonn Conference in 2001. The limit was set at 70,000 personnel for the Ministry of Defence (including all military and civilian personnel in the Afghan army and air force) and 62,000 for the police.

In 2008, due to a resurgence in violence, the Afghan government requested an increase of troops to 134,000 for the Army. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved it and established that this limit would be reached by 2014.

There have, however, been further modifications. Currently the established frame of reference is a structure with a total volume of 352,000 members for the whole of the ANSF.

From this total volume, the ANA is allocated 187,000 troops – a number that should have been reached in December 2012; the ANP should have had 157,000 members by February 2013; and finally, the AAF, 8,000 by December 2014.

According to the most recent available data provided by the CSTC-A (March 2014), the ANA has 182,777 personnel, or 98% of the set total (9,236 are civilians,

corresponding to 5% of the ANA total). The ANP has similar figures (98%) with 153,269 members. The AAF, however, only has 85%, or 6,763 members out of the maximum allowed limit¹⁸ (of which 250 are civilians – 3.7%).

By way of summary, the ANSF have a total of 342,809 personnel – 97% of the threshold.¹⁹

3.4 The Afghan National Army (ANA)

As we have seen, the ANA is the key element of the Afghan Ministry of Defence. It comprises a Chief of General Staff and a series of Divisions dedicated to finances, intelligence, public affairs, health, legal assistance, personnel, and strategic communication.

The ANA is led by the Chief of General Staff. The ANA has adopted the general staff system: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics,... and also has a Military Centre for National Coordination, equipped with military command and control capabilities for the follow-up of operations.²⁰

Under the authority of the Chief of General Staff are the Ground Force Command, the Special Operations Command, the logistics, academic and training centres units, and the Mobile Strike Force.

The Ground Force Command is an operational unit with six Army Corps and the 111th Division under its authority. The Army Corps, which began to be established in September 2004, are currently structured in a similar manner to the divisions of western Armed Forces (between 3 and 5 brigades):

- 201st Corps, located in Kabul and comprised of four brigades;
- 203rd Corps, located in Gardez, comprised of four brigades;
- 205th Corps, located in Kandahar, comprised of five brigades;

¹⁸ The CSTC-A data used in this report was taken from the quarterly and annual reports provided by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The figures used here were taken from the report dated 31 March 2014. Consulted June 2014 under www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf.

¹⁹ To achieve 100%, the ANA needs 4,223 soldiers, the ANP 3,731 police officers and the AAF 1,237 soldiers. In total, 9,191 members (3%).

²⁰ Strategy Paper 164, “Afghanistan after ISAF”. Spanish Ministry of Defence, Madrid, 2013, p.118. www.ieee.es.

- 207th Corps, in Herat with three brigades;
- 209th Corps, in Balkh with three brigades; and finally,
- 215th Corps, in Helmand with four brigades.²¹

Division III, comprised of two brigades, is located in Kabul.

ANA STRENGTH		
	Authorized	Assigned
ANA Component	Q1 2014	Q1 2014
201st Corps	18,130	17,489
203rd Corps	20,798	20,029
205th Corps	19,097	17,891
207th Corps	14,879	13,806
209th Corps	15,004	14,554
215th Corps	17,555	16,310
111th Capital Division	9,174	8,921
Special Operations Force	12,149	10,458
Echelons Above Corps ^a	34,866	29,727
TTHS ^b	-	24,356 ^d
Civilians	-	9,236
ANA TOTAL	161,652	182,777
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	6,513
AAF Civilians	-	250
ANA + AAF TOTAL	168,749	189,540

Notes: Q4 2013 data is as of 12/30/2013; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014.
^a Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands
^b Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel
^c Includes 5,010 cadets
^d Includes 4,701 cadets
^e Q4 2013 assigned total includes 10,251 AWOL personnel

Sources: CSTCA, responses to SIGAR data calls, 1/6/2014 and 3/31/2014.

Box 2: Distribution of ANA staff by first level Commands/Units²²

Each brigade is made up of three light infantry battalions (kandak), one combat support battalion (artillery, signals and reconnaissance) and a logistics battalion. Initially the plan was for each kandak to have up to 600 troops; the current figures lie between 250 and 300.

21 The data provided was taken from “Jane’s World Armies. Afghanistan. Updated 20 June 2014”. Consulted July 2014 under <https://janes.ihc.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1319169>.

22 Table drawn up by the author using data available under www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf . p.97

3.5 ANA weaponry

Most weaponry has been donated to the ANA over the years without a suitable programme for its maintenance or supply of spare parts.

The publication *Military Balance 2014*²³ states that the ANA has 673 personnel carriers – 173 M113s and almost 500 MSFVs (*Mobile Strike Force Vehicle*). It also has 214 artillery pieces – 85 122mm D-30s and 24 155mm M114A1s, as well as 105 82mm M-69 mortars.²⁴

There is one mechanised brigade constituted of Soviet T-55 tanks, although their level of operability is unknown.

As regards light weapons,²⁵ the ANA has the Makarov 9mm pistol, the 5.56mm M16 rifle and the 7.62mm AK-47 rifle, and the M-249 SAW machine gun.

To give an example, and also to compare with western air forces, the AAF has 100 aircraft and helicopters, including:

- 2 C-130 aircraft for transport of troops, supplies and cargo; 6 C-182 trainer aircraft; 26 C-208 aircraft for training, troop and supplies transport, and medical evacuation; and 3 PC-12s.
- 6 MD-530 trainer helicopters; 6 Mi-35 close air support and reconnaissance helicopters; 58 Mi-17 helicopters for air attack, troop transport, medical evacuation and supply. These have night flight capabilities.

The AAF has 650 pilots and aircrew out of a planned total of 780; 1,000 maintainers out of the planned 1,370, and 5,200 support and security personnel out of the planned 5,750.²⁶

23 “Military Balance 2014”, International Institute for Strategic Studies. Consulted July 2014 under <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597222.2014.871879> P. 222.

24 Author’s note: there are notable differences regarding the total number of vehicles, cannons, mortars and individual weaponry that currently exist in Afghanistan, depending on the report consulted. For this reason, I have used data from *Military Balance 2014* so as to give an idea of the type of vehicles and crew-served and personal weapons in Afghanistan, and so as to compare this with the weaponry of other armed forces.

25 The Ministry of Defence report to the US Congress of April 2014 stated that more than 202,000 personal weapons had been delivered as of that date.

26 “Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces”, CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, 2014. Consulted July 2014 under <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of%20the%20ANSF.pdf> p. 133.

3.6 ANA infrastructure

There are two main types of infrastructure:

- infrastructure created specifically for the ANA through investments made by donor countries, and
- infrastructure ceded by the international community's military forces following the withdrawal of the international military forces to their countries of origin.

Since 2011, military bases have been built across the whole of Afghanistan with the aim of extending the central government's authority beyond Kabul. In 2012, the number of installations (bases, outposts,...) totalled more than 850.²⁷ In September 2013, ISAF had already transferred 455 installations to the Afghan Government: 248 to the Ministry of Defence, 181 to the Ministry of the Interior, and 26 to other ministries. Many other installations have been closed due to the impossibility of maintaining or using them by the ANA (or the ANSF in general).

3.7 Training in the ANA

Since the first Afghan kandak was created in July 2002, individual and unit training have gone through many changes.

Initially, the training period lasted 10 weeks and covered individual basic and advanced training, as well as platoon unit training.

Between 2002 and 2005, the length of this training period fluctuated between 8 and 10 weeks (during the shorter periods there were more hours of training allowing units with the same formation to be created in less time).

As previously explained, in 2004 training was complemented by the participation of the Embedded Training Teams (ETT) composed of instructors (between 10 and 15) who lived with the unit and assisted with the tactical, logistical, leadership, etc. side of operational planning and execution.

In 2006, NATO established Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) that were similar in function to the ETTs. The activities that the OMLTs carried out were determined by national restrictions imposed upon the instructors by their home nation.

²⁷ "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan", US Department of Defense, 2014. Consulted July 2014 under http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf.

One of the principal objectives of the NTL-A has always been to ensure that the ANSF are able to train their troops without the aid of international military forces. This objective is now almost a reality: 90% of training is led by Afghan personnel with just a small amount of assistance needed in certain areas.

In 2009, the NTM-A decided to build some basic infrastructure to allow for troop basic training and for the training of ANSF officers and non-commissioned officers. At the same time, study programmes were drawn up and Afghan instructors were trained to be able to take over the training of their own armed forces in the near future (the programme was called “train the trainer”). The instructor training process started in December 2011, with 2014 set as the date for the ANSF to be capable of training their personnel without the help of the international community.

Currently, the ANA training process is managed by two main commands: the ANA Training Command (ANATC) and the Afghan National Security University (ANSU).

The ANATC, responsible for the training of Afghan military personnel and for developing doctrine, has a whole range of training centres under it. The Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) is particularly important and it is here that soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, as well as female Afghan military personnel are trained.²⁸

Individual basic training is conducted at the Kabul Military Training Academy or at one of the five Regional Military Training Centres. It is conducted primarily by Afghan personnel in Dari or Pashto, with literacy being a basic requirement. Classes are given on shooting, operations in urban areas, checkpoints, anti-insurgency operations and C-IED. After 12 weeks of theory and practical training, a basic training battalion can train 1,400 new recruits.

Future non-commissioned officers are selected from among the participants who complete the basic training course. These future NCOs then participate in a four week leadership course. Possible officer candidates have to follow a 20 week course.

Upon completion of their respective courses, soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers attend the branch academies or centres that are specialised in other subjects.

²⁸ The following academies and training centres exist in Afghanistan: the Kabul Military Training Academy (KMTC); the branch schools (infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, signal) – centres or academies that teach subjects related to military police, logistics, human resources, financial assistance, legal affairs, cultural affairs, civil and religious affairs. There is also a Regional Military Training Centre (RMTC) in each one of the Army Corps (in Mazar-i-Sharif, Khowst/Gardez, Kandahar, Shorabak and Shindand/Herat).

4. THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND THE START OF THE TRANSFORMATION DECADE

In previous chapters, we have looked at the creation and evolution of the ANSF from its birth with the I Bonn Agreement (2001) to the creation of the NTM-A (NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit 2009).

Another watershed moment in Afghanistan's history is the NATO Lisbon Summit (November 2010) where a transition timetable was established between ISAF and the ANSF. By the end of the transition period, the ANSF should be capable of independently carrying out security missions as expected of a state. This period would run from July 2011 until the end of December 2014.²⁹

Later, at the Chicago Summit (May 2012), an agreement was made to continue providing support to the ANSF over the ten years between 2015 and 2024. This period would be called the "Transformation Decade"; an agreement was also reached regarding the ANSF personnel volume which would be no greater than 228,500 people by 2024. The annual cost was fixed at 4.1 billion dollars, and as of 2015 the Afghan government would have to provide 500 million dollars as an initial contribution to the ANSF budget. This contribution would then increase year-on-year until the total financial burden for the ANSF would be completely taken over by the government of Afghanistan in 2024.


Both NATO summits served to establish, in general terms, the main deadlines for the transfer of security activities from the armed forces of the international community to the ANSF.

At the Kabul Conference (September 2010), the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) was established to evaluate in which provinces, districts or cities the ANSF should start to take over security missions.

Between March 2011 and June 2013, the JANIB established five periods or "tranches" for the gradual transfer of security operations from ISAF to the ANSF (see box below³⁰).

29 Consulted July 2014 under http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.

30 Military Balance 2014. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Consulted July 2014 under <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/04597222.2014.871879> P. 219.



Box 3: Transition of security activities from ISAF to ANSF

Since June 2013, the ANSF have been leading security and combat operations at the national level in Afghanistan. They have proven to be a competent force, capable of providing security to their population, preventing the insurgency from achieving their aims. Although the ANSF have suffered many losses, approximately 400 per month, due to an increase in fighting, and the high levels of fatality in battles,³¹ they do have an image of cohesion and of confidence in themselves, of tactical superiority over the insurgency, and the ability to limit violence in less densely populated areas.

The transition period will come to an end in a few weeks (December 2014) and the Transformation Decade (2015-2024) will begin. The current feeling is that the ANSF have started to effectively take over numerous security missions that would be expected of a state. As of January 2015, there will be a big reduction in the capacities implemented by the international community so that Afghanistan is able to become an autonomous and complete country by the end of the Transformation Decade.

Following the presidential elections and the appointment of a new president, a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) was signed with the United States, as well as a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO.

The BSA, signed on the 30 September, established a maximum of 9,800 US troops on Afghan territory. NATO will also reduce its contingent until it reaches a level of 2,000 troops.

In this way, the statement made by president Obama on the 25 May at Bagram air base, close to the capital Kabul, in front of some of the 32,000 troops stationed there

31 BYRD, William A. "Revisiting Chicago. The Critical Need To Maintain Support For Afghanistan's National Security Forces Post-2014", United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, 05 June 2014. Consulted September 2014 under <http://www.usip.org/publications/revisiting-chicago>.

will be upheld: complete withdrawal of US military forces stationed in Afghanistan by the end of 2016, which will also coincide with the end of Obama's second and final term. President Obama thus showed his desire to withdraw the troops deployed there, as he did in 2011 with the troops in Iraq (it should be noted that US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011 due to the lack of signature of a new SOFA, among other reasons).

This was not the only aim of Obama's visit: the following day, *Memorial Day* was celebrated – a day where the United States remembers the men and women who have fallen in the line of duty, and it was perhaps one of the best moments to approach American troops with whom he did not have a good relationship.

Another aim, and perhaps the most important for Obama, was to obtain the signature of the Bilateral Security Agreement. This BSA set out that 9,800 military personnel would remain in Afghanistan during 2015, to be halved during 2016, with the aim that a few weeks prior to the end of his second term (January 2017) all troops would have been withdrawn (not including usual embassy personnel). In this way, Obama would have brought to an end the US participation in both Iraq and Afghanistan (which has already led to 2,329 American deaths and 19,664³² American casualties).

The signature of this agreement means that US troops will be present in Afghanistan for two more years, and will have a double mission: continuing training Afghan military forces, and participating in anti-terror operations against Al Qaeda.

While some journalists, analysts and politicians imply that President Obama is trying to win votes for the next presidential elections in the United States, it is clear that if a new BSA and SOFA had not been signed, there may have been a rushed withdrawal of US and NATO military forces. This would have led to a difficult situation in Afghanistan seeing as the ANSF are not yet able to act alone without the support of the international community.

5. VIABILITY OF THE ANSF BEYOND JANUARY 2015

Since Karzai announced on the 18 June 2013 that the ANSF would take over combat and security missions, there have been many examples of the capabilities and the professionalism of the ANSF.

Since June 2013, they have successfully executed combat missions, combat support missions, medical evacuations and route-clearing operations. An example is Operation

³² Most casualties occurred between May 2010 (1,000) and April 2014. The number of casualties has tripled in the last four years.

Seemorgh,³³ carried out in July 2013, where the AAF worked together with the ANA on troop transport, resupply, and casualty evacuation. Throughout August and September 2013, operation OQAB³⁴ was carried out with the participation of special forces, ANP personnel and the National Directorate of Security.

Both operations are examples of coordination between land and air forces or between security elements at the highest level, even outside the ANSF structure – something that would have been unthinkable in the past.

Over the past two years, the volume of ANSF activities has increased greatly. They have gone from 329 casualty evacuation missions to 993, the Special Operations Forces have carried out around 1,200 operations, and they have seen more than 1,560 flight hours in combat support operations.

These examples of tactical operations, as well as the volume of activities, are not enough for us to consider the ANA and the AAF as institutions able to act autonomously. They do, however, confirm that the security sector reform process has allowed an institution such as the ANA, that wasn't even in existence at the beginning of 2002, to start developing its missions with low levels of support from the international community.

Conversely, there are numerous reports that flag up deficits, both at the ministerial level as well as in the army and the police:

- For example, the need for better planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition of resources for the ANSF has been detected within the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior
- At the tactical level, a lot of effort still needs to be made as regards:
 - the sustainability of operations,
 - the planning of air operations
 - the execution of close air support,
 - the need for specialised personnel,
 - the need for capabilities for casualty evacuation,
 - C-IED (Counter Improvised Explosive Devices) capabilities,

33 <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/aaf-supports-operation-simorgh-in-logar-afghanistan.html>.

34 Consulted September 2014 under http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/mirror/2006/mirror_35_200611.pdf.

- improvement in logistical support,
- the need for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities.

It has also been noted that most brigades are only capable of reduced length tactical actions – up to 96 hours. The lack of technicians specialised in maintenance and the lack of a suitable logistics system prevent, for example, the resupply of units, meaning that they are unable to act for longer periods.

In conclusion, then, the ANSF have greatly evolved and are now capable of acting independently for short periods. However, they still suffer from a series of vital deficits as compared to the armed forces of western countries.

6. SHORT-TERM CHALLENGES FOR THE ANSF

We have already mentioned some important deficits. Some of these will be resolved when the ANSF are better equipped, with new training programmes (specialists) with greater experience and training, with participation in tactical operations and exercises,...which will allow the ANSF to become a forces that is increasingly better prepared.

We will now analyse some of the peculiarities of the ANSF that will need to be dealt with if the ANSF is to become a modern, well-prepared institution, capable of tackling any type of threat to Afghan national security.

6.1 Ethnic distribution

The international community has always demonstrated a deep commitment to ensuring that the ANSF are an institution that can represent all of the existing ethnicities in Afghanistan (see section 3, box 1). The will to meet with this requirement has been so great that personnel have been recruited from across all regions of the country

The following table shows the ethnic proportions in Afghanistan and in the Afghan National Army (ANA). The percentages are very similar, with a maximum divergence of 5%.

Ethnic group	In the ANA ^(A)	In Afghanistan ^(B)
Pashtun	39%	42%
Tajik	32%	27%
Hazara	11%	9%
Uzbek	10%	9%
Other ethnic groups	8%	13%

A Figures from the CSTC-A, April 2014.

B IEEE Analysis Document 12/2011: Geopolitical Analysis of Afghanistan. April 2011 www.ieee.es/.../DIEEEA12_2011AnalisisGeopoliticoAfghanistan.pdf

The current ethnic problems in the ANA come about when there are notable ethnic discrepancies in a specific job group (officers) which may then become an internal threat to the stability of the ANSF, bearing in mind the existing difficult relations between some ethnic groups. An example would be the number of Tajik officers in the ANA (almost 40%), a figure that is much higher than the ANSF average in 2014 (32%) of the national average in 2011 (27%).

A further example is the existence of areas (and thus the units deployed there) in which the predominant ethnic group is the Pashtun (for example the south-east area of Afghanistan), but in which Pashtun recruitment doesn't even reach 2%. This situation has an influence on the units that make up the Army Corp deployed in the area.

It is a highly complex issue that needs to be dealt with in the most appropriate manner so as to ensure the ANSF does not become destabilised.

6.2 Literacy among personnel

One of the basic requirements for Afghan recruits to the military or police forces is literacy. With more than 11 million illiterate adults in the country, a suitable selection process is difficult to implement (9 out of every 10 Afghan military personnel are considered to be illiterate or are unable to make simple mathematical calculations).

For this reason, from day one, the NTM-A developed various literacy programmes within the ANSF. This is now a mandatory requirement during the basic training period.

Since April 2012, the NTM-A has given literacy classes to almost 120,000 Afghan military personnel in 1,551 schools, with nearly 2,800 Afghan teachers employed. All recruits are required to be able to “identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate,

compute and use printed and written materials associated with varying contexts”,³⁵ which corresponds to Functional Literacy Level 3 as defined by UNESCO.

This project has a budget of almost 200 million dollars. The results as of April 2014 were that 242,120 had achieved level 1 (first grade), 102,155 had basic literacy skills and 82,437 personnel had completed level 3.³⁶

There is, however, a lot still to be done: if all recruits were to complete level 3, non-commissioned officers, officers and general officers would be able to follow further training courses. The ANA needs its personnel to be able to take part in advanced courses such as the staff school, intelligences courses, or material or personnel resources, similar to those in western countries.

6.3 Departures, an element of attrition

We have already looked at the maximum troop volume in the ANSF. Each year in the ANA there is a large number of departures; at the same time, the recruitment system is very demanding, preventing new recruits from entering. In this way, the losses caused by departures lead to a high level of attrition in the ANA that is not made up for by recruitment due to the complex and demanding process.

Departures arise mainly due to combat, expulsion or voluntary desertion of the army.

- between February 2013 and February 2014, 43,887 Afghans were expelled, and
- between March 2012 and February 2014, 2,166 military personnel were killed and 11,804 injured in combat.³⁷

Desertion of the ANA is attributed to, among other reasons: low salaries, separation from family, pressure placed on the family by local militias, not accepting orders from other ethnic groups, rejection of the governmental structure, etc.

While attrition due to reasons mentioned above is great, the demanding recruitment process also considerably affects the number of troops entering service of the ANSF, and thus the total volume of the forces.

The recruitment process should continue to be demanding so as to avoid people being accepted who, due to their situation before entering the ANSF, could create

35 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-supporting-docs/ntm-a.page>.

36 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf p.35.

37 www.sigar.mil/pdf/quaterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf p.97.

internal militias within the ANA upon acquiring a military job. Or to avoid personnel from acquiring a leadership position that doesn't correspond to the military rank they obtained during training.

In addition, efforts are made to limit access to Afghans who could cause internal incidents to the ANA or to the military forces of the international community. There have been many departures due to the phenomenon called "*green on blue*", where, once recruited, a member of the Afghan military forces attacks the commanders and troops of the ANA or of the international military forces.

The demanding recruitment process followed by NATO has 8 steps:

1. Initial identification.
2. Two individuals guarantee/confirm the identity of the recruit.
3. Verification of the information supplied.
4. Criminal check of the individual.
5. Verification of personal documents.
6. Medical test.
7. Drugs test.
8. Biometric data collection (iris scan, fingerprints, weight, height, age).

Once accepted into service, soldiers/commanders are re-verified each time they return from leave or from an unjustified absence. These precautions are part of NATO's Counter-Infiltration Plan to try to reduce the number of "*green on blue*" incidents.

6.4 Female participation in the ANSF

The inclusion of women in the ANSF is clear evidence of the positive evolution of these institutions.

At the end of March 2014, there were 672 women in the ANA and 51 in the AAF, broken down by rank as follows: 244 officers, 260 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 46 enlisted, and 173 cadets (according to figures provided by CSTC-A³⁸)

In the police force, there were 1,743 women (226 officers, 728 NCOs and 789 police officers).

38

Ibidem, p. 101 y 107.

One of the elements defined as part of the SSR is the inclusion of women in the ANSF. The international community has committed itself to ensuring a rate of 10% women in the ANA (the volume set for the police force is 5,000).

These figures have not yet been reached: the 723 women in the ANA and AAF only constitute 0.38% of the total of both military forces; and the 1,743 women in the ANP only constitute 1.13% of the total (bearing in mind that the limit is set at 5,000, they are currently only at 34% of the set quota).

The international community considers female participation so important that a specific budget of 25 million dollars has been set aside with the aim of boosting recruitment, integration, retention, training and treatment of women.

These figures are of great importance, and even more so if we consider the fact that the SSR only started 13 years ago. When compared to the standard in western countries, these numbers are somewhat insignificant; they do, however, constitute an indication of change in a culture that is so radically different to that of the western countries.

6.5 Measuring capabilities effectiveness

Currently, ISAF carries out an evaluation of the ANSF every four months. They evaluate the efficiency of the advising, training and mentoring role carried out by the international armed forces.

To do this, various command support tools have been created to allow for the evaluation of each one of the brigade units.

Initially, the *Capability Milestone (CM) Rating System* was used and was designed to evaluate preparation.

Later, the *Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT)* was put into use, but it was difficult to use and not very efficient; it established five categories/levels (the *Rating Definition Level*) to classify the evaluated units as “independent with advisors, effective with advisors, effective with partners, developing with partners, and established³⁹”.

Currently the *Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR)* is used, which is a much simpler tool allowing evaluation of units in 6 fundamental areas:

- planning and execution of joint operations using combined arms;

39 For details of these five categories or levels, see pages 116 and 117 of Strategy Paper 164: Afghanistan after ISAF. www.icee.es.

- leadership;
- command and control;
- sustainment;
- training and
- departures.

As shown in the following table, as of 31 March 2014,⁴⁰ the ANSF had a total of 17 “fully capable” units and 44 units “capable” of executing the missions assigned to them. Here all of the Army Corps control posts have been included, as has Division III and 23 of the 24 brigades (number 24 had not been evaluated on that occasion).

Figure 21: ANSF RASR Ratings, as of March 2014

Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/ Div HQ	IN Bde	Corps ENG KDK	Corps SIG KDK	Corps/ DIV MI KDK	OCC-R	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP Zone HQ	ANCOP Bde HQ	MSF KDK*	Total RASR Assessed Units
Fully Capable	1	10	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	17
Capable	6	13	3	2	2	6	3	5	2	2	44
Partially Capable	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	9
Developing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	10
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	7	24	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	85

RASR = RC ANSF Status Report; OCC-R = Operational Coordination Center - Regional; MSF = Mobile Strike Force; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police.

* IJC RASR assigns "Awaiting Fielding" status to units who have completed CFC but have not yet graduated from ABS, thus have 3 MSF KDKs waiting. ISAF defines fielding IAW Tashkil 1392 as all units who completed CFC, thus assigns only 2 MSF KDKs "Awaiting Fielding" status.

Box 4: ANSF assessment, as of March 2014.

We can also see that only three units are developing: an engineer battalion, a signal battalion and a Mobile Strike Force.

Once the Transformation Decade starts and the international units withdraw, it will be difficult to continue to carry out these evaluations. There will still be personnel carrying out training, advising and mentoring roles but there will not be a structure to evaluate whether the proposed objectives are being achieved. It should be remembered that the commitment made by the international community to continue financing the ANSF will be kept until 2024 so that the ANSF can achieve complete maturity and not require external support.

The issue that will come up in the future is whether the financing will serve to achieve the objectives proposed in the ANSF, whether it is appropriate to continue

⁴⁰ http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf p.58.

providing funds, or whether the economic support will get lost in the governmental structure.

6.6 The threat from armed groups

When designing the ANSE, it was necessary to bear in mind the threats that they may have to deal with at any future moment.

Across the whole of Afghanistan, there have always been numerous war lords and military leaders with private armies with greater total volumes than the ANA. Up until now, most of them have seemed to support president Karzai,⁴¹ particularly if they also held a government post. But let us not forget that due to their sheer number of personnel, as well as the weapons they have available to them, they should still be considered a latent threat, capable of influencing, destabilising or quashing the ANSE.

The international community has always tried to implement the complex process of “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration” (DDR) in all of the illegal armed groups in the country. It should be remembered that DDR allows for the development of a more stable and effective reform of the security sector.

During the International Donors Conference in Geneva (2002), Japan emerged as the lead country for the implementation of DDR in Afghanistan. Four DDR programmes have been implemented in Afghanistan: the first began in 2003 and was applied initially to existing military forces, the Anti-Taliban Alliance that helped the Coalition overthrow the Taliban in 2001.

In 2005, various programmes were started: the “Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups” (DIAG), followed by the Tahkim-e Sohl programme (Strengthening Peace, started 2005, now completed) and the still active “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme” (APRP).

In March 2006, it was estimated that there were between 1,800 and 2,000 illegal armed groups, composed of around 150,000 individuals. By the end of 2010, 759 illegal armed groups had been dissolved and 54,138 illegal weapons confiscated.⁴²

Despite this, the effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of illegally armed personnel has not been achieved. There are many reasons for this, but

⁴¹ In February 2007, an amnesty for many of those accused of crimes against human rights was signed.

⁴² Jane’s World Armies. Afghanistan. Updated 20 June 2014 Consulted July 2014 under <https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1319169>.

in particular the extremely adverse political context: while there continues to be no peace agreement that includes all parties, offering a complete frame of action to all the illegal armed groups; while the Afghan people continue to have no trust in their political system or in the necessary security measures, these war lords or chiefs of illegal armed groups will be reluctant to accept a DDR programme.⁴³ These war lords do not know whether the ANSF will be capable of providing internal security and stability over the coming years, and for this reason they all prefer to keep large volumes of arms and people at their disposal.

Of all the armed groups in Afghanistan, the Taliban movement should be highlighted as being one of the most important (also known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, particularly during the period when the fundamentalist Taliban seized Kabul in 1996). They recruit in the rural Pashtun areas; one of the most important splits was by the Mahaz-e-Fedayeen group led by Mulá Haji Najibullah.

The second most important group is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and is based in Pakhtunkhwa; the third is the Haqqani network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani.⁴⁴ It is also believed that there are left-overs of Al Qaeda, with much degraded capabilities, in Afghanistan.

6.7 Financing of the ANSF

The funds for Afghanistan's reconstruction are provided, to differing degrees, by numerous donor countries belonging to the international community.

Various donor conferences have taken place to coordinate efforts for the reconstruction of this state. Each state that makes donations decides for which sector or institution their funds should be used.

Two institutions have been created to manage the funds provided by the donor countries:

- The *Afghanistan Security Forces Fund* (ASFF) is a body through which the United States delivers funds to provide the ANSF with equipment, training, financing (salaries and funds for the ANSF's activities), supplies, as well as

43 Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan. Lessons from the past. United States Institute of Peace Peacebrief 168. Consulted September 2014 under www.usip.org.

44 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/256-afghanistan-s-insurgency-after-the-transition.pdf>.

repairs, renovation and construction of infrastructure. On the 31 March 2014, the funds supplied by the United States for the reconstruction of Afghanistan exceeded 103 billion dollars.

- The *NATO ANA Trust Fund* (managed by the CSTC-A) has received donations totalling 885 million dollars from 23 nations.


The 103 billion dollars appropriated by the United States for Afghanistan’s reconstruction have been distributed as follows:

- \$58.84 billion for security
- \$25.96 billion for governance and development
- \$7.55 billion for counternarcotics efforts
- \$2.78 billion for humanitarian aid
- \$8.05 billion for civilian operations⁴⁵


Almost 60% of the United States’ investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan has been dedicated to security. Almost 60 billion dollars is not an inconsiderable sum of money.

Of the 58.84 billion dollars of funds for security, the ANSF has so far received 57.33 billion, distributed between the ANA (\$30.1 billion), the ANP (\$15.4 billion) and detainee operations (\$11.8 billion). Each of these three budget activity groups have been further split into four sub-activity groups: Sustainment, Equipment and Transportation, Infrastructure, Training and Operations (see box below).

**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005-MAR 31, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)**



**ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005-MAR 31, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)**



Note: Numbers have been rounded.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.

45 Consulted July 2014 under www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf p.71.

Box 5: ASFF disbursements for the ANA and ANP

A quick analysis of these figures shows us that about 10% of the total budget for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is used for the sustainment of the Afghan army (ANA) and almost 6% for the sustainment of the Afghan police (ANP), i.e. 30 billion for the ANA and just over 15 billion for the police.

6.8 Corruption


Corruption has to be one of the fundamental elements of any self-respecting study on Afghanistan. It is a global issue that affects governmental structures, be they state, provincial or local structures.

However, here we want to study how corruption affects the ANA and the police without comparing these two institutions to other institutions or structures. Neither will we examine the influence of corruption on the ANA and the ANP according to geographical areas of Afghanistan.

The aim here is merely to briefly analyse the figure below⁴⁶ wherein the police is detailed as being the most corrupt institution in Afghanistan and the ANA as the least corrupt (possibly due to the functions that they each carry out).

46 Consulted July 2014 under <https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Pages/CFCAFGReports.aspx>.

Figure 2. Percent of Adults who Paid at Least One Bribe during the Last Year to the Following Types of Office



Source: UNODC, *Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims, 2010*

Box 6: The most corrupt individuals in Afghanistan.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This text has examined the creation and evolution of the ANSF, their current situation (personnel volume, type and quantity of equipment available, training, infrastructure,...), the main problems they have to deal with in order to evolve into a modern and professional armed forces (balanced ethnic distribution, illiteracy, inclusion of women, corruption, financing,...), as well as the main weaknesses/deficits from which they currently suffer (sustainment of operations, planning of aerial operations, execution of close air support, need for specialised personnel, casualty evacuation capability, C-IED capability, improvements in logistical support, ISR capability,...).

We have been able to observe how the Afghan Army (ANA) has been created following a security sector reform process.

Even though a conceptual theoretical frame on SSR didn't exist in 2002, and neither was there enough real experience of the global implementation of this concept, we can state that between 2002 and 2009 (when the NTM-A was created), the strategies followed both by the United States as well as the other participating countries were the result of national positions and visions, and were followed purely in the interests of the objectives SET OUT by each one of these nations. For the United States, the objective was to endow Afghanistan with military capabilities.

During the Tokyo and Geneva Conferences (both in 2002), the five countries that formalised their will to participate in the security sector reform showed positive interest in helping reconstruct Afghanistan. However, a global strategy was never defined. There was no holistic approach to SSR. There was not even any coordinated planning among the different participating countries to define short-, medium- and long-term objectives.

The initial design of the reform programme was, therefore, incorrect, incomplete, with no coordination between the different countries, and only addressed national criteria. We cannot talk of a true security sector reform process over the years from 2002 to 2009.

2009, however, was a decisive year for Afghanistan. It was the year when the international community introduced a radical change as regards their approach to SSR. There were three decisive events:

- The creation of the NTM-A with the aim of training, advising and assisting the ANSF, and thus creating a capable and permanent force that would be able to protect the Afghan population and deny the insurgency safe haven.
- The appointment of a single Lieutenant General to lead the NTM-A and the CSTC-A, providing a single holistic approach.
- The international conferences in London and Kabul (2010) set out the timeline that would culminate in the phased withdrawal of the international community's military forces. Afghanistan should gradually start to take over all security activities inherent to a modern state. Defining this timeline meant that the government could be made aware of the fact that the international community's troops would be abandoning Afghan territory in five years' time and that the ANSF would be expected to take over the functions.

A lot has been done; but, undoubtedly, the ANSF will continue to need the support of the international community for some time to come.

Nonetheless, it is now time that the lessons learned following the withdrawal of military troops from Iraq be implemented in Afghanistan, avoiding committing similar mistakes. The international community should be vigilant to the repercussions of the withdrawal of US and international community troops during the second semester of 2014. The moment has now come to observe the reactions of the insurgency, the local militias, the Afghan citizens...and to ascertain whether the ANSF are capable of countering these threats.

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